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Hong Kong, a global financial hub, is well-known for being the world's “freest” economy, 
and the least affordable city for housing. The rapid and stable financialization process through 
which Hong Kong was transformed from a light industrial city in the 1970s to a financial hub 
with real estate as the engine of growth since the 1980s was not only a top-down imposition; it 
also relied on securing the consent across the population, albeit temporarily and contingently, 
in a unique context. By piecing academic and non-academic literatures together, this research 
proposes that homeownership and financialization were articulated jointly by the British 
colonial state and the local population from the 1970s to the 1990s into a cultural mechanism 
of hope – House Buying. 
This hope mechanism requires: 1. a self-reliant subject acting through the market, 2. a 
narrative of life-goals that characterize a middle-class way of living; 3. a temporal mapping of 
the future based on the social route of a “housing ladder” from public rental, subsidized 
homeownership to private homeownership, and a social plane with a relatively open 
opportunity structure. The formation of House Buying was part of, and reinforced the 
depoliticization of the local population from the 1970s to the 1990s through producing “hope 





After the 1997 handover, Hong Kong became the Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) under the rule of China. The context changed dramatically, and the hope mechanism 
was seriously challenged. People's individual effort was unable to keep up with the booming 
property market when the housing ladder collapsed, and the objective opportunity structure 
was narrowing. Through conducting focus group interviews among 73 relatively better 
educated young adults, this research finds that the hope mechanism of House Buying is still 
dominant yet with a different formula. These young adults remain self-reliant in the individual 
level, and attach a sense of safety net to homeownership as both a shelter and a financial tool 
to secure their own future. They gain hope through “waiting for the coming crisis” (like SARS 
or terrorist attack) as the connection to the future. The supposedly devastating crisis is now 
domesticated as an excellent homeownership and real estate investment opportunity for being 














The completion of a dissertation always requires a massive amount of material, 
emotional and intellectual supports, and the purpose of Acknowledgements is to reveal these 
otherwise hidden conditions. 
I am very lucky to be supported by many teachers, friends, and family members. My 
supervisor, Lawrence Grossberg, has had a no-nonsense commenting style that can always 
make me stressful, and hence push me further forwards. And I will always remember the fried 
chicken in Mama Dips, and the Chinese buffet in 35 Cafe. Meaghan Morris has faith in my 
abilities, encouraged me to pursue the academic career, and treated me an expensive French 
meal in Wanchai. Donna Chu has been my interlocutor on intellectual and emotional issues 
throughout this long journey from the first day, and has forced me to join parties that rescue 
me from isolation and loneliness. And if my memory is reliable, I drank almost a whole bottle 
of expensive Japanese whisky in one of these parties. I regularly met with Ng Chun-hung and 
Charles Cheung in the Japanese restaurant Oishi around HKU. Ng always advised me with 
caring and inspirational aphorisms like shedding light in the darkness, and Cheung has never 
hesitated to give me a helping hand whenever I was in need. 
The chance of participating in the focus group interviews with Francis Lee, Leung Kai-
chi, Gary Tang, Chan Chi-kit, and Vivien Zhang is key to the completion of this research. I can 
never thank enough for Tang’s invitation, and Lee’s prompt reply and thoughtful comments to 
my preliminary ideas and drafts. Eva Li, Joseph Li, Dennis Leung, Shannon Wong Lerner, and 
Grover Wehman-Brown are my academic comrades. I constantly bombarded Eva Li with rough 





suggestions. I discussed with Joseph Li and Dennis Leung numerous times about the 
framework, and they continued to sort out the findings together with me. Shannon Wong Lerner 
and I have always been supporting each other in our long journey of dissertation writing. And 
Grover Wehman-Brown helped me copyedit this dissertation and unconfused the confusing 
sentences and paragraphs. 
Many friends in Chapel Hill and Hong Kong have helped and stayed with me. Alex 
Chan, Jackie Tang and Kaman Lau hung around with me in Chapel Hill, and spent time together 
in Mint & Basil, Buns, University Mall and South Point. My classmates, Adam Rottinghaus 
and Justin Flores, housed me when I traveled between Hong Kong and Chapel Hill. Wayne 
Erik Rysavy, HyunJoo Mo, Tu Lan, and Jing Jiang drove me to do grocery shopping in Harris 
Teeter, and thus sustained my life in critical moments. In Hong Kong, Daisy Chu, Moffy Lee, 
Kelvin Yau and Kathy Yu are my interlocutors on social and cultural issues, and Alex Leung 
is my long-term gym comrade. Kitty Ho, Sampson Wong and the Alcohol Salon they host also 
gave me a sense of self-worth amid my darkest hour in dissertation writing. Karen Chan, Kim 
Lee and Benny To generously offered me teaching opportunities that secured my living 
expenses and tuition fee. 
My parents trust me unconditionally and have kept their worries about my progress and 
concerns of family expenses only to themselves. I am blessed that we can make ends meet 
during the years of my study. Kim Cheung chooses to stand by me when I was most uncertain 










TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ ix 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Making a Dialogue in the Financialization of Housing and Hope ........................... 8 
1.2 Engaging in Local Discussion ............................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 2 – FINANCIALIZATION AND HOPE: THE CASE OF HONG KONG.. 20 
2.1 Approaches to Financialization and Housing ........................................................ 20 
2.2 Cultural Mechanism of Hope – the Case of Hong Kong ....................................... 30 
2.3 Thinking through Hope – the Social Subject, the Good Life, and Temporal 
Mapping of the Future ................................................................................................. 32 
2.4 House Buying as Hope Mechanism under the Discourse of the Market ............... 37 
2.5 Gloominess in Hong Kong among Young Adults ................................................. 47 
CHAPTER 3 – HISTORICAL FORMATION AND POLITICAL EFFECT OF HOUSE 
BUYING IN HONG KONG (1970S – 1990S)...................................................................... 56 
3.1 The Watershed of Hong Kong – 1966 and 1967 Riots .......................................... 59 
3.2 Three Steps of “Housing Ladder” in Hong Kong .................................................. 64 
3.3 Self-reliance in the Official Discourse ................................................................... 71 





3.5 Financialization of Homeownership – Homeownership as a Good Investment 
Decision ....................................................................................................................... 82 
3.6 Belief in Open Opportunities, Generally-felt Optimism and Hope in the Tunnel 
with Undercurrents of Social Inequality ...................................................................... 90 
CHAPTER 4 – COLLAPSE OF HOUSING LADDER AND NARROWING OF 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN THE STRUGGLED PERIOD ................................. 97 
4.1 Social Policy: Failed Response from the State ...................................................... 99 
4.2 Political: Corporatist State ................................................................................... 105 
4.3 Economic: Deindustrialization and Financialization ........................................... 109 
4.4 Social: Increasing Social Polarization and Narrowing of Opportunity Structure 115 
4.5 Cultural: Emergence of Post-materialist Values and Discourses ........................ 120 
CHAPTER 5 – HOPE THROUGH WAITING FOR THE COMING CRISIS ............ 128 
5.1 Gloominess of Young Adults with Social Awareness ......................................... 133 
5.2 Identifying the Social Factors in Stagnation ........................................................ 137 
5.3 Imagination of a Stagnant Social Plane ............................................................... 139 
5.4 Self-government in Waiting – “Heroism of the Stuck” (the Case of Australia) .. 147 
5.5 The “Coming Crisis”............................................................................................ 150 
5.6 Self-reliance – Buying a House as a Shackle and/or a Safety Net ....................... 157 
5.7 Undercurrents besides House Buying .................................................................. 164 
CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION............................................................................................. 168 
6.1 Passive and Active Hope ..................................................................................... 169 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Hope Mechanism of House Buying (The Formative Period: 1970s - 1990s) .......... 3 
Figure 1.2 Hope Mechanism of House Buying (The Struggle Period: 2010s) .......................... 5 
Figure 2.1 Price Indices for Selected Popular Developments (1992 - 2017) ........................... 53 
Figure 2.2 Median Monthly Employment Earnings of Employed Persons (2001 – 2016) ..... 53 
Figure 2.3 Domestic Households by type of Housing (2015). ................................................ 54 
Figure 3.1 Historical Timeline of Hong Kong before 1967 ..................................................... 59 
Figure 3.2 Historical Timeline of Hong Kong from the 1970s to the 1990s ........................... 61 
Figure 3.3 Private Domestic (1980 – 2003) Price Indices for Selected Popular Developments.
.................................................................................................................................................. 67 
Figure 3.4 Percentage of Households Living in Self-owned Premises (1986 – 2001). ........... 79 
Figure 3.5 Median monthly household income indices for a family of four (1981 - 2001). ... 84 
Figure 3.6 Share of total household expenditure on housing (1981 - 2005). ........................... 84 
Figure 3.7 Gini Coefficient Indicator (1971 – 2001). .............................................................. 95 
Figure 4.1 Historical Timeline of Hong Kong from 1997 to the 2010s .................................. 98 
Figure 4.2 Year-on-year % change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1997 - 2016). ........ 111 
Figure 4.3 Unemployment Rate (%) (1997 – 2017). ............................................................. 112 
Figure 4.4 Gini Coefficient Indicator (1971 – 2016). ............................................................ 115 
Figure 4.5 Number of Persons Engaged by Industry Section (1981 – 1996). ....................... 116 
Figure 4.6 Number of Persons Engaged by Industry Section (2000 – 2017). ....................... 117 
Figure 5.1 Background of Focus Group Interviewees in 2014 and 2016 .............................. 132 







Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Hong Kong is a peculiar case in the financialization of housing. Housing in Hong 
Kong has at least three bizarre characteristics. First, Hong Kong’s private housing prices have 
been exceptionally high. It has been the least affordable private housing market in the world 
since 2010 for eight consecutive years, far surpassing other developed cities, in a one of a 
kind way. Hong Kong’s housing unaffordability ratio was 19.4 in 2017, while the ratios of 
the cities at the second and the third places were “only” around 12 – 13.1 Meanwhile, Hong 
Kong was the second-most unequal city in the world behind New York in terms of income in 
2016.2 Second, despite the skyrocketing housing price, homeownership has been the most 
desirable life goal local population have said they desire to achieve according to many 
surveys and studies throughout the late 2000s and the 2010s.3 Third, Hong Kong has been 
one of the major global financial hubs since the 1980s; it is fueled by a finance-led growth 
regime that is real-estate-centric. This model is different from the Anglo-Saxon model of 
financialization based on capital gains, dividends, interest, and pension income from 
sufficient stocks of property.4 The Hong Kong government, since its early colonial era, which 
                                                 
1 The unaffordability ratio is calculated by dividing the median house price with median pre-tax household 
income. The survey suggests that a region with more than 5.1 is “severely unaffordable”. The ratio of Hong 
Kong in 2017 was 19.4, far surpassed the runner-up and second runner-up cities, Sydney (12.9) and 
Vancouver (12.6). Demographia (2018). “14th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability 
Survey”.  
2 Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2017). “Thematic Report on Household Income Distribution 
in Hong Kong”. P. 9. 
3 HKUPOP (2009) “Back to Basics: a survey on Risk, Protection and Long-term financial planning”, 
Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre (2010) “Research on the Diversity of Youth Aspiration”, HKUPOP 
(2013) “Opinion Survey on Wealth Management and Life Planning of Hong Kong Post 80 & 90 
Generations”, HKUPOP (2014) “Survey on Public Attitude towards Financial Management 2014”, & 
HKUPOP (2015) “Survey on Public Attitude towards Financial Management 2015”. 
4 Haila, A. (2000). “Real Estate in Global Cities: Singapore and Hong Kong as Property States”; Smart, A. 





began in 1842 and after the handover of sovereignty from the British to the Chinese in 1997, 
has carefully managed the land supply. Government revenue has relied heavily on land-
related income.5 Five major real estate conglomerates dominate the private housing market 
and have extended their reach to other businesses that service the operation of daily life, like 
supermarkets, telecommunications, energy and transportation.6 
This research project answers the following questions: Why does and how has 
homeownership occupied the position of the most desirable life goal in Hong Kong society – 
the least affordable private housing market in the world? What are the political effects of the 
desire towards homeownership on the population? How do these effects mitigate and/or 
channel the social discontent that derives from having one of the greatest gaps between rich 
and poor in the world? 
My research proposes that a perspective of hope is key to answer the above questions. 
Understanding homeownership as a hope mechanism, a phenomenon I name House Buying,7 
contributes a cultural and temporal understanding of how the financialization of housing in 
Hong Kong is able to operate amid severe social inequality. Hope, in this research, is 
understood as an accumulation of expectations based on personal efforts, care, attention, 
knowledge, and experience, which is articulated by and mediated through discourses. I use 
the term mechanism to describe the combinations of objective social structures and 
                                                 
A. & Lee, J. (2003b). “Financialization and the Role of Real Estate in Hong Kong’ s Regime of 
Accumulation”. 
5 For instance, 31.9% of the government revenue in 2014 – 2015 came from land-related income. Research 
Office, Legislative Council Secretariat. (7th December 2015). “Fact Sheet: Major sources of government 
revenue”. 
6 Poon, A. (2011). Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong. 





discourses that articulate the socially defined, yet personally internalized, subject positions, 
trajectories, benchmarks, and life goals. 
Society has always been distributing hope through different mechanisms, and House 
Buying is one of the dominant mechanisms in the history of Hong Kong since the 1970s. 
“House Buying” is deliberately used to name this hope mechanism to emphasize the 
inseparable connection between homeownership and real estate investment in the context of 
Hong Kong. While the English language separates “home” and “real estate” into the social 
and economic realms respectively, in Hong Kong’s Cantonese language, people use maai 
(buying) lau (house) to signify the act of acquiring homeownership.8 
 
Figure 1.1 Hope Mechanism of House Buying (The Formative Period: 1970s - 1990s) 
 
House Buying as a hope mechanism connects subject formation, life goals, and 
temporal mapping of the future. This research traced the historical development of House 
Buying, and argues that House Buying was established in Hong Kong during the period of 
the 1970s to the 1990s, and that the discourse among the young adults of Hong Kong has 
                                                 





changed in the 2010s. In the 1970s to the 1990s period, which I call the Formative Period of 
House Buying (as shown in Figure 1.1), the self-reliant subject emerged through articulations 
as evidenced in both the official discourse of the colonial state and the experience of the local 
population. In this period, homeownership became the symbol of the middle-class good life 
and good investment decisions, and were connected through a temporal mapping of the 
future. This temporal mapping combined two elements – a housing path constructed by the 
colonial state as a hierarchical housing ladder with three steps (public rental housing, 
subsidized homeownership and private homeownership), and an imagination of the social 
plane as a structure with open opportunity. This mechanism produced individualization, self-
governing, and hope effects – Hong Kong people believed that their waiting in the housing 
ladder would be temporary, and would eventually pay off in the future. One would enjoy the 
middle-class good life if one was self-reliant, worked hard and invested wisely. 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent economic recession until 2003 
changed the temporal mapping that was central to the above hope mechanism. First, the 
housing ladder collapsed following the HKSAR government’s retreat from active 
participation in the housing market, ending the subsidized homeownership program in 2003.9 
Second, the objective opportunity structure among the local population, especially the new 
comers to the job market, was narrowing even though the economy had steadily recovered 
since 2004. On one hand, the deindustrialization and the expansion of the tertiary sectors 
began in the 1990s and became more drastic in the 2000s. Young adults who had lower 
educational qualifications often end up in the entry level jobs in the retail sectors, and suffer 
                                                 
9 The government officially stated that, it “should withdraw from its role as property developer”. “…Home 
ownership should be a matter for the market with which Government should refrain from competing.” 
Legislative Council, HKSAR. (2003). “A Statement on Housing Policy by Hon. Michael M Y SUEN, GBS, 
JP Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands”. P. 3 & P. 15. 






from job insecurity and temporary contract work.10 On the other hand, polarization has also 
happened among the middle-class. Local professionals, like teachers and doctors, do not 
benefit from the opportunities created from the rapid economic development of China starting 
from 2003.11 These opportunities fall mostly to the high-end, transnational workers in the 
sectors of trade, commerce and finance. 
 
Figure 1.2 Hope Mechanism of House Buying (The Struggle Period: 2010s) 
 
Following the above structural changes, this research discusses the modification in 
House Buying as hope mechanism in the 2010s, which I call the Struggled Period. (See 
Figure 1.2) Scholars have proposed that in the aftermath of the increasing social polarization 
and widening gap between the rich and poor on one hand, and a series of social movement 
since 200312 on the other, Hong Kong has showed signs of the emergence of a stronger civil 
                                                 
10  Lee, K. M. and Law, K. Y. (2014). “Economic Insecurity and Social Protection for Labour: The 
Limitations of Hong Kong’s Adhocism during the Financial Crises”. 
11 Lui, T. L. (2008). “Fear of Falling”. 
12 These movements include the “Hong Kong 1 July Marches” in 2003 and 2004 with approximately 500,000 
protestors in each, “New Preservation Movement” from 2003 to 2008 which is a series of social movements 
aim at preserving the local landmarks and communities, and the Umbrella Movement in 2014 – the largest 





society,13 progressive localism,14 and post-materialism.15 The younger generation has 
especially had much stronger social awareness about social inequality and injustice than the 
older generations.16 Against this backdrop, this research interviewed a total of 73 young 
adults (20s to 30s years old who are relatively better educated) in 12 focus groups during the 
summers of 2014 and 2016. As shown in these discussions, having stronger social awareness 
cannot be taken as rejecting the status quo of commodification and financialization of 
homeownership. House Buying as hope mechanism persisted with a modified formula under 
the discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis”. 
The young adults in these focus groups all shared indications that they had a gloomy 
imagination about the Hong Kong society as a stagnant social plane – “a pool of stagnant 
water”.17 “Stagnation” signifies a condition which a person is not suffering from immediate 
problems, like homelessness or unemployment, but is concerned about the sluggish, if not 
worsening, future direction of the society. Unlike the relatively depoliticized older 
generations, these young adults in general could effectively articulate their personal 
frustrations beyond an existential account. They could connect their discontent with problems 
in the social system, like the collapse of the housing ladder and the collaboration between the 
state and the real estate conglomerates, yet they also shared a strong sense of political 
impotence. 
                                                 
13 Ma, N. (2007). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. 
14 Chen, Y. C. and Szeto, M. M. (2015). “The Forgotten Road of Progressive Localism: New Preservation 
Movement in Hong Kong”. 
15 Lee, F. L. F. and Tang, K. Y. (2013). “Economic Development, Political Change, and the Post-material 
Turn of Hong Kong Young People”. (in Chinese). 
16 Ibid. 
17 “A pool of stagnant water” was a phrase used by one of the interviewees to describe the social plane they 
were situated in. This phrase crystalizes their social imagination, and its meaning will further be elaborated 





As I show in my analysis of their discussions about the issue of homeownership, most 
of the social discontent was not connected to a reflection on the capitalist system in Hong 
Kong, but was channeled into a response to these conditions by being self-reliant through the 
market. Pursuing homeownership in the private market was desirable and seen as a symbol of 
a safety net. Yet, without the housing ladder, waiting for the “coming crisis” became the way 
they hoped to achieve this goal. Especially within the middle-class and the higher-educated 
groups, the young adults were waiting and preparing themselves for the next crisis, like 
SARS,18 a terrorist attack, or the next financial crisis. The supposedly devastating crisis, 
which most people want to avoid, now has become domesticated and welcomed by these 
young adults to be an excellent investment opportunity. These young adults justify this hope 
through waiting for a crisis by referring to the economic opportunities present within a 
historical narrative of the housing market in Hong Kong. To these participants, this economic 
narrative “revealed” that crisis is part of the “normal” economic cycle. It will certainly come, 
and will eventually go. Homeownership, more than being an ordinary good investment 
object, is too “risk-free” to even be called an “investment” in this historical narrative. The fall 
of its price is only temporary, and will be restored in the future. Hence, one should grab the 
opportunity in the coming crisis to achieve homeownership, which has become the taken-for-
granted ultimate destination of one’s savings. People gain hope, no matter how slim and 
distant this hope is, by waiting for the coming crisis, and continue their day-to-day work and 
plan for the future. 
Through the discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis”, House Buying as a hope 
mechanism is modified, and still produces the political effects of individualization and self-
governing amid increasing social inequality. In this discourse, the social system is 
                                                 
18 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in Hong Kong broke out during the Spring of 2003. 





problematic and cannot be changed easily but at least the problems in people’s personal life 
can be solved through using homeownership as the safety net. The image of the home as a 
safety net is contradictory because homeownership cannot enable people to live within a 
shelter and to sell the property as an investment object simultaneously. But, the young adults 
take for granted its wealth accumulation effect in a booming housing market, and reconcile 
this contradiction through possible financial methods like scaling down to a cheaper 
apartment, re-mortgage and reverse mortgage.19 
1.1 Making a Dialogue in the Financialization of Housing and Hope 
This research intervenes into two academic dialogues – the financialization of 
housing, and local housing studies in Hong Kong. The first body of literatures will be further 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Here I only briefly highlight the studies this research has learned from 
and developed into the concept of hope mechanism. 
After the financial crisis in 2008, financialization became a popular topic of scholarly 
inquiry. The micro approach to financialization in the realm of real estate and housing 
concerned the importance of the mortgage and its influence on people’s everyday life, as well 
as the social need of sheltering and home-making. Hope is a shared, yet theoretically 
underdeveloped common theme throughout these analyses. Garcıa-Lamarca and Kaika20 
conduct a historical review to study the trajectory of financialization in Spain as a biopolitical 
process since 1939. Mortgage contracts in this context promised the local population a future 
                                                 
19 Re-mortgage and reverse mortgage will be further discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.6. “Re-mortgage” is 
to take advantage from the inflated housing price through taking loan from the bank, and “reverse mortgage” 
is usually treated as a pension funding. 






with the optimization of income and wealth, yet connected their livelihoods with risk in the 
global capitalism and real-estate speculation. 
Pellandini-Simanyi, Hammer, and Vargha21 discuss the calculative behavior over 
future planning in choosing mortgage plans, and explored the interaction between financial 
knowledge, and the local cultural and social context. They study the promotion of new 
financial knowledge about mortgage loans in the Hungarian context, and find that the state-
subsidized mortgage borrowers were indeed more calculative than the market-based 
mortgage borrowers. The former group made use of their existing cultural framework – the 
knowledge and common-sense learned in the previous socialist state era – to spot and take 
advantage from the loopholes of state policy. 
Lastly, and most related to this research is Allon’s22 study of the subprime mortgage 
borrowers in the US. Allon identify an affective dimension among these borrowers who 
imagined the future, hopefully and anxiously, through using mortgage “as key to the freedom 
of a more secure future”.23 These borrowers shared “a feeling of being propelled into a better 
future, of no time to lose, not even the time to read the fine print of mortgage documents”.24 
Together these studies provide a historical review about how financialization interacts with 
the webs of the local cultural and social contexts with an imagination towards the future. 
My research proposes to understand hope as a mechanism to extend the shared 
element of hope in the above studies. I derive the concept of hope mechanism from Ghassan 
                                                 
21 Pellandini-Simanyi, L. Hammer, F. & Vargha Z. (2015). “The Financialization of Everyday life or the 
Domestication of Finance”. 
22 Allon, F. (2015). “Everyday Leverage, or Leveraging the Everyday”. 






Hage’s discussion25 about hope. In his book, he focuses on the scarcity of hope as the context 
behind the paranoid nationalists in Australia. He proposes that capitalism and the nation-state 
have been distributing hope in a relatively egalitarian way. Having hope to move upward 
socially is the secret to ease the discontent that arises alongside social inequality, and it is 
necessary to uphold the status quo. 
The secret of capitalism is its capacity in hope distribution: This capacity to distribute 
hope (particularly the capitalist-specific dreams of upward social mobility) in the 
midst of massive social inequality has been the secret of the ability of the nation-state 
to provide such an enduring framework for capitalist accumulation.26 
Recent developments in hope studies further enrich our understanding of hope as the 
secret to maintaining social stability by grounding the study of hope in specific social and 
cultural context. Zigon’s study27 of Moscow argues that hope has specific historical and 
religious roots developed in the communist regime. Eggerman and Panter-Brick’s28 study of 
the suffering in Afghanistan shows how the bedrock of their long-lived hope that is evident in 
their cultural values are based on religious belief. Finally, Jansen’s29 recent research of the 
Bosnian and Herzegovinian context connects hope with the belief in returning to “normal 
lives”. 
Methodologically, Jansen30 and Robbins31 both argue for the historicization of and 
attention to how particularized items and goals are arranged in the study of hope. Jansen, in 
his above research, emphasizes that historicization “allows us to foreground contingency by 
                                                 
25 Hage, G. (2003). Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. 
26 Ibid. P. 14. 
27 Zigon, J. (2009). “Hope dies last - Two aspects of hope in contemporary Moscow”. 
28 Eggerman, M. and Panter-Brick, C. (2010). “Suffering, hope, and entrapment: Resilience and cultural 
values in Afghanistan”. 
29 Jansen, F. (2016). “For a Relational, Historical Ethnography of Hope: Indeterminacy and Determination 
in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Meantime”. 
30 Ibid. 





investigating the conditions of existence and possibility of particular instances of hope as 
relational phenomena in particular historical moments”.32 Likewise, Robbins also asks us to 
look at history to identify the grounds of hoping in a given context.33 Instead of asking “what 
can I hope?”, he proposes to ask, “looking at history”, what grounds do I have for hoping? 
“Grounds” in this sense are the conditions of possibility that enable and limit one to look 
forward to the happenings in the future.34 On the “grounds”, he particularly pays attention to 
particularized items and goals. Each item or goal, which lies seemingly within our reach, 
leads us forward one-step-at-a-time. 
In a recent special issue on hope studies in the Journal of History and Anthropology, 
Kleist and Jansen35 list a series of specific questions that the authors in the issue tried to 
answer, and have also inspired my research to trace hope as a mechanism. These questions 
highlighted key terms like “temporal reasonings”, “protracted crisis”, “futures in social 
configurations”, “projects of government”, and “social immobility”, and pointed to a project 
to study hope in the realm of the concrete and empirical, “how are they generated, distributed, 
negotiated, sustained and/or transformed—in other words, how do hopes themselves develop 
over time?”36 
                                                 
32 Jansen, F. (2016). P. 260. 
33 He argues that the perspective of “a religiously-inflected, sacrifical ethics” has been dominated in the 
academic imagination of hope. Robbins, B. (2016). 
34 “The sense of history to which I have been appealing would suggest that there might be grounds for hope 
in the case of global justice or cosmopolitanism because cosmopolitanism can mobilize self-interest on its 
side. The term ‘reform’ suggests only a range of particularized items or goals that lie within reach and 
that also–this is what Clarke says–lead beyond themselves. Hope, like cosmopolitanism, is not an all-or-
nothing proposition.” Ibid. 
35 Kleist, N. and Jansen, S. (2016). “Hope over Time – Crisis, Immobility and Future-Making”. 
36 “Which forms of temporal reasonings can we identify amongst people in situations of protracted crisis? 
How do they engage with futures in social configurations where the future is a fraught notion, or perhaps: 
an even more fraught notion than usually? How are hopes incorporated into projects of government? What 
are the visions and repositories of hope and meaningful futures in situations of outspoken uncertainty and 





This research responds to their call by proposing House Buying as a hope mechanism. 
I read the above literatures and questions as pointing towards a contextualized project to 
tackle social immobility or stagnation as the shared imagination about our social plane in our 
current time across the globe. This sense of stagnation further triggers people to adopt and be 
limited by specific ways and temporal frameworks to make sense of the past, present and 
future. In Moscow and Afghanistan, hope may derive from religious belief, but in Hong 
Kong, hope has a tradition that rests in being self-reliant by utilizing the market,37 with 
property being a good investment object. The strength of thinking of hope as a mechanism 
can help us piece different elements together, and can make sense of its historical trajectory. 
1.2 Engaging in Local Discussion 
Proposing House Buying as a hope mechanism is also a response to a tendency of 
taking culture as the mystical cause of the housing problem in the local literatures in the study 
of homeownership. This tendency is often assumed in the works of the scholars and writers 
who are more critical of the social and land system of Hong Kong. They aim at uncovering 
the truth underlying the housing policy, yet were unable to make sense of people’s 
“subordination” to the social system. The key exemplars are Alice Poon,38 and a series of 
publication by a local think tank, Liber Research Community.39 The series follow the 
political-economy approach and aim at taking the enchantment out of the myth of “little land, 
many people” by uncovering the biased land policy of the government that limits the land 
supply and creates the image of “little land”. 
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Alice Poon’s work “Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong” is the more influential 
one. It is one of the few scholarly works that became a bestseller in Hong Kong when it was 
translated into Chinese in 2010. It has helped the people of Hong Kong recognize the 
influential roles of real estate conglomerates, and hence its analytical framework is worth 
examining. Poon provides a detailed discussion of the political economy of land and housing 
in Hong Kong. Her argument is simple: although Hong Kong has been named as one of the 
freest economies in the world, “she has in reality been restrained from achieving free market 
goals, namely, those of promoting competition and consumers’ interests, of maintaining a 
level playing field in all business sectors and of nurturing fairness and equal opportunities for 
all.”40 Five major conglomerates that are controlled by a few families have a stranglehold on 
“Hong Kong’s economic arteries”.41 They are the major land owners and their influence is not 
limited to property, and extends to many parts of people’s life, including utilities (gas and 
electricity), transportation (public bus service), and food retail (supermarket).42 The 
government’s role, according to her discussion, is a “behind-the-scene director”.43 The 
combination of the land system and the lack of competition laws entrench economic and 
wealth concentration, while the lords derive their financial power from land and its 
overwhelming effect on the remainder of society.44 
Her basic assumption is that land and housing in Hong Kong are a struggle between 
two classes: “the humbler social class (ordinary people) and the lordly class (the large 
conglomerates)”.45 It is a dependent relation, which she describes as similar to feudalism. But 
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there is at least one more class, or a sub-class in this analysis. It is the “locally born and 
educated middle class”.46 She suggests that one major difference between Hong Kong’s 
situation and the feudal regime is that we have “an educated community who has democratic 
aspirations and expects government to play the role of a referee”.47 But earlier in the chapter, 
she is surprised that this class remains “strangely reticent about the growing social injustice 
and the gaping divide that separates the rich from the poor”.48 She is perplexed about why 
“people in Hong Kong are dangerously apathetic about such phenomenon”.49 
This is shared by scholars and critics who are interested in the political economy in 
housing policy. When I went to a conference about housing and rental control in Hong Kong 
in the summer of 2014, I heard similar perplexity. The conference was organized by a local 
university with three speakers: an economist who participated in government’s policy 
making; a professor from the host department whose expertise is on social work and housing 
policy; and a researcher from a concerned group about land and housing issues. The 
discussion revolved around whether rental control should be reintroduced in Hong Kong, 
since its abolition in 2004. During the Q&A section, an old lady from the floor asked, “you 
all agreed that the present housing problem is very serious. So what can we do to change the 
situation?” While the economist left early, both the professor and the researcher responded 
similarly as follows, “unless Hong Kong people change the culture of treating housing as an 
investment, it’s difficult to turn around.” Peculiarly, this perspective of culture was not 
discussed in the conference, yet it was assumed to be the major cause of the housing problem 
in Hong Kong. 
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To answer Poon’s perplexity and understand Hong Kong people’s “apathy” and 
economic culture, this research incorporates local research, local literatures, banking 
pamphlets, and focus group interviews, piecing them together like a jigsaw puzzle50 to map 
the hope mechanism in the 1970s to the 1990s, and its modification in the 2010s. In the local 
research, Lee,51 Chan,52 Koo,53 Cheng54 and Cheung and Ma55 are the pioneers. Lee and Koo 
document the experience and life narratives of homeownership among middle-aged families 
in the late 1990s. Chan outline the government’s “pro-ownership and anti-rental” policy 
articulated with the residual Chinese cultural elements, like the concept of “family house”. 
Cheng, and Cheung and Ma both study the advertisements of homeownership in Hong Kong. 
Cheng discuss the ideological articulation behind the real estate advertisements, and Cheung 
and Ma discuss the role of the government’s policy in producing space as a luxury good by 
assigning the private housing estates with better location and sea view. 
Yet the above researches have not developed a theoretical framework to discuss and 
trace people’s attachment to homeownership. For instance, Cheng’s study shows us a subtle 
reading of the meanings of the text, yet it also underexplores the contradiction between 
people’s awareness of the false and manipulative ideological content in the advertisement, 
and the reasons behind these people’s willing “subordination”. In her ideological framework, 
Cheng proposes that real estate advertisements in Hong Kong served as “a false connection” 
to the homebuyers “between their hopes in the cultural world (that of becoming high-class) 
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and their inadequacies in the material world (their lack of space)”.56 Yet, Cheng also reckons 
that these people indeed realized the advertisements were “unrealistic and manipulating”,57 
but still they were all buying into the dream the advertisements promoted. Cheng at last is 
unable to make sense of the reason behind the phenomenon – “their acknowledgement of 
such manipulation does not seem to prevent them from being manipulated”.58 
Cheng’s case shows that studying only the media text itself and its reception may not 
be adequate. People are not passive recipient of the media content. Indeed, they are social 
agents who are hoping, planning and calculating about homeownership and its cost and 
benefit. The advantage of thinking about House Buying as a hope mechanism is that it gives 
us a full picture that pieces people’s understanding of homeownership, life planning, and 
social circumstances together; giving us a framework to track its change over time. 
Pierre Bourdieu, at the very beginning of his book about the social structures of 
homeownership in the 1980s France, forcefully cited Bertrand Russell to declare his war on 
neoclassical economics, “While economics is about how people make choice, sociology is 
about how they don’t have any choice to make.”59 This research aims at tracing not only the 
social structures, but also the dominant discursive structure through which the young adults 
make sense of their choices and future.60 This research follows a cultural studies perspective 
and “describes how people’s everyday lives are articulated by and with culture. It investigates 
how people are empowered and disempowered by the particular structures and forces that 
organize their everyday lives in contradictory ways, and how their (everyday) lives are 
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themselves articulated to and by the trajectories of economic, social, cultural, and political 
power.”61 
Chapter 2 first reviews the existing literatures in financialization and housing, then 
outlines the concepts of hope and House Buying, including the social subject, the life goal, 
and the temporal mapping of the future. It proposes that the dominance of the discourse of the 
market in Hong Kong is the condition that makes House Buying as a hope mechanism 
possible. Finally, it traces the recent social movements and the sense of gloominess among 
the younger generation in Hong Kong, proposing that we should further understand the social 
discontent through studying the emergence and modification of House Buying. 
Chapter 3 traces how House Buying was formed from the 1970s to the 1990s. It first 
discusses the watersheds in Hong Kong history – the 1966 and 1967 riots that marked the 
beginning of an era of social reform of the colonial state. It then traces and analyzes the 
historical trajectory of House Buying. Over the course of the 1970s to 1990s, the following 
elements emerged and connected. First, the housing ladder was constructed by the colonial 
state as the housing path, structurally supported by large scale public rental housing projects 
and subsidized homeownership schemes. This ladder included three steps: public rental 
housing, subsidized homeownership and private homeownership. Second, the self-reliant 
subject was jointly articulated by both the colonial state and the local population against the 
background of refugee experiences in the past and rapid economic development at the 
present. Third, homeownership was transformed from being merely a shelter to a symbol of 
the middle-class good life in an increasingly affluent society. Fourth, homeownership was 
also perceived as a good investment object based on the belief of “little land, many people”, 
and the faith in the colonial state to carry out social reform and urban planning. Fifth, the 
                                                 





social plane of Hong Kong was imagined as a land of opportunity, even though social 
inequality had been worsening in the 1990s. House Buying in the Formative Period helped 
produce depoliticizing effect through the prioritization of individualization and self-
government.  
Chapter 4 traces the reasons behind the collapse of the housing ladder and the 
narrowing of the objective opportunity structure in Hong Kong since 1997 to the 2010s. 
Politically, the handover of sovereignty from the British to the Chinese government in 1997 
has not led to decolonialization. Rather, it formalizes the sectoral interests in the political 
system through influencing the Legislative Council and the election of the head of the 
HKSAR government. Economically, Hong Kong has completed the process of 
deindustrialization and its economy now is a real-estate centric and finance-led growth 
regime. Socially, the society is increasingly polarized, and the opportunities derived from the 
Chinese market are unequally distributed. Among the middle-class, the local professionals do 
not share the benefits of economic growth like the cross-border financial workers do. The 
above social problems are deepened when the government policy fails to mitigate the social 
inequality and promotes homeownership as the financial solution for self-reliant individuals. 
Culturally, a new wave of citizenship and a new discourse of post-materialism seem to be 
emerging.  
Chapter 5 discusses how the hope mechanism of House Buying was modified in 
response to structural changes in the housing ladder and opportunity structure. Drawing from 
the focus group data among the better educated young adults and the discussion of Ghassan 





people into “an enemy of the established order”.62 Through a discourse of “waiting for the 
coming crisis”, House Buying still channels people’s discontent through being self-reliant in 
the housing market. These young adults imagine homeownership to be a future safety net as 
both a shelter and a financial tool. 
Chapter 6 engages in the theoretical debates about hope as passivity and activity. By 
reviewing the theoretical debate over hope, it proposes that these two elements coexisted in a 
concrete hope mechanism like House Buying in Hong Kong. This discussion expands the 
existing discussion of the micro approach in the financialization of housing, and contributes a 
subtler understanding of economic culture in Hong Kong by providing a theoretical 
framework to understand how hope operates in a financialized capitalist society. 
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Chapter 2 – Financialization and Hope: the Case of Hong Kong 
This chapter reviews the current academic discussion of financialization of 
homeownership, and proposes that Hong Kong is a peculiar case in which the colonial state 
and the population jointly articulated homeownership and financialization together from the 
1970s to the 1990s as a cultural mechanism of hope, which I call “House Buying”.63 House 
Buying associates homeownership with three components – a self-reliant subject, an image of 
the good-life, and a temporal mapping of the future based on a housing path which was 
constructed as the “housing ladder” (from public rental housing, subsidized homeownership 
to private homeownership) and an imagined social plane with a relatively open opportunity 
structure. (See Figure 1.1) This mechanism emerges out of the unique colonial context, which 
is characterized by an absence of the discourse of the nation-state, and instead relies on the 
dominant discourse of the market. This research proposes that understanding the 
transformation of the hope mechanism of House Buying in recent years can help us probe the 
gloominess and frustration of the life planning of young adults in today’s Hong Kong. 
2.1 Approaches to Financialization and Housing 
In its 150 years before 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony. During those years, 
Hong Kong transformed from an entrepôt before the 1950s into a light industrial city in the 
1960s and 1970s, and became one of the major global financial hubs in the 1980s. Now, it is 
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a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the rule of China, yet it still retained its 
position as a financial hub after the handover in 1997. Its finance-led regime of accumulation 
is different from the Anglo-Saxon model for the centrality of real estate, resulting in a unique 
historical development. Unlike the post-war UK and US, with relatively benevolent social 
protection, Hong Kong has been a colonial state with minimal social welfare and a hands-off 
approach to the population. Public housing is one of the few exceptions, producing housing 
of good quality since the 1970s. Why, then, would the local population welcome the 
promotion of subsidized homeownership and the construction of the housing ladder in the 
1980s, which may have signaled the “neo-liberal” retreat of the state from providing public 
housing – the most important, affordable and reliable social policy? In pursuing this question, 
I trace how the state and the population jointly constructed a cultural mechanism of hope as 
House Buying since the 1970s. This was achieved by articulating financialization and 
homeownership together with the market discourse, the self-reliant subject formation and an 
imagination of a social plane with open opportunities. 
This section reviews academic approaches to financialization and housing, and then 
proposes the cultural mechanism of hope – House Buying as the perspective with which to 
understand the relation of financialized housing to everyday life in Hong Kong. The growing 
dominance of the financial sector in the economic structure, and the popularization of 
financial products in people’s everyday lives has caught the attention of many scholars 
ranging from political economists to cultural theorists. “Financialization” has become a 
common keyword in many academic discussions, especially after the global financial crisis in 
2008.64 Financialization as a keyword, when used loosely, “is a bit like ‘globalization’ – a 
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convenient word for a bundle of more or less discrete structural changes in the economies of 
the industrialized world”.65 van der Zwan nonetheless provides a useful topology and 
summarizes three approaches in the academic debates of financialization – the macro, the 
meso and the micro.66 
The macro approach points to financialization as an emerging regime of accumulation 
in the global capitalist system that is superseded industrialization since 1970s. Krippner’s 
definition would be an exemplar of this approach: financialization is seen as “a pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production”.67 One core concern of this macro approach is the inherent 
instability of financialization. The combination of the accumulation of debt on one hand, and 
unstable and volatile pricing of assets on the other, alongside recurring crisis and risk are an 
inevitable part of this finance-led growth regime.68 In this approach, financialization is often 
seen as a process that is driven by two key actors: “a wealth-maximizing rentier class or the 
imperial aspirations of the American state”.69 In the face of heighted international 
competition, the capitalist elites divert their investment from production to finance while the 
American state resolves its “crisis of hegemony” after the Vietnam War.70  
The meso approach probes into the influence of financial market and related 
shareholder value on the managerial practice in the non-financial corporations. The attention 
shifts from steady and reliable profit to quarter-to-quarter performance in stock price. The 
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management class in these corporations performs “innovation” and “efficiency” through 
downsizing, offshoring and contracting-out, and this goes along with shifting the pressure 
from financial market to the employees.71 
The micro approach is concerned with the rise of the citizen as investor and the 
influence of “financialized imagination”72 on people’s everyday life.73 The structural changes 
described in the above macro and meso background include the retreat of the state in social 
welfare and the fluctuation in economy, increasingly flexible employment practices in the 
workplace, and the displacement of risk onto individuals.  In this context, individuals 
increasingly resort to financial markets in order to resolve their own financial problems.74 
Debts and investment behavior become part of everyday life.75 Under financial capitalism, 
there is a preferred subject position – the investor subject. An investor manages money 
differently when compared to the traditional way of savings. While savings requires delaying 
gratification – save the money and leave it untouched – investment requires people to 
constantly look after the money. Money and the portfolio have to be “constantly fondled, 
mined daily like a well-stocked refrigerator”.76 The investor, often addressed as a male 
subject, as characterized by an entrepreneur-like mentality that embraces and calculates risk 
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actively and is willing to take up the financial responsibility for himself and his family.77 
Paradoxically, from the macro perspective, financialization regularly creates crisis and 
precarity. Yet on the micro level, investment is offered by the state and financial institutions 
to be the “remedy” to their personal precariousness with the promise that one can thrive or at 
least safeguard oneself and his/her family through putting effort into acquiring investment 
knowledge and playing the investment game carefully.78 The investor subject and the cultural 
formation of financialization are visible in keywords like, “security” and “creativity”,79 and in 
media such as popular children’s culture80 or financial news and media programs.81 
Within the above broad discussion of financialization, real estate is a major financial 
sector alongside finance and insurance (together they are called FIRE) that is an as yet 
underexplored area in the humanities and cultural studies. Real estate is often rendered as 
“playing a minor role” or being “seen as one of the bearers of financialization”.82 
But real estate has two characteristics that mark its difference from other sectors. 
First, real estate is the financial name for the built environment, with housing as one of its 
most important areas. Housing as real estate can be in conflict with other social uses of 
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housing including sheltering and family making.83 Second, real estate consists of a unique 
financial technology – the mortgage, which is the most accessible financial tool to ordinary 
people. In recent years, a series of studies84 on the financialization of housing began to 
emerge suggesting “the financialization of home forces more and more households to see 
acquiring a house not just as a home, as a place to live, but as an investment, as something to 
put equity into and take equity from”.85 
The macro approach addresses the specificity of real estate in financialization as an 
accumulation regime by exploring the mortgage market’s role in the process of capital 
switching,86 “when capital flows from one sector of the economy to the other”.87  Aalbers 
discusses four circuits of capital switching: the primary, which includes production, 
manufacturing, and industrial sectors; the secondary, which refers to the production and 
consumption of built environment, like infrastructure for production and housing for 
consumption; the tertiary, or social infrastructure, like investment in technology, science, 
conditions of employees, health and education, etc.; and the quaternary – financial markets 
for the trade in money, credit, securities, etc..88 The role of the mortgage market helped in 
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facilitating capital switching from the primary to the secondary circuit. The mortgage market 
and the loosening of mortgage requirements fueled rising housing prices by allowing the 
homeowners access to capital. 
In the age of the financialization, mortgage markets became “markets in their own 
right” in the global capitalist system.89 One of the consequences was the securitization of 
mortgage loans and secondary mortgage markets. This development of financialized 
mortgage markets leads to the global economic crisis caused by subprime mortgages in 2008. 
Consequently, the fate of local homeowners is now tied to that of global investors. After 
years of quantitative easing in the US and the Chinese economic stimulus program90 since 
2008, the financialization of housing has further expanded. The housing market has been 
used to absorb the wall of money – the large amount of money generated by the US and the 
Chinese economic programs, albeit under uneven trajectories based on national institutional 
structures.91 The financialization of housing can cause problems to the state’s legitimacy if 
the government fails to negotiate the demands of social rights and welfare, and to regulate the 
market forces in relation to the housing needs of the population. Chua,92 a researcher in 
housing of Singapore, presents a case for the financialization of public housing as an asset for 
retirement planning in which such financialization resulted in a crisis of the state’s 
legitimacy. 
The meso approach concerns the influence of the mortgage market on the urban 
setting and local community through the role of financial institutions and institutional 
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investors. On one hand, the mortgage market heightened gender, race and class segregation in 
the local community, and uneven development between different districts via gentrification 
and ghettoization.93 For instance, when the federal government in the US intervened into the 
private mortgage market by insuring or providing direct home loans, it developed a system of 
appraisal that evaluated individual dwelling units as well as neighborhoods in order to 
determine value and risk.94 But this system was intertwined with racial, ethnic, gender and 
anti-urban biases, and nonwhite people and women were by and large penalized.95 The 
marginalization of these populations in the mortgage market provided the ideal condition for 
predatory lending (high interest rates, high fees and onerous non-payment penalties) 
following the deregulation of the finance market and the invention of new financial products 
in the late 1990s.96 On the other hand, van Loon and Aalbers’s research on institutional 
investors in Netherlands shows that the investors withdrew from direct ownership of 
properties and have been disconnected from the locality since the 1980s. They transform real 
estate from “opaque, local, non-standardized goods” into an abstract form of finance capital – 
real estate shares. This financialization of real estate removes the connection between 
institutional investors and the geographies of their investment, and turns real estates into 
“liquid, globally traded financial assets”.97 
Adding to the previous discussion of the “investor subject” in financialization, the 
micro approach highlights the importance of the mortgage and its relation to people’s 
everyday life and the social need of sheltering and home making. Garcıa-Lamarca and 
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Kaika98 exemplify this approach. They propose that financialization isn’t only a process of 
macroeconomic and policy change, but also a biopolitical process that recruits the local 
population and their livelihoods. Mortgage contracts connect the livelihood of local 
populations to the global capitalist system and real-estate speculation with the promise of 
optimizing income and wealth. Through the concept of “mortgaged lives”, they historicize 
the process of these embodied practices in housing financialization in Spain since 1939 and 
the further liberalization of mortgages starting from the late 1990s. 
The process of embodiment of financial knowledge and mentality isn’t a one-sided, 
top-down imposition, but a process of negotiating with existing knowledge and social 
relations. Pellandini-Simanyi, Hammer, and Vargha99 discuss the domestication of mortgage 
loans in Hungary and explore the complex subject formation process of the investor subject 
through their ethnography of Hungarian mortgage borrowers. They argue that financialization 
and the promotion of mortgage loans don’t directly lead to people embracing more risk. 
Rather, the mortgage interacts with and is domesticated within people’s existing social 
relations and cultural frameworks. For instance, market-based mortgage borrowers are 
supposedly more influenced by investment knowledge. But, in actual practice, the state-
subsidized mortgage borrowers are more financially savvy and calculative than those with 
market-based mortgage. They make use of the calculative mentality they learned in socialist 
times to spot profit opportunities, as they were used to taking advantage of the loopholes of 
socialist state policy and to appropriating state property for personal use. In other words, 
borrowers of mortgage loan incorporate or domesticate the logic of finance within the realm 
of their existing cultural and social framework of everyday life. 
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Mortgage borrowers’ loan practice also consists of an affective dimension towards the 
future, and borrowers have a more complex relation to mortgage and debt than the abstraction 
of social relations by financialization. Allon100 discusses the leveraging effect of debt in 
subprime mortgage and its relationship with consumers. Instead of viewing debt as part of the 
one-sided process of abstraction, depersonalization, and dematerialization in capitalism, 
Allon proposes that finance rearticulates and reformulates the everyday settings of debt and 
indebtedness into “evergrowing webs of profit-generating interconnection between the public 
and the private and between consumer and corporate indebtedness and financial markets”.101 
Allon provides evidence of this new affective articulation through a case in Stockton, 
California, the sub-prime mortgage capital of the United States. Subprime mortgage 
borrowers in Stockton were actively embracing debt, risk, and the leveraging effect of 
mortgage loans not only because of rational calculation and the benefits from asset-
acquisition. To them, this was a complex affective attitude, anxious yet hopeful, towards the 
future that is articulated with the financial tool of mortgage “as key to the freedom of a more 
secure future” and “a feeling of being propelled into a better future, of no time to lose, not 
even the time to read the fine print of mortgage documents”.102 This pressing sense of a 
future encouraged or even urged people to set foot in the housing market as soon as possible. 
It is not only financialization and housing in the US that utilizes this element of “hope and 
futurity”. We can find similar promise towards future life goals and calculated life planning 
in the aforementioned Spanish and Hungarian context – the promise of optimizing income 
and wealth in Spain, and the calculation of taking advantage of the mortgage scheme in 
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Hungary. But this dimension of “hope and futurity” has not been fully explored in these 
studies. 
2.2 Cultural Mechanism of Hope – the Case of Hong Kong 
My research explores this “hope and futurity” dimension in the micro approach to 
financialization and housing. The contribution of this research to the above approach is 
twofold. On the one hand, it proposes a framework – the cultural mechanism of hope. On the 
other hand, this aspect is explored within the unique context of Hong Kong as a colonial 
global city, in which the discourse of the market has been in dominance since the 1970s. I 
name the cultural mechanism of hope in the financialization of housing in Hong Kong 
“House Buying”. 
Choosing Hong Kong as the case through which to study financialization and housing 
is not accidental. Hong Kong is one of the major global financial hubs since the 1980s and 
has been the least affordable city for housing in the world since 2010 for eight consecutive 
years. Smart and Lee,103 exploring the finance-led regime of accumulation through the macro 
approach,104 proposed that the Hong Kong (and Japanese)’s real-estate-centric model is 
different from the Anglo-Saxon’s model that is based on capital gains, dividends, interest, 
and pension income from sufficient stocks of property. One key contextual difference in these 
two models is the development of the welfare state and its relation to housing. The post-war 
period of the US was characterized by the relatively liberal and benevolent social protection 
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under the New Deal. On the contrary, the colonial state of Hong Kong refused to reform its 
low taxation system and maintained minimal social welfare in the 1950s and 60s.105 
Housing sits at a peculiarly contradictory position in both contexts. In the US context, 
housing was the “wobbly pillar”106 or the weakest link in the whole system of social 
protection where the market remained the dominant force in housing provision. In the Hong 
Kong context, housing was the area most invested in and controlled by the colonial state 
since the middle of the 1950s, despite its traditionally hands-off approach to the local 
population. Since the early 1970s, the colonial government developed the public rental 
housing project into one of the largest schemes in the world to provide cheap and intensive 
labor to the development of light industry through subsidizing the rent of the working class. 
The housing project also won its legitimacy across the population. Since then, the project has 
housed nearly half of the population with good quality public housing in affordable rate of 
rent. 
Emerging out of this context, the financialization of homeownership is not only about 
the deregulation of the financial sector and the liberation of mortgage. In Hong Kong, the 
colonial state began to promote homeownership in the early 1980s. As a city with good 
quality public housing, the success of homeownership promotion is based not only on the 
relaxation of mortgage requirements, but also on the persuasion of the colonial state in 
attracting the local population to give up the good quality public housing units they were 
enjoying and venture into the private housing market. 
I propose that one of the major reasons behind the success of housing privatization 
was securing the consent of the population in “teeth-gritting harmony”.  Financialization and 
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homeownership were articulated to a cultural mechanism of hope – House Buying – jointly 
by the colonial state and the population. This mechanism articulates different elements 
together, including the state policy of welfare and housing, the refugee experience, the 
discourse of the market, the self-reliant subject, the ideology of open opportunities, and the 
ever-booming housing market from the 1970s to the 1990s.107 The following sections further 
examine the concept of hope and futurity, and delineate the specificity of House Buying in 
the context of Hong Kong.  
2.3 Thinking through Hope – the Social Subject, the Good Life, and Temporal Mapping 
of the Future 
Hope is both a verb signifying the act of anticipation and a noun denoting the belief in 
the attainability of certain goals. In this research, it is understood as an accumulation of 
expectations based on personal efforts, care, attention, knowledge, and experience. It is 
articulated by and mediated through discourses.108 A subtle distinction must be made between 
hope as a cognitive understanding and hopefulness/hopelessness as an emotion/affect, 
although they are usually in a direct, even corresponding relation. One who accumulates and 
possesses more hope is more hopeful than those who don’t, and vice versa. Taken together, 
hope is a mixture of calculation and emotion with a temporal relation in which people are 
influenced, if not determined, “by the future”.109 In this research, the expectations associated 
with hope are social – expecting to augment one’s social being in a society. In other words, 
hope is about how one fancies the chance of improving one’s self and/or one’s social position 
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within a society.110 This research focuses on the social dimension and explores the 
mechanism that distributes the shares of expectation. A mechanism is the combinations of 
objective social structures and discourses that articulate the socially defined yet personally 
internalized subject positions, trajectories, benchmarks, and life goals. This framework 
provides insight into the questions of futurity that encompass people’s social needs, material 
interests, practical calculation, cultural expectation, and affective assessment towards their 
life planning. 
The contribution of thinking through hope is to advance our understanding of culture 
by bringing forward the importance of futurity. Appardurai111 reflects on the stereotypical 
opposition between culture and economy, and suggests that the distinction between them in 
our common sense is based on temporality. Culture is often associated with the past, while 
economy, particularly in the face of development, is future-oriented. Keywords like “habit, 
custom, heritage, tradition” fall into the category of culture, while “plans, hopes, goals, 
targets” are often implied in economic development.112 In fact, futurity does exist in most 
approaches to culture. Norms, beliefs, and values are central to cultures, and they are not 
merely sediments from the past. These are also guidelines, plans, maps and “specific and 
multiple designs” for people to imagine and practice in their social life.113 
Society has always been distributing hope through different mechanisms. One type of 
mechanism was the imperial examination in China. It opened up opportunities of social 
mobility based on talent to those from different classes who could then be recruited and 
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incorporated into the state government. The hope towards achieving social mobility appeared 
to be egalitarian since this imperial examination was open to all. In reality, the chances 
remained slim for those with limited social capital and who lacked personal connections with 
the government officials. The successful candidates were predominantly the descendants of 
the established official families and the gentry class.114 
Religion is perhaps a more common mechanism that has historically distributed hope. 
Marxism too, attempts to produce hope by putting the future in the hands of human beings 
through the effort and planning of the proletariat, or at least the socialist state. But this belief 
in hope, that human effort can make a difference or at least a different future, is not the 
monopoly of either religion or Marxism. It is a common theme in modern societies. In fact, 
one major characteristic of modernity that distinguishes modern societies from traditional 
ones is its relatively abundant production and egalitarian distribution of hope. I will further 
specify the mechanism of hope by pointing out its three interconnected components – the 
social subject, good-life goal, and temporal mapping of the future. 
The mechanism of hope assumes people are capable of augmenting their “social 
beings”. Here I adapt Hage’s use of “social being”. This term doesn’t only refer to a subject 
with agency who is situated in (thus, being in) a society and is affected by the socialization 
process. This also concerns the quality of such being – “a life that is more meaningful, 
satisfactory, fulfilling, etc”.115 Social being is not a static state and social subjects are not 
“passive recipients of being”,116 as the quality and quantity of being can be pursued and 
accumulated in one’s social life. In this light, hope is one’s expectation of acquiring more 
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meaningfulness in the future. However, this is often distributed unevenly. Some may live a 
meaningful life with more hope, while others live with less. Furthermore, this distribution 
may vary in different historical periods and it can be evaluated differently according to 
different value systems with different constructions of subject position. Value systems as the 
cultural dimension of hope bring us to the second component of the mechanism. 
The mechanism of hope is built upon a collective understanding of the good life. 
What is being studied in this research is not the immediate calculative behaviours of one 
specific commodity over another, like “for this piece of land or that, for that marriage 
connection or another one, for this job in the bureaucracy as opposed to that job overseas, for 
this pair of shoes over that pair of trousers”.117 The focus is put on the cultural imagination of 
the good life. The good life can be composed of social promises, like “upward mobility, job 
security, political and social equality, and lively, durable intimacy”.118 It can also be the result 
of receiving joy from improving one self and achieving bodily improvement.119 But the key is 
that all these imaginations and expectations are guided by “general norms, presumptions and 
axioms”,120 and thus, are socially and culturally grounded. The good life as the object of hope 
must be attainable, and the one who pursues this knows, or at least believes in, its 
attainability. Otherwise this expectation is merely a kind of daydreaming. Attainability 
requires a temporal mapping towards the future, and this connects to the third component of 
hope. 
                                                 
117 Appadurai, A. (2004). P. 68. 
118 Berlant, L. (2011). Cruel Optimism. P. 3. 
119 See Hage, G. (2002). “‘On the Side of Life’ - Joy and the Capacity of Being - with Ghassan Hage / 
Interviewer: M. Zournazi”; Sennett, R. (2007). The Corrosion of Character.  





The mechanism of hope consists of a temporal mapping that connects the present and 
future in an indefinite yet causal relation. If identification (i.e. nationalism or localism) is 
more about articulating present to the past with glory or suffering, and consumer desire is all 
about the present as immediate gratification, then hope is about expecting a better, or at least 
different, tomorrow through a social map of the good life. This expectation necessarily 
involves a temporal mapping of future movement that is varied in directions, speeds and 
patterns. While expecting upward movement on the cultural map is the general desirable goal 
of augmenting social being, foreseeing downward movement is often the unpleasant hopeless 
condition of which people want to rid themselves. Horizontal movement is a more ambiguous 
recent condition that can be interpreted differently as hopeful or hopeless according to 
different cultural maps and social positions. For example, freelance workers may perceive 
this as being either lack of employment protection, or being freed from the traditional career 
path and controlling one’s own fate. Similarly, expecting rapid or slow movement, being 
satisfied with being still, discontent about stagnancy in life, and predicting uncertain or 
consistent future movements are different temporal mappings, and their relation to hope can 
be ambiguous and should be studied historically and empirically. 
Recent developments in the study of hope offer us methodological direction in 
studying the mechanism of hope with an emphasis on historicization. For instance, Kleist and 
Jansen,121 in a recent special issue on hope studies, proposed a list of important questions that 
the study of hope in our time should answer. These questions connect to this project of hope 
mechanisms in Hong Kong where young adults are living in an era of protracted crisis with 
                                                 





uncertainty and social immobility. At the end of their list is the crucial question, how are 
hopes “generated, distributed, negotiated, sustained and/or transformed” over time?122 
2.4 House Buying as Hope Mechanism under the Discourse of the Market 
Hage proposes the importance of hope in maintaining the stability of capitalism. In his 
discussion of the Australian context, the nation-state took the major role in distributing hope 
through providing dreams of upward social mobility.123 To further contextualize this secret of 
capitalism, this section is going to review Hong Kong’s peculiar colonial context in the 
absence of the nation-state and the prominence of the discourse of the market. This context 
enables the interconnection of social need and economic calculation in the hope mechanism 
of house buying. Mathews, Lui and Ma124 provide this perspective in thinking about the 
uniqueness of the Hong Kong context. They propose that in other modern societies, the 
discourses of both the state and the market usually coexist and their co-presence is taken for 
granted. The state discourse advocates for citizen’s loyalty – for instance, “you must cherish 
and defend your nation and its way of life”,125 while the market discourse assumes a free 
world of consumption that is unbounded by anything – “You can buy, do, and be anything in 
the world that you want”.126 Hidden contradictions exist between these two discourses, but, 
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very often, they are too taken for granted for most people to notice. One core contradiction is 
on “constraint”; loyalty imposes a constraint in consumer choice (one must be loyal to the 
state that is above all market consideration), while consumption secularizes all the sacred 
(everything, even one’s loyalty to the state, can be offered for sale). They conclude that the 
discourse of the market “entails detachment and calculation”,127 instead of attachment and 
love. 
Home, land and Hong Kong identity, which usually involve commitment and 
attachment towards a specific locality, are articulated to the global market within the 
discourse of the market. Home can be anywhere as long as you have the purchasing power to 
secure a middle-class lifestyle – “I can make anywhere in the world my home, as long as I’m 
near an airport”.128 Land is just yet another commodity which is detached from emotion. 
“One newspaper article describes how land in Hong Kong is not viewed as one’s sacred 
motherland as in China: ‘in Hong Kong land is not holy … it is just a commodity’.”129 Unlike 
the previous refugee generation who fled to Hong Kong after the WWII, the first local-born 
Hong Kongers began to treat the city they live as their home only since the 1970s. This 
home-making is not in the form of being loyal to Hong Kong, but is based on an economic 
discursive framework: “Hong Kong offered better prospects for the attainment of an affluent 
life than anywhere else”.130 
Hong Kong identity is thus defined “in part, as loyalty to the global market over any 
state”.131 In this discourse, self-interest and calculation are valued over love and emotion. 
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Thus, this is all about “a judgment based on personal calculation of profit and loss rather than 
on one’s belonging to a particular place and society to which one is unstintingly loyal”.132 But 
as Mathews, Lui and Ma also noted, we should treat the discourse of the market as an “ideal 
type”. People’s actual practices are often messier when involving other social needs and 
emotional attachments.133  
In capitalist societies, homeownership is situated at the intersection between differing 
social needs, such as sheltering and family formation. People in Hong Kong, with the 
dominance of the market discourse, take their inseparability for granted. For example, in his 
cross-cultural comparison of the ideology of homeownership between East and West, Richard 
Roland highlights the inseparable connection between homeownership and property 
investment as the unique characteristic of Hong Kong’s housing culture when compared to 
other places like the UK and Japan.134 But neither “homeownership” nor “real estate 
investment” in the Anglo-American context fully captures this ambiguous nature of housing 
culture in Hong Kong. Hence, this research uses House Buying to name the cultural 
mechanism of hope that articulates financialization and homeownership together. 
In Hong Kong’s Cantonese language, people use maai lau (買樓) to signify the act of 
acquiring homeownership. “Maai” means “buy” and “lau” means “a house”, and can literally 
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be translated as “house buying”.135 This term has very different spatial and temporal 
implications in its relation to the market if we compare it with “homeownership” and “real 
estate investment”. “Home” usually carries the meaning of a private space in which one 
dwells, and home making is a process that transforms a house into a castle with his/her own 
personal touch. This process involves devoting time, labor, and affection to decorate the 
private space to suit one’s way of living, taste and family formation. “Ownership” 
emphasizes the acquisition and possession of the exclusive property rights to that private 
space. This carries a sense of safeguarding the private space that we call “home” from other 
people’s invasion through acquiring the exclusive property ownership. The transaction of 
property rights as commodity and investment good is possible, but is not the denotation in the 
phrase “homeownership” per se. Other terms, like “real estate” and “property”, are 
commonly used when a house is placed in the field of economics that involves active 
behaviours in the market. In this sense, the realms of the social and the economic are 
separated through different words – “home” or “real estate”.136 
“House buying” as a word usage is different in its ambiguous nature that includes 
both homeownership as social need and real estate investment as economic calculation. 
“House” (most often an apartment in the context of Hong Kong) is a man-made object that 
encloses a space with unspecific use. One can treat a house as temporary shelter, make it into 
home, rent it out as an asset, and/or treat it like an investment object. “House” lacks the 
personal attachment and devotion that “home” assumes. “Buying” and “selling” are two sides 
of the decision in the marketplace. It highlights the act of transaction in the blink-of-an-eye, 
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and is different from the longer duration of owning, and the immovability in “real estate”. 
“House buying” as a hope mechanism is developed ambiguously in a way that presumes the 
possibility of satisfying both social and economic needs through the market. Its connection 
with hope was a historical contingent articulation between the 1970s and the 1990s, and such 
connection is struggled over and questioned in today’s Hong Kong. As a hope mechanism, it 
consists of an individual subject that hopes to achieve self-reliance through the private 
market, a good-life goal that connects buying a house with middle-class status and way of 
living, and a temporal mapping of the future that connects switching from public to private 
housing with a progressive life trajectory.137 
A self-reliant individual subject has been constructed in the official discourse of 
homeownership in Hong Kong. For instance, the colonial government had repeatedly 
emphasized nurturing independent citizens who can “stand on their own feet”. “Hong Kong is 
not, in the full sense, a welfare state. People are expected to stand on their own feet, a 
principle which accords with their proud and independent spirit.”138 
When applied to the housing policy, the colonial government constructed a three-step 
“housing ladder” to encourage homeownership starting from the mid-1970s. These three 
steps are public rental housing, subsidized homeownership, and private homeownership. 
Public rental housing is the starting point for the lower-class. The colonial state expected that 
after enjoying years of cheap rent, those capable persons and/or their children should have 
worked their way up, and they should withdraw from enjoying social resources and set foot in 
the private housing market. “Public housing tenants are heavily subsidized by the community, 
and many have become quite well-off after enjoying years of cheap rentals.”139 However, the 
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private housing price was already expensive in the 1970s, and hence the colonial government 
designed a middle step between public rental and private homeownership – the subsidized 
Home Ownership Scheme (HOS). In this scheme, the government took the role of building 
and selling apartments to the local population at a price that was usually lower than the 
market level (usually 30% to 40% discount). The eligible applicants included the public 
housing tenants and middle-to-low income families who cannot afford homeownership in the 
private market. 
The message behind the construction of the “housing ladder” is that public housing is 
only for the needy, and the capable citizen who became well-off should stand on their own 
feet and move on to embrace homeownership. The colonial state had helped through 
constructing a housing path for the capable to be self-reliant and reach the final destination of 
homeownership. This individual subject has been articulated with the emergence of the Hong 
Kong Dream in the 1970s within the local population. In this dream, an individual can move 
up the social ladder by his own effort and ability under this formula – “hard work plus a little 
bit of luck could bring great success”.140 
The self-reliant social subject was not only instituted through a top-down construction 
of the official discourse, but also through a common life trajectory in the 1970s within the 
younger local-born generation, especially when they compared their upwardly mobile 
experience with the transient experience of the previous refugee generation. This was 
articulated with the discourse of the market as the framework that connected one’s personal 
experience with social change. One element – “choice” in the market – is particularly salient. 
Thus, an individual social agent can control his/her own fate through acquiring enough 
wealth, and having the choice and freedom to determine what to do in the market. One 
                                                 





significant example is demonstrated in Rosen’s ethnographic study of Mei Foo Sun Chuen – 
the first large private housing estate that marked the rise of the middle class in Hong Kong in 
the early 1970s.141 Rosen concludes her fieldwork by pointing out the significance of 
individual choice and the pleasure associated with it in the housing market. 
If (the middle classes) are happier in their daily lives, it is at least partly because they 
perceive a new element of choice in much of what their days include. … Likewise, the 
flat in Mei Foo (the middle class private housing estate) is not an assigned 
accommodation based on waiting lists in the Housing Authority headquarters; Mei 
Foo was a choice made, and part of the pleasure of the new environment is the 
pleasure of a choice well made.142 
Meanwhile, homeownership had also been seen as a good investment object. Sherry 
Rosen also finds that “flats in Mei Foo Sun Chuen are currently considered excellent 
investments”.143 This continued to be so in the late 1990s, when Koo summarizes, at the end 
of her research, “The positive experience shared by a ‘successful’ group, buying flats in their 
thirties or forties in the late 70’s, 80’s or early 90’s, made them hold more strongly to the 
spirit or ethos. After years of development, …the ethos – perceive housing as an investment – 
is strongly built up among the public.”144  
The good life goal that connects homeownership with the middle-class social status 
was also visible in the 1970s. Rosen interviewed one resident who stressed social status and 
its connection with money in living in Mei Foo, and more broadly in Hong Kong society: “it 
takes money to live here, and this society is built on money. If you live here, your friends and 
business associates will be very impressed.”145 Likewise, Cheng’s study of housing 
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advertisements146 in the 1990s enriches our understanding of the connection between social 
status and homeownership, and the cultural content of such a middle-class way of living. The 
property developers were selling a middle-class dream of home that included “taste, style, 
warmth, cultural ethos and assets”.147 This dream is to embrace a set of desires of urban life – 
convenience and exclusiveness.148 
More than the basic requirement of having a bigger and safer shelter, living the good 
life through buying a house in a large private housing estate is about a comfortable, peaceful, 
and quiet environment. On one hand, one wishes to live near to the urban center or connect to 
the transportation system. On the other hand, one also wishes to live in an isolated 
community that excludes outsiders. It ensures the owner will enjoy privacy not only in his/her 
apartment, but also within the area of the housing estate, which is self-sufficient. The 
exclusiveness reflects personality, taste, and prestige, and serves as an identifier of middle-
class status. After all, this shared understanding of prestige can further sustain the increase of 
housing prices. Similar to Rosen’s findings, Cheng concludes that ownership of such a “high-
class” apartment was the most prominent material evidence of one’s monetary achievement 
and social status in the form of potential investment value.149 
Finally, House Buying consists of a temporal mapping that connects one’s present 
with the future. Koo illuminates two elements of this connection in the 1990s – “an ideal 
housing path (home-ownership is a better form/ affluent way of accommodation, and private 
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home-ownership is the best of all)” and “a strong housing belief (everyone would have 
chance to experience upward housing mobility)”.150 For the former, together with the 
aforementioned self-reliant social subject and housing ladder, the government constructed an 
ideal cultural map of a housing path through which people could imagine their future. The 
government expects the public housing tenants to achieve homeownership through the HOS 
and following the steps in the “housing ladder” since the early 1980s. The Introduction of 
Home Ownership Scheme clearly states this sense of moving along the ideal trajectory: 
The main objectives of the scheme are, firstly to encourage better-off rental estate 
tenants to purchase their own flats so that their heavily subsidized accommodation 
can be reallocated to more needy families and secondly, to assist families in the 
private sector with limited incomes to become home-owners.151 
The Housing Authority vision the future society in which homeownership will be the 
preferred form of housing: “The government’s goal is to encourage homeownership in the 
community. Home ownership helps to foster social stability and a sense of belonging and to 
provide personal financial security.”152 Hence, in the official discourse, when these 
subsidized homeowners continue to enter the private housing market, they enjoy financial 
security, and the whole society also benefits by having more home-owners securing social 
stability. 
The “strong housing belief” was part of the general social ethos in the 1990s. 
Sociologist Thomas Wong summarizes that in the 1980s and the 1990s, even though people 
                                                 
150 Koo, A. C. H. (2001). Beyond the Hong Kong Dream - Housing Experience and Social Ethos in Hong 
Kong. P. 30. Koo’s research aims at understanding how people make sense of the discrepancy between the 
ideal and the actual housing path.  
151 Hong Kong Housing Authority. (1984b). Annual Report, 1983-1984. Ho, D. K. L. (2000b) shows another 
side of the story by analyzing how the housing movement in the 1980s failed to respond to this wave of 
privatization and the underlying assumption of self-reliance. Next chapter will further discuss the struggle 
of the historical development of house buying. Ho, D. K. L. (2000b). “The Rise and Fall of Community 
Mobilization: The Housing Movement in Hong Kong”. 
152 Hong Kong Housing Authority. (1997). Home for Hong Kong People: the Way Forward. Long Term 





in Hong Kong suffered from social inequality in the immediate present of their personal life, 
they still had hope towards the social future. This hope soothed their strains. This was partly a 
result of the ideology of openness and opportunities, and the aforementioned “individualistic 
and generally conservative orientations (such as the ‘catch as catch can’ mentality, or ‘to each 
according to his contribution’)”.153 On top of this ideology, Thomas Wong adds a temporal 
dimension of hope through using the parable of the “tunnel effect” – hope towards one’s 
future emerges from observing other people’s advancement, which I call “hope in the 
tunnel”. This conjures a scene in which drivers are stuck in a traffic jam inside a tunnel, but 
they see cars in the neighboring lane starting to move. 
Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same 
direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I 
can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while the 
cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know 
that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come any 
moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before because of 
the expectation that I shall soon be on the move.154 
A sight of the future emerges from seeing “others did move”, and thus hope arises in 
the drivers’ mind.155 This hope carries the effect of mitigating the envy and strains of those 
who are left behind in the present by receiving information from the prosperous economic 
environment. Thomas Wong attributes this tunnel effect to the spectacular economic growth 
in the 1970s. In this social context, one man’s gain is not directly another man’s loss.156 
Hence, those who are still stuck at the present perceive other people’s gain as a source of 
                                                 
153 Wong, T. W. P. (1995). “Economic Culture and Distributive Justice”. P. 387. As he said, “strain which 
arises from personal, class-related, circumstances and which could lead to or radical redistributive demands, 
exists, but its potency is mitigated by the prevailing social ideology”. 
154 Hirschman, A. O. and Rothschild, M. (1973). The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the 
Course of Economic Development. P. 546. 
155 Ibid. Pp. 388 – 9. 
156 Ibid. Wong’s observation about the social context of Hong Kong: “Hong Kong’s spectacular economic 
development in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to bring about social advancement for many without a serious 
opposite and downward effect on others. Prosperity and growth generated a benign external environment; 





hope instead of the target of envy. They expect the opportunity to move forward to a better 
future within this economic tunnel of social advancement.157 The ideal housing path is one of 
these tunnels, alongside career path and entrepreneurship. But Thomas Wong warns about the 
possible limitations of this tunnel parable. At the early stage of economic development, like 
Hong Kong from the 1970s to the 1990s, the state may find the citizens surprisingly easy to 
please with the tunnel effect. But, once this tunnel effect runs out and the hope of moving 
forward remains unfulfilled for a period of time, he predicts people would become furious 
and turn into an enemy of the established order.158 His prediction will be examined in Chapter 
5 by using the focus group data collected in 2014 and 2016. 
2.5 Gloominess in Hong Kong among Young Adults 
Through exploring House Buying as the cultural mechanism of hope, this research 
aims to address the organic crisis in today’s Hong Kong. It argues that, contrary to the 
“cautious in immediate present, optimistic towards social future” ethos which Thomas Wong 
depicts in the 1990s, the generally felt pessimism across the younger generation is not so 
much about immediate hardship in life and absolute poverty. Rather, it’s about a discrepancy 
between the material experience of their life and the potential to “improve” that experience or 
climb social classes. Hence, what is being struggled over in today’s Hong Kong is hope, with 
House Buying being one of its hegemonic mechanisms. 
                                                 
157 Ibid. P. 389. He cited from Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) that the tunnel effect “operates because 
advances of others supply information about a more benign external environment; receipt of this information 
provides gratification; and this gratification overcomes, or at least, suspends, envy .... As long as the tunnel 
effect lasts, everybody feels better off, both those who become richer and those who have not.” 
158 Ibid. And as Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) also pointed out, “As long as the effect is strong, the 
developing country will be relatively easy to govern. It may even exhibit a surprising aptitude for democratic 
forms, which, alas, is likely to be ephemeral; for, after a while the tunnel effect will decay and social injustice 





In today’s Hong Kong, young adults are gloomy about their personal future. A news 
report from the BBC finds that young adults, aged 18 – 29 years old, are the least likely group 
to agree with the statement – “life is really worth living”.159 A recent report on inequality 
reveals a discrepancy between present material well-being and subjective happiness. Hong 
Kong is an affluent society and ranks no. 8 on GDP per capita. People in general enjoy a 
relatively convenient and comfortable living standard. But Hong Kong ranks only no. 71 on 
the ranking of happiness. The gap between these two rankings is the widest among the top 20 
countries by GDP per capita, far exceeding other countries with a similar gap like Qatar and 
Kuwait.160 
In the realm of life planning, young adults are frustrated about their personal future, 
mostly in terms of practical expectations of career prospects and housing. One interviewee 
from the BBC news report further commented on his observation about these two areas of life 
planning in Hong Kong, “The atmosphere of society doesn’t really lend itself to a future for 
young people. …they don’t know what will happen… – including in their own careers, and 
whether they can afford housing.”161 A leader of the Umbrella Movement,162 Joshua Wong, 
discusses similar factors behind this social movement in 2014. “Job prospects are depressing; 
rents and real estate are beyond most young people’s means.”163 Wong believes that this 
                                                 
159 Cheung, H. (April 29th, 2017). “Have Hong Kong’s youth lost hope in the future?” 
160 These two countries rank no. 1 and no. 4 on GDP per capita, and happiness rank at no. 35 and no. 39 
subsequently. Barr, C. (April 26th, 2017). “Inequality index: where are the world’s most unequal countries?”  
161 The discontent is not only about the economic environment. Over 80% of the interviewees in the survey 
are unhappy with the political system. This political discontent is also the theme of Umbrella Movement in 
2014. Young people hence treated leaving Hong Kong as a way-out. In the survey, among people aged 18 – 
29, 60% of them want to emigrate. Cheung, H. (April 29th, 2017).  
162 Umbrella Movement in 2014 was the largest social movement in Hong Kong since the 1967 riot, but 
ended without achieving any closer to the goal of the election of the Chief Executive through universal 
suffrage. Hong Kong people has asked for the universal suffrage of the Chief Executive since the drafting 
of the Basic Law in the 1980s and 1990s. This 30-year struggle was detained by the Chinese Central 
Government in the August of 2014. The Central Government issued a restriction over the election through 
having a pre-screening of the Chief Executive candidates. This triggered the Umbrella Movement, a sit-in 
protest lasted for three months since the September of 2014. 





bleak economic situation was part of the frustration underlining the movement. In another 
survey of the happiness index that compares Hong Kong with two other Asian cities (Seoul 
and Osaka), Hong Kong people were found to be the unhappiest ones. Housing is the most 
unsatisfying area named in the index of quality of life, lower than other components such as 
politics and society, and environment.164 
The bleak economic situation of work and housing is not unique to young people in 
Hong Kong. Job insecurity and flexible employment are common characteristics of flexible 
capitalism and the proliferation of precarious labor in the global context.165 Long term life 
planning, which was previously based on a stable career path and bureaucratic system, now 
has been challenged.166 Unstable income from precarious labor and flexible employment 
practices influence housing and its unaffordability for the younger generation. Housing 
unaffordability has happened in other developed societies when the costs of independent 
living, such as rent and first deposit, have become too high for most young adults. For 
                                                 
164 Wong, S. W. (2016). “CityU’s Happiness Index for Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea” (January 25th, 
2016) 
165 Kalleberg (2009) has provided an overview of this discussion of precarious labor. Other examples include 
Ross (2009) and Standing (2011). Standing uses the term, “The Precariat” to describe a new class of people 
who works without job security in intermittent employment or underemployment. For the discussion of 
Hong Kong, see Tam (2005) and Chiu, So & Tam (2008). Chiu and Lui (2004) has discussed the larger 
social background of deindustrialization in Hong Kong since the 1990s, and how deindustrialization leads 
to social polarization in occupational and income structure in the local context.  
Kalleberg, A. L. (2009). Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in transition; Ross, A. 
(2009). Nice work if you can get it: Life and Labor in Precarious Times; Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: 
The New Dangerous Class; Tam, M. Y. K. (2005). “Job Security and Flexible Employment”; Chiu, S. W. 
K., So, A. Y. and Tam, M. Y. M. (2008). “Flexible Employment in Hong Kong: Trends and Patterns in 
Comparative Perspective”; Chiu, S. W. K. & Lui, T. K. (2004). “Global city, Dual city? Globalization and 
Social Polarization in Hong Kong since the 1990s”. 
166 Richard Sennett (2000; 2006) has discussed the cultural influence of flexible employment which corrodes 






instance, the young adults (aged around 20 to early 30) in the US167 and UK168 today are 
more likely to live with their parents than in the 2000s. In Japan, the group of young adults 
that live with their parents beyond their early 30s are called “Parasite singles”. The total 
population of these singles is estimated to be around 4.5 million.169 Hong Kong shares a 
similar phenomenon. In 2016, young adults (aged 25 – 34) are more likely to live with their 
parents when compared to 2006 with an increase varying from 6% to 9%.170 In this age 
group, around 40% of female and 60% of male are living with their parents. 
The gloominess of young adults in Hong Kong has a peculiar relation to two aspects 
of economic life in Hong Kong – the real estate-centric regime of accumulation, and people’s 
strong attachment to property ownership as the future life goal. Hong Kong has been ranked 
as “the freest economy in the world” since 1995 for the 23rd consecutive years.171 But, 
underneath the seemingly non-interference economic policy and low direct taxation,172 the 
government influences the economy through careful management of land supply and urban 
planning. The government stated that their objective in land policy is to safeguard “public 
revenue through the policy of not selling land cheap”.173 This policy, unofficially called as 
                                                 
167 Statistics from the US Census Bureau shows that in the age group of 18 to 34 years old, around 30% (24 
million) are living in the home of their parents in 2015. It has increased for 8% when comparing to 2005. 
Vespa, J. (April 2017) “The Changing Economics and Demographics of Young Adulthood: 1975–2016”. 
168 In the UK, 25% of the young adults (aged 20 – 34) are living in their parents’ home in 2015, and it has 
increased 5% since 2008. Office for National Statistics (February 22th, 2016). “Why are more young people 
living with their parents?”  
169 In Japan, 4.5 million adults (aged 35 – 54 years old) are unemployed, unmarried and live in their parents’ 
homes. England, C. (April 20th 2017). “Japan: More than four million middle-aged ‘parasite singles’ still 
live with their elderly parents”. 
170 And over 95% of people who are under 24 years-old are living with their parents. Census and Statistics 
Department, HKSAR. (2017). Living Arrangement and Household Characteristics. 
171 Heritage Foundation. (2017). “2017 Index of Economic Freedom Report”. 
172 The tax system is simple and taxes are low when compared to the US. Only three direct taxes are imposed: 
1. Profits tax is capped at 16.5%; 2. Salaries tax is a maximum of 15%; 3. Property tax is 15%. And following 
taxes are not imposed: no sales tax, withholding tax, capital gains tax, tax on dividends, and estate tax. See 
InvestHK, HKSAR. (2018). “Low, Simple and Competitive Tax System”.  






the “high land price policy”, is the foundation for the real estate centered model of the 
finance-led regime of accumulation.174 Between 1985 – 2012, over 600 hectares of land were 
sold through public auction and tender, and generated a total premium of over HK$400 
billion.175 In 2014-15 and 2015-16, land-related income contributed 31.9% and 27.4% to the 
government revenue respectively.176 These figures do not include the profit from taxes on real 
estate conglomerates, which will bring the total up to 45%.177 Business in Hong Kong is also 
real-estate-inclined. 40 – 50% of capitalization on the stock market in the early 2000s is from 
real estate conglomerates. And this field of property development is highly monopolized. The 
five largest conglomerates have occupied 70% of the market share in private housing.178 
During the last two decades of this economic development system, the difference in 
the speed of wealth accumulation between property owners and non-owners in Hong Kong is 
drastic. Between 2003 and 2017, housing prices have risen more than 460%,179 while the 
median monthly employment earnings have increased only around 50%.180 Non-owners are 
facing a more difficult situation to enter the housing market than previous eras and other 
cities. Hong Kong has the least affordable private housing in the world since 2010, and the 
situation has worsened.181 Despite this, Hong Kong’s cultural values are still dominated by 
                                                 
174 Haila, A. (2000). “Real Estate in Global Cities: Singapore and Hong Kong as Property States”. 
175 Lands Department, HKSAR. (2012). “Fact Sheet of Lands Department”. P. 5. 
176 Research Office, Legislative Council Secretariat. (7 December, 2015). “Fact Sheet: Major sources of 
government revenue”. 
177 According to the estimation from a local think tank, Civic Exchange, “no less than 45 per cent of 
government revenue comes from land, including land premiums, property rates and taxes on property 
developers’ handsome profits.” Pilling, D. (9 March, 2011). “Hong Kong’s land system that time forgot”. 
178 Smart, A. and Lee, J. (2003b). P. 159. 
179 See Figure 2.1 for the overall trend in the housing market. 
180 See Figure 2.2 for more details. The median monthly earnings have increased from $10,000 to $15,000 
per month from 2001 to 2016. In the same period, the rise of the median monthly employment earnings 
among young people aged 20 – 29 is around 30% increase, which is lower than average. 
181  See Footnote 1 in Chapter 1 for more details. Demographia (2018). “14th Annual Demographia 





property ownership as the most desirable life goal to be achieved. In several recent surveys of 
life goals among Hong Kong people, private property ownership continues at the top of the 
list.182 
The housing choice for the young adults are very limited in this context. 
Homeownership, private rental housing and public rental housing are not viable choice to 
them. Homeownership is clearly unaffordable. The average price for one sq. ft. is more than 
HK$13,000 in 2018. Thus, the housing price for a 300-sq. ft. apartment is HK$3,900,000 
(USD$500,000), and the down payment can be around HK$1,600,000 (USD$200,000). One 
also has to pay around HK$10,000 as monthly installment, yet in 2017, the median monthly 
wage in the age group of 25 – 34 years old was HK$17,600.183 And usually an individual has 
to earn more than HK$22,000 to secure a mortgage loan from the bank. The average cost of 
private renting is high as well. The rent of a 450-sq. ft. flat was HK$15,900 per month in 
2017. Those at the city center were even higher. Renting a 200-sq. ft. studio could cost 
HK$16,000 per month.184 Meanwhile, the income ceiling to apply for public rental housing 
for an individual is HK$11,540. In this way, a capable young adult who earns the average 
income cannot enter into public housing – the entry of the housing ladder. One cannot fit into 
                                                 
182 The age group and the outcome varied in different surveys depending on how they asked the question, 
but in general, not only the young adults, but all Hong Kong people value house buying to be their top life 
goal. In 2010, people aged 16 – 35 years see “buying apartment or improving living condition” to be the top 
life goal to be achieved in 10 years (57.1%). (Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, 2010) 
In HKUPOP (2013), 34% of respondents from 16 – 33 years old value buying their own home as the dream 
they most want to achieve. Similar findings are there in a series of survey in HKUPOP (2014) and HKUPOP 
(2015). The life goal that one most want to realize is house buying (18.2% and 19% respectively) in all age 
groups. The rate is higher among people aged 18 – 29 in 2014. 25.3% of them pursued after house buying, 
while 15.5% wanted to further study and 11% dreamed of traveling around the world. Another question 
reveals similar belief. When being asked how they may spend the money from a lottery, buying property 
(41.4%) tops the list in all age groups from 18 – 65 in HKUPOP (2009). 
Forrest and Yip (February 6th 2015) also found in their survey that 80% of the young people in Hong Kong 
view ‘owning property is an essential symbol of being middle class’. Forrest, R. & Yip, N. M. (February 6th 
2015). “What young people really think about housing in Hong Kong”. 
183 Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2017). Wages and Labour Earnings. 
184 SCMP. (10 Oct 2017). “Looking for a flat for under HK$10,000 per month on Hong Kong Island or 





any one of the above choices, and can only choose between living in a tiny sub-divided unit 
(around 100 – 150 sq. ft.) in old buildings, living with parents, or living with partner(s) who 
can share the renting cost. 
 
Figure 2.1 Price Indices for Selected Popular Developments (1992 - 2017) 
Source: Rating and Valuation Department, HKSAR. (2018). Property Market Statistics. 
 
Figure 2.2 Median Monthly Employment Earnings of Employed Persons (2001 – 2016) 







Figure 2.3 Domestic Households by type of Housing (2015). 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2016). 2014/15 Household Expenditure Survey. 
 
The combination of job insecurity and unaffordable housing in an economic system 
that is real-estate-centric and social values that put great emphasis on property ownership, 
make young adults’ gloominess understandable on the surface.185 But this explanation needs 
to be pursued further. How has homeownership been articulated as the taken-for-granted 
desirable life goal in people’s life planning? How do young adults connect with the future if 
they believe that this life goal is desirable yet unachievable? In this research, these questions 
are explored with the concept of the cultural mechanism of hope in House Buying. The 
aforementioned phenomenon of a strong desire towards property ownership and a general 
                                                 





sense of gloominess among young adults is part of the struggle over this hope mechanism in 
recent years. 
This research is going to answer three sets of questions by relying on literature and 
historical reviews,186 and focus group interviews with young adults.187 The three sets of 
questions are: first, why and how does property ownership occupy such a prominent position 
as people’s life goal in Hong Kong? How has this articulation formed historically? Second, 
how has the social context changed in recent years? How has these changes affect the 
housing ladder and the social plane? Third, how do young adults imagine and articulate their 
pathways to break through and resolve this crisis of gloominess they face? How do they 
imagine the connection and/or disconnection between their present condition and the future 
possibilities? Chapter 3 explores the first set of questions concerning the historical formation 
of this hope mechanism from the 1970s to the 1990s and the process when different elements 
of House Buying happened to join force in this period. Chapter 4 considers the contextual 
changes since the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, the collapse of the housing ladder and 
the narrowing of the objective opportunity structure in the Hong Kong society even when the 
economy has been recovering since 2004. Chapter 5 discusses how House Buying as a hope 
mechanism changes with a new discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis” across the young 
adults this research interviewed. 
  
                                                 
186 This consists of a review of ethnographic researches, banking pamphlets, short stories, and documentaries 
mainly in the 1950s to 2010s. Chapter 3 will use these materials to articulate the context behind the 
emergence of House Buying. 
187 This research interviewed 12 groups with a total of 73 young adults who are in their 20 – 30 years old in 
2014 and 2016, and asked them about their future planning. Chapter 5 will further illustrate the details of 







Chapter 3 – Historical Formation and Political Effect of House Buying in Hong Kong 
(1970s – 1990s) 
Historicization does not mean losing sight of contingency. Quite on the contrary: it 
allows us to foreground contingency by investigating the conditions of existence and 
possibility of particular instances of hope as relational phenomena in particular 
historical moments.188 
This chapter examines the historical formation of house buying from the 1970s to the 
1990s. Studying the financialization of homeownership requires studying more than the realm 
of economics. The cultural, the political and the economic elements are connected in 
transient, contingent, and sticky ways; they merge together to form people's whole way of 
living. Understanding House Buying as a hope mechanism weaves the cultural imagination of 
the self-reliant subject through the market who makes good investment decision to achieve 
homeownership, and also aspires to the middle-class good life. It also requires understanding 
the social mapping of the future through the “housing ladder” on a social plane with an open 
opportunity structure. 
House Buying is a historically contingent construct since the 1980s. The above 
elements in house buying did not emerge simultaneously and become connected right away. 
Each has its own historical trajectory.189 The belief in self-reliance emerged in the early 
1950s under two intersecting historical contexts: the refugee experience and limited social 
welfare of Hong Kong. The belief of having real estate as a good investment emerged in the 
                                                 
188 Jansen, S. (2016). “For a Relational Historical Ethnography of Hope”. P. 260. 
189 As Grossberg (2005) points out, the new economies have their histories. It’s not that “the present has 
broken with the past, that there is a radical disjuncture between yesterday and today, so that the past no 
longer has anything useful to teach us, at least about economy”. Grossberg, L. (2005). Caught in the 





1950s; yet homeownership had not been a popular housing choice until the early 1970s. The 
middle-class life style emerged in the 1970s and developed into a form of private housing 
estates in Hong Kong. The housing ladder that paved the way from public rental housing, to 
subsidized homeownership, then to the private housing market, was fully established only in 
the mid-1980s. Last but not least, the belief of open opportunities in the society had been 
strong since the 1970s with widespread feelings of optimism in the social future and a 
pragmatic attitude toward personal life. 
The above components accidentally joined forces in the 1980s under the colonial 
policy of limited and development-centered social welfare,190 the financialization of housing 
through the relaxation of mortgage requirements, and the political uncertainty before the 
1997 handover. In this context, the formation of house buying carried a political dimension. 
The emergence of House Buying reinforced the depoliticization of the population from the 
1970s to the 1990s, which was characterized by reframing political problems of colonialism 
and capitalism into “governmental responsiveness and administrative efficiency”,191 and the 
individualization and self-governing effect of minding one's own economic business and 
leaving the political issues in the hands of the colonial government. 
The following sections aim at outlining the above related elements in the historical 
formation of House Buying. I divide the history of House Buying in Hong Kong roughly into 
two periods – the Formative Period (from the early 1970s to the late 1990s), and the 
Struggled Period (from 1997 to the 2010s). In this chapter I will focus on the Formative 
Period of house buying, and the next chapter will focus on the Struggled Period. Two 
historical moments split these periods – the 1966 and 1967 Riots in colonial Hong Kong, and 
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the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. The separation between these periods are not 
absolute and clear cut. Between these periods, there were times when the future direction of 
the Hong Kong society was uncertain and undetermined. 
The time between 1967 and 1973 was primarily characterized by activities aimed at 
recovering from the 1966 and 1967 riots.192 The colonial government had just begun to 
experiment with social reforms such as health care and free education, and the local 
population still distrusted the government. The signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration in 
1984 and the uncertain political negotiation between the British and Chinese government 
over the sovereignty of Hong Kong between 1982 and 1984 were two critical moments in the 
political future of Hong Kong, and were central shifts during the Formative Period. As we 
shall see in the following sections, the mass consumption in homeownership began only in 
the late 1970s when the colonial government began its social reform in a subsidized 
homeownership program in the context of an increasingly affluent society, and house buying 
was formed during this period. 
The time between 1997 and 2003 was characterized by chaos, with a major economic 
recession and a serious legitimacy crisis of the government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR); these developments set the stage for the ongoing tensions 
about economic opportunity and governance that continued during the current Struggled 
Period. The collapse of the housing market and the subsequent total retreat in 2003 of the 
HKSAR government from actively participating in the housing market through building and 
selling subsidized housing. Since then, the role of the government has changed drastically 
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from being the active administrator193 to the by-standing facilitator of housing in the name of 
the free market. At this point, housing in Hong Kong was left to in the hands of the real estate 
conglomerates. 
3.1 The Watershed of Hong Kong – 1966 and 1967 Riots 
  
 
The riots in 1966 and 1967 were the watershed194 in the history of Hong Kong that 
marked the beginning of social and political reform. Before the riots, the colonial government 
had taken a hands-off approach to the local Chinese population since 1842 when Hong Kong 
became a British Crown Colony. The economy of the early colonial state was entrepot-based 
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before 1950s and was light-industrial after 1950s. The colonial administration and foreign 
merchants dominated political power.195 Under the policy of indirect rule, the local population 
was left to be self-governed by the Chinese merchants, who formed charitable organizations to 
cater to the Chinese population's medical, welfare, and security needs. These Chinese 
merchants were later incorporated (to a limited extent) into the ruling elites and the political, 
economic and cultural middleman. Local sociologist Ambrose King names this system a form 
of synarchy – “elite-consensual polity”, in which the colonial state and the Chinese elites jointly 
governed the local Chinese population.196 
The colonial state provided very limited social welfare to the local Chinese population 
for a few reasons. First, the British colonial policy had a tradition of providing limited 
economic subsidies to the colonies, and asking the colonial governments to be self-sufficient 
and financially solvent on their own.197 Second, as an entrepot, its economy was dominated 
by the merchant class who pressured the state to maintain a low-taxation system and restrain 
its public spending.198 Third, the Chinese population was seen by the colonial state as merely 
sojourners when the boundary between Hong Kong and China was open before the beginning 
of the Cold War in the 1950s. The colonial government did not view itself as having a moral 
obligation to look after the coolies who treated Hong Kong as a place of work or waves of 
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Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation; and the Governor – in that order.” Cited from Hughes, R. (1976). 
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the Chinese merchants. Law, W. S. (2009). Collaborative Colonial Power. 
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Parliament instructed Sir Pottinger, the first governor of Hong Kong, that the colony “was expected to pay 
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refugee who treated Hong Kong as a “life boat” to escape from the political turbulences in the 
Mainland China from the 1930s to the 1960s, like the Second World War, the civil war and 
the political movements under the rule of Communist China.199 These joined together and 
became the cornerstone of financial conservatism in public spending and social policy. 
The 1966 and 1967 riots both exposed the social problems in post-war Hong Kong 
brought by the rapid industrialization of the 1950s and 60s. These problems included social 
inequality, poor living conditions, the lack of labor rights, and the lack of social welfare 
under an unresponsive colonial government. The previous colonial policy of indirect rule 
could no longer solve these discontents by merely securing collaboration from the Chinese 
merchants and elites. Nevertheless, these two riots carried different meanings in local history. 
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Lasting for a few days, the 1966 Riot was led by the young local-born generation to 
protest the increase of the ferry fare. The Official Report of the colonial government 
concluded that this riot was a symptom of youth problems, housing problems, and political 
miscommunication. The state aimed to correct these problems through policy measures. This 
also signaled the emergence of the local-born baby boomers who had a very different way of 
approaching life and social issues compared to their expatriate and refugee predecessors. 
These local-born boomers were the first generation who treated Hong Kong as their home 
and they would voice their discontent. The colonial government was aware that, if not 
addressed with care, these discontents could possibly be articulated against the legitimacy of 
the colonial rule and the exploitation of capitalism. 
The 1967 Riot was led by the sympathizers of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong 
Kong. It started as a labor movement, and developed into a movement of nationalism to 
protest against “national oppression”.200 The scale was much larger than the riot in 1966, and 
lasted for seven months with a series of fatal bombing incidents. This riot marked the end of 
the proxy struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Nationalist Party in 
Hong Kong.201 After the 1967 riot, Hong Kong people chose to side with “the devil they 
knew” – the unpopular colonial government instead of either one of these parties.202 
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The 1967 riot also raised the curtain for the subsequent government’s social reform in 
the 1970s on issues including free primary education, improved health care services, labor 
reform, the establishment of an anti-corruption bureau (ICAC), and the Ten Year Housing 
Program. The colonial state changed its previous hands-off approach to the local population, 
and carried out reforms in the early 1970s to build its political legitimacy and establish civic 
pride203 in the local population. The objective of social reform, besides pacifying social 
discontent, was to prepare for the future negotiation with the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) over the dispute about the end of the 99-year lease of New Territories – the northern 
part of Hong Kong where Qing Dynasty leased to the British in 1898.204 
The previous opposition from the business community and the government to increase 
public spending now was eased after witnessing the disturbance of the two riots. The “elite-
consensual polity” of the colonial state also modified itself to extend its network of 
consultation – “administrative absorption of politics” – to the representatives from the 
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must legitimate demands be satisfied, but the population must be convinced that such satisfaction is 
genuinely the objective of Government. The need is not only for administrative action producing physical 
results; there is also a need to secure the active confidence of the population. We cannot aim at national 
loyalty, but civic pride might be a useful substitute. 
 “This can be achieved only by corporate effort, and such a concept is new to Hong Kong where the tradition 
has been for people to do only more or less what they are told by Government and otherwise … to be as 
little bothered with corporate affairs as possible. I think that from now policy must aim to make both the 
elite and the masses feel, as they felt in 1967, that Hong Kong is an entity to which they belong, and the 
place they wish to live in.” 
As cited in Smart, A. & Lui, T. L. (2009). “Learning from civil unrest: State/society relations in Hong Kong 
before and after the 1967 disturbances”. P. 157. 
204 From “The Guidelines for the Governor Designate, Hong Kong” (1971). “We must work out policies in 
Hong Kong consciously designed to prolong confidence and so gain all possible time for conditions to 
emerge in China in which a favorable negotiation would be possible. Conversely we must avoid actions and 
administrative procedures in Hong Kong which tend to highlight the diminishing term of the Lease.” As 





grassroots as well.205 Though this by and large remained a gesture, the colonial state set up 
offices across different districts of Hong Kong to collect people's opinions and complains in 
the hope of lessening its tension with the local population. This kind of public consultation 
through the administrative system signaled the government’s willingness to resolve political 
miscommunication with the public.206 
The transient refugee mentality began to fade away in the mid-1970s when the first 
local born baby-boomers grew up and emerged as the new generation of the society. This 
generation took root in the colonial city and developed a sense of local identity. They were 
different from the previous generation because they would fight for social rights and welfare, 
yet they also inherited the utilitarian, practical mentality that is grounded in material 
calculation. 
3.2 Three Steps of “Housing Ladder” in Hong Kong 
This section outlines the colonial government’s housing policy in constructing the 
housing ladder since the 1970s. “Housing ladder” is a unique housing path in Hong Kong that 
consisted of three hierarchically-ordered steps: public rental housing, subsidized 
homeownership, and private homeownership. The lower-class people can enter this housing 
path through applying for public rental housing. Public rental housing aims at 
accommodating two types of people: to compensate the tenants in the squatter areas who 
were affected by the government's project of slum clearances from the 1950s to the 1990s, 
and to be the safety net for the poorest households who are living in poor conditioned private 
                                                 
205 King, A. Y. C. (1975). “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass 
Roots Level”. 
206 One example is the city-district officer scheme, which the colonial government sent a civil servant to 
each district to consult the opinions from the local population. At that time the city-district officers 
understood their role to be not “only the ‘eyes and ears of the government’ but also the ‘tongues of the 





rental housing. Means test is imposed only on the latter group, and the income and asset 
limits have been strict throughout the history of public housing with family and age bias, 
which favor the family and elderly one-person applicants.207 
The reforms in social policy during the 1970s provided social welfare to serve 
economic development. Underneath its benevolent outlook and concern over the “happiness” 
of the local population,208 the social reform was a response to changing political 
configurations, modes of economy, and social formations in Hong Kong during the 1960s 
and 1970s. After the Second World War, the economy of Hong Kong had begun to transform 
from entrepot to light industry, yet the colonial government was still allied with the 
commercial capitalists (the merchants) and financial capitalists (the bankers, in particular 
from HSBC).209 This collusion, along with the obligation of maintaining a balanced budget to 
avoid interference from the Colonial Office in the UK,210 contributed to the relatively laissez-
faire industrial policy and non-interventionist social policy in the 1950s and 1960s. 
But the emergence of the Chinese industrial capitalists in the late 1960s asserted their 
influence on the colonial government and began to affect industrial policy with a more state-
interventionist approach.211 In the 1970s, under the neologism of “positive non-
interventionism”,212 a series of economic and political considerations were implemented 
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about when and how the government should intervene. Social welfare213 was on the list of 
considerations, yet often subordinated to other “more important” issues, like securing the 
legitimacy of the colonial state with its proximity to Communist China,214 maintaining a low 
tax rate system to ensure the development of the economy, limiting public spending, and 
building up the government reserve to stabilize the financial system in case of a banking 
crisis.215 Public housing policy, besides building state legitimacy and consolidating the 
population,216 had also been providing a social wage that subsidized the laborers and lowered 
the production cost of industrial development since the early 1950s. Because of this, it was 
selected to further expand in the 1970s over other possible social policy goals like elderly 
care, retirement planning, and labor rights. 
In 1972, the colonial state announced a large-scale, ten-year public housing project 
with a humanistic caring tone toward the local population, 
It is my conclusion that the inadequacy and scarcity of housing and all that this 
implies, and the harsh situations that result from it is one of the major and most 
constant sources of friction and unhappiness between the government and the 
population. It offends alike our humanity, our civic pride and our political good 
sense.217 
The target of the Ten Year Housing Programme was to house 1.8 million people in 
housing estates. The land in the urban areas was not sufficient for such a large public housing 
project and this pushed the government to open up the previously undeveloped areas – the 
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New Territories at the north near to the boundary with Mainland China. The plan was to 
develop several self-sufficient new towns in these areas, which included private and public 
housing, industrial areas, shopping malls, and recreational and communal facilities. 
The final step of the housing ladder – private homeownership market is for the upper-
middle class and it is a monopolized market in the hands of five major property developers 
since the late 1970s. These developers occupying 70 percent of the market share in private 
housing. The private homeownership market had been through cycles of ups and downs since 
1960s. Three property bubbles emerged and burst: 1967 – 1972, 1976 – 1981, and 1986 – 
1997. The price index can trace only the last property bubble, which happened in the 1980s to 
the 1990s, yet the approximate increase of the private housing price was 1 to 2 times from 
1967 – 1972, 3 times from 1976 to 1981, and 8 times from 1986 – 1997.218 
 
Figure 3.3 Private Domestic (1980 – 2003) Price Indices for Selected Popular Developments. 
Source: Rating and Valuation Department, HKSAR. (2018). Property Market Statistics. 
                                                 





Hong Kong's land policy originated from the colonial system of the British Empire 
and is still practiced nowadays, and hence the supply of land is still controlled by the then-
colonial and now-HKSAR government. It has four characteristics. First, land ownership 
rights and land use rights are separated. Hong Kong was a crown colony and all land was 
crown lands. That means all land belonged to the current monarch of the colonial empire and 
now the Chinese state, and was managed by the government. Almost all land of Hong Kong 
is sold in leasehold with assigned terms and conditions,219 and all property owners in Hong 
Kong are indeed leaseholders. 
Second, Hong Kong has a low direct tax environment. The tax system is light-duty as 
the tax rate is around 15%, is simple, with only three kinds of direct tax: salaries tax, property 
tax and profits tax. Besides having no sales tax and withholding tax, Hong Kong does not tax 
on capital gains, dividends, and estate.220 The then-Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority in the 1980s, Tony Latter wrote, “The low tax environment ... is 
crucial in sustaining Hong Kong's image as a business-friendly place where government 
interferes as little as possible in resource allocation, such as the choices between work and 
leisure, or spending and saving.”221 In this system, real estate investment is encouraged since 
the profits from property market and the inheritance of properties are not taxed.  
Third, underneath the seemingly non-interference economic policy and low-rate tax 
system is the careful management of land supply and urban planning by the government to 
secure its finance through land revenue. Latter adds, “However, the system is not entirely free 
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of allocative distortions. The principal one occurs in the realm of land and housing.”222 Since 
the early period, the colonial government had already been under severe financial pressure in 
maintaining economic independence.223 The major source of government revenue is from 
selling land and charging tax through stamp duties. Land revenue had accounted for one third 
to almost half of the government income since 1881.224 The then-colonial state and the now 
SAR government has occupied a dual and contradictory role as the landowner, and the 
administrator of the well beings of local population. As the sole landowner, the government 
has a role in maintaining the land price to safeguard “public revenue through the policy of not 
selling land cheap”.225 But it also has the responsibility to ensure sufficient land supply and 
well-planned land use for the common good of the whole local population. These two roles 
create a dilemma between maintaining high land price and providing affordable housing to 
the population. 
Fourth, land supply is also limited by the legal system in Hong Kong. The population 
in Hong Kong is 7 million. It has 1,100 square kilometers of land but less than 25% of it is 
urbanized or developed. Almost half of the land in Hong Kong is Country Park or for similar 
use under the Country Parks Ordinance (1976). The Ordinance aims at nature conservation, 
and countryside recreation and education. These lands were prohibited from development. 
Land reclamation is the major way in increasing urban land use, as approximately 30%226 of 
the urban area are made from this method. Yet it was further restricted by legislation in 1997 
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under The Protection of the Harbour Ordinance, which aims at protecting and conserving the 
Victoria Harbour as a public asset. 
Under this land tenure system, the land and housing price has a tendency to go up 
because of the limited and controlled supply of land, and the incentive of the state policy in 
maintaining the “high land price”. Real estate has also been a popular investment choice for 
the relatively well-off segment of the population.227 In the 1950s and 60s, anthropologist 
Topley observed that “real estate, particularly blocks of flats, was a popular form of 
investment for Chinese”.228 Yet owner-occupancy as a housing choice was not popular: “the 
demand for housing does not usually come as high on the list of preference goods of the 
Chinese as on that of the westerner”, for their “social life is carried on largely in 
restaurants”.229 This continued to be so in the 1970s as shown again in the case of the first 
large-scale private housing estate – Mei Foo Sun Chuen. At that time, Sherry Rosen found 
that “flats in Mei Foo Sun Chuen are currently considered excellent investments”, and “as of 
the end of 1973, 30% of all purchasers were investors with no intention to live in the flats 
they had purchased”.230 
The middle step of the housing ladder – Subsidized Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) 
was designed by the colonial government in the late 1970s to fill the gap between the 
affordability of tenants in the public rental housing, and the soaring housing price in the 
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private housing market. For instance, in the Policy Address of 1981, the reason behind the 
practice of HOS was that 
…the sharp rise in land and property prices, in addition to interest rates, has greatly 
aggravated the effects of housing shortage. Housing otherwise available has become 
beyond the means of those who need it, and the proportion of family incomes spent on 
rents or mortgages has been grossly inflated. This is perhaps the greatest single cause 
of unhappiness and worry in Hong Kong at this time.231 
In this scheme, the government took the role of building and selling apartments to the 
local population at a price that was usually lower than the market level (usually 30% - 40% 
discount). The eligible applicants included the public housing tenants and middle-to-low 
income families who could not afford homeownership in the private market. Since this 
scheme was very popular, the applicants were selected through a lottery. And the public 
housing tenants could give up the public housing units they are living in exchange for a 
higher chance in the lottery. 
The construction of this housing ladder, as we shall see very soon, was characterized 
by the official discourse of self-reliance, and an upward mobile experience of the local-born 
generation in the 1970s. This serves as the backbone for people to imagine their temporal 
mapping of the future to an “upward” direction if they enter the first step – the public rental 
housing. 
3.3 Self-reliance in the Official Discourse 
Underneath the above housing ladder was an official discourse of self-reliance. Public 
rental housing is the safety net for the poor and incapable, and subsidized homeownership 
was the helping hand from the colonial state to lift the capable public housing tenants and the 
lower-middle class in achieving the final step of private homeownership. Yet the local 
                                                 





population should mostly rely on themselves to achieve this upward mobility in social ladder 
and housing path. 
The discourse of self-reliance was built upon the refugee mentality232 in the post-war 
era. Since the late 1940s, the practice of not relying on social welfare and surviving through 
their own means had been strong in Hong Kong across the refugees from the Mainland. This 
practice was built on the background of limited social welfare and hands-off approach from 
the colonial state.233 Throughout the 1950s, the majority of the population still lived in poor 
housing conditions despite the government's public resettlement projects. Almost half of the 
population (47.1%) lived in “cubicles inside private tenement flats”, 11.9% lived in “rented 
bedspaces or on verandahs” and 21% lived in “temporary structures, including rooftop huts 
and squatters’ makeshift dwellings”.234 But the pain and insecurity from social downward 
mobility and poor living conditions were outweighed by the greater fear of the Chinese 
Communist Party, the economic hardship, and the political turbulence that they had gone 
through during these political changes when living in Mainland China. 235 Living in Hong 
Kong, they were preoccupied with surviving the present with their families and kept 
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themselves away from political issues.236 Hong Kong, after all was the “lifeboat”237 that kept 
one out of the political uncertainty in the Mainland. 
Family as a social institution also helped to buffer the social discontent in the 1950s. 
By adding to the family’s well-being and relying on the help from one's family, the potential 
discontent towards the colonial state was diluted. For instance, local sociologist Lau Siu-kai 
uses the concept utilitarianistic familism238 to describe the dominant cultural codes in the 
post-war Hong Kong. “The furtherance of his familial interests is the primary 
consideration”,239 and “among the familial interests, materialistic interests take priority over 
all other non-materialistic interests”.240 This thesis depicts an economic being with an 
apolitical attitude of a family-centered social life in the post-war Hong Kong.241 
Alongside the above refugee mentality, in its social reform since 1970s, the colonial 
state continued to repeatedly send out the message of self-reliance to the population: “Hong 
Kong is not, in the full sense, a welfare state. People are expected to stand on their own feet, 
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a principle which accords with their proud and independent spirit.”242 And this discourse 
continued to prevail from the 1970s to the 1990s. For instance, the Hong Kong Social 
Welfare Office stressed the use of Public Assistance Scheme’s role in “relieving distress and 
hardship amongst individuals and families as part of a process of helping them to re-establish 
their independence”,243 and “normally public assistance is needed for a limited time only, 
until the recipient becomes independent again”.244 In the 1990s, social welfare was reviewed 
by the state for improvement without “creating the sort of dependency culture that has 
emerged in some developed industrialised societies, a phenomenon that removes the 
incentive to work and undermines the productive engine of the economy”.245 
Public housing was reviewed in the early 1980s under the same discourse. The 
colonial state insisted on the principle that “housing subsidies should be given only to those 
who are really in need of them”.246 Many tenants should have become financially capable 
after years of help from the colonial state, and were ready to move on to homeownership. 
“Public housing tenants are heavily subsidized by the community, and many have become 
quite well-off after enjoying years of cheap rentals.”247 This discourse continued and was 
articulated with a success story in the 1990s, when the Hong Kong Housing Society248 
celebrated its achievement for lifting the capable tenants and/or their children to move on to 
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the road of success as professionals, become “former” residents and withdraw from using 
valuable social resources. 
Thus, all tenants have been given a helping hand through the Housing Society's rental 
policy. As a result, former estate residents have become professional people such as 
doctors, lawyers, accountants and bankers. By saving on rent their parents were able 
to afford a good education and send them to university. 249 
The subsidized Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was put into practice under the same 
discourse of self-reliance. 250 The government agency of housing – the Housing Authority – 
reviewed the works of HOS in the 1990s and concluded that it had a role in “facilitating 
greater mobility within PRH (public rental housing) and providing more affordable rungs on 
the housing ladder had been gaining momentum”.251 Subsequently, the emphasis on rational 
allocation of housing resource resulted in “the increased mobility amongst well-off 
households which helped to release more PRH units to other families in greater need”.252 
Underlying the establishment of the housing ladder and the belief in self-reliance was 
the depoliticization of the population. This happened within the context of the government 
and the leaders of social movements negotiating social rights within the framework of 
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“residual social welfare”.253 This framework treats welfare as the emergency safety net 
instead of a way of redistributing social resources and ironing out inequality. This framework 
assumed that social welfare was only for the needy, and a proper citizen in Hong Kong was 
expected by the state to be self-reliant, stand on their own feet, stop from using social 
resources, and achieve homeownership in the long run. This framework was well-received by 
the local population, as it was implemented alongside rapid economic growth that brought 
about the emergence of the middle class, relatively open opportunity structure, improvement 
of living standards, and a sense that an individual can control their own fate through the 
market.254 
On the one hand, the colonial state intended to nurture the “civic pride” of the local 
population. Yet, it carefully avoided the issues of citizenship and public participation.255 The 
state reframed social discontent among the local population – social issues like labor and 
housing were not the result of the structural problem of inequality in colonialism and 
capitalism. Instead, these issues were addressed as matters of political miscommunication, 
and hence could be solved by improving “governmental responsiveness and administrative 
efficiency”.256 On the other hand, the leaders of the social movement accommodated this re-
framing. They lacked “a new ‘frame of right’ or a ‘frame of citizenship’”257 as a framework 
to advocate for narrowing social inequality. This resulted in the inability of the activists “to 
mobilize the masses, especially when the population of the economically disadvantaged had 
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shrunk in the context of phenomenal economic growth”.258 Focusing only on social welfare 
and public housing, this limited view of housing failed to concern other housing problems 
like “the rights of owners in the private housing sector and the housing needs of middle-class 
people”, and hence remained “sporadic, small-scale and localized”.259 
Thus, the local population and the colonial state both negotiated within the discursive 
framework of residual social welfare while leaving the problems of social inequality and the 
redistribution of social resource aside. The outcome was that the colonial state took this 
opportunity to successfully establish its legitimacy as “an efficient administration which 
could meet the needs of the population and provide them with an institutional framework 
within which the Hong Kong Chinese could improve their livelihood”.260 This resulted in 
reinforcing the depoliticization of the population and provided the groundwork for the market 
discourse to flourish, and “making state and government not matters of political loyalty of 
any kind but of administrative efficiency alone”.261 Hong Kong people were happy to be left 
alone to pursue career success and life goals as long as the colonial state took care of law and 
order, the legal system, and the basic needs (such as public housing and health care) of the 
population. 
3.4 From Shelter to Home – the Middle-class Good Life 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, there was a transformation in ideas about housing 
wherein homeownership became the taken-for-granted housing choice and the final step in 
the housing ladder that the local population aspired to achieve. This significant shift 
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transformed conceptions of housing from merely a shelter for dwelling in the 1960s to 
housing as a way to make a home in the 1990s.262 In this process, the relaxation of mortgage 
terms played an important role by making homeownership more accessible to the ordinary 
people and fueling demand in the private housing market. Under the process of 
financialization, a house simultaneously and accidentally became both a home decorated with 
the dream of being the middle-class and its lifestyle, and a good investment decision.  
Homeownership as a housing decision was not prevalent in the 1960s. For instance, 
69% of the local population wished to move into public rental housing instead of pursuing 
owner-occupancy.263 Since the early 1980s, homeownership became a popular, ordinary 
experience. Over 90% of the local population aspired to home ownership in the mid-1990s.264 
With increased affluence and common access to financial capital through mortgage, the 
housing market was rising and the percentage of homeowners increased from 34.9% in 1986 
to 52.2% in 2001. (See Figure 3.4) A gendered version of good life at that time was formulaic 
– a wife, a car, a son, and a house defined the success of a man. 
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Figure 3.4 Percentage of Households Living in Self-owned Premises (1986 – 2001). 
Source: Social Indicators of Hong Kong. (2018). Percentage of domestic households living in self-owned premises 
among total domestic households 
 
Alongside the proliferation of homeownership, people's desire for housing changed as 
well. More than the basic requirement of having a bigger and safer shelter, now the ideal of 
the good life in homeownership was about a house that is comfortable, peaceful, and quiet. It 
ensures the owner will enjoy privacy not only in his/her apartment, but also within the area of 
the self-sufficient housing estate. A home should also reflect the owner's personality, taste, 
and prestige. On the one hand, it serves as an identifier of middle-class status. On the other 
hand, a home with prestige can further sustain the increase of its price. 
This was manifested in Mei Foo Sun Chuen, the first large scale private housing 
estate that was developed in the late 1960s. On one hand, it represented the emergence of the 
middle class with generally higher income and educational level. On the other hand, it 
reflected the formation of the middle-class taste, with promotions emphasizing on “well-





garden, community facilities and leisure grounds”.265 The combination of serenity, comfort, 
and self-sufficiency quickly became the standard of subsequent private housing estates, 
including Tai Koo Shing, Whampao Garden, and Shatin City One. In general, the middle-
class lifestyle transformed “from small to big, communal to independent, and public to 
private”.266 
This also became the shared aspiration of the good life for the whole society, as public 
housing estates were developing with the same ideals. For instance, in the 1950s, the 
residence of the public housing was concerned mainly with survival. The residents even 
complained that having the basketball and badminton courts in the public housing estates 
increased the appetite of their children after exercising, and worried about its effect on family 
expenditures.267 But, in the early 1980s, public housing estates were developed by the state 
based on standards similar to those of the private housing estates. Seaview, community 
center, kindergarten, nurseries, sports facilities, children playgrounds, and shopping arcades 
became issues that the residents were concerned about. 
There came a competition of symbolic distinction between the public and the private 
housing estates. The private estates further raised the benchmark of amenities to distinguish 
themselves from the public housing estates. The private housing estates looked up to the 
standard of the hotel with decorated, luxurious lobbies and public corridors. These estates 
also included facilities like club houses, Romanesque fountains, and large gymnasiums.268 
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Homeownership of a “high-class” apartment is the most prominent identifier of one's 
monetary achievement and social status throughout the formative period.269 
Government housing policy played an important role in designing this new standard 
of the ideal home, “controlling individuals’ choices” and space became a state-produced 
luxurious good.270 Through urban planning, the government has produced a scarcity over 
space and privacy, and hence created a shared social desire for this space as a value more 
than merely physical environment and basic necessity. Space can also function as an 
identifier of class status – being in a small group while excluding “the mass”. 
Ma On Shan, a new town in the New Territories since the late 1980s, is an example 
that illustrates the rationale of urban planning. Ma On Shan is located along the Tolo 
Harbour, and was one of the new towns designed by the government to house the new 
middle-class families at that time. These young couples grew up in the public housing estate, 
and looked forward to achieving “a good quality of living in an environment they call 
home”271 because they had moved upward on the social ladder. In the government planning, 
space in these newly developed areas is produced as a luxurious good that is distributed 
unevenly between different types of housing. The housing of Ma On Shan was divided by 2/3 
ratio: 40% belong to private estates while 60% are public rental or subsidized home 
ownership schemes. Most of the private estates are built near the harbor with good exterior 
views and an exclusive clubhouse. These estates often boast about these features in the 
advertisements: “more space than urban areas”, “a good view of the sea”, “have most 
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entertainment facilities” and “convenient transportation”.272 On the contrary, public rental 
and subsidized owned homes are placed at the inner areas with limited sea view. Among five 
public rental housing estates, only one is located on the coastal area.  
3.5 Financialization of Homeownership – Homeownership as a Good Investment 
Decision 
Since the late 1970s, Hong Kong's economy was undergoing deindustrialization. One 
of the reasons behind deindustrialization was the Open Door Policy of PRC in the late 1970s. 
The nearby provinces began to provide cheap labor power and hence attracted the 
manufacturing sector of Hong Kong to move their factories across the border. Hong Kong's 
economy was restructuring to become a global financial center. Smart and Lee frame such 
economic development model as the “property-based regime of accumulation”273 through 
which real estate became one of the key sources of government revenue that can both 
supplement other financial markets and stimulate economic growth. Businesses in Hong 
Kong were tightly connected to the conglomerates in the real estate sector as discussed in 
Section 3.2. 
The financialization of Hong Kong's economy and its centrality in real estate came 
with the spread of a financial tool – the mortgage. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the local 
population was still by and large in the era of poverty, and real estate investment was still 
confined to a limited segment in the local population. The requirement of the banks for a 
mortgage loan was also stringent for the public. The installment period was short and ranged 
from one to three years. Mortgagees were even required by the banks to buy life insurance 
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before getting the loan.274 In 1967, Hang Seng Bank had already loosened the mortgage 
requirement from a 2 year to a 7-year payment period. But the proliferation of 
homeownership only began when the mortgage requirement was further loosened to a 20-
year payment period in the early 1980s.275 
Mortgage loans helped households to gain access to mortgage credit and, in doing so, 
further increased demand and thereby housing prices as well as their improved capability to 
purchase more expensive properties.276 For instance, in Lee's research of homeownership in 
the 1990s, all the informants in his 30 cases had opted for mortgage in their process of home 
purchase, instead of solely relying on savings or family support.277 These financial reasons 
were part of the cause behind the booming housing market and the popularization of 
homeownership between the mid-1980s and 1997. 
As we previously see from Figure 3.3, the price indices from 1986 to 1997 had 
increased 8 times. During the same era, the median monthly household income, though not as 
much as the housing price, had also increased around 5 times. (See Figure 3.5) Together, with 
the increase in the share of total household expenditure on housing from around 20% to over 
30% between 1981 and 1996, (See Figure 3.6) the local population's income level could keep 
up with the booming housing market though in increasingly difficult conditions. The early 
home buyers did make good fortune from the booming market, even though their decision of 
house buying may not have been made out of investment considerations. 
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Figure 3.5 Median monthly household income indices for a family of four (1981 - 2001). 




Figure 3.6 Share of total household expenditure on housing (1981 - 2005). 






The relaxation of mortgage requirements and the promotion of homeownership was 
not purely an economic decision. Relaxed requirements were also a political decision in the 
1980s. The government's promotion of a subsided homeownership program was a decision to 
respond to the growing need of the local-born middle-class in home and family making.278 
The early 1980s was also the time when the negotiation between the British and the PRC 
began. The property market plummeted because of people's lack of confidence in the political 
future of Hong Kong. At that time, the HSBC and the China Bank aimed at stabilizing the 
local population by loosening the payment period of mortgage to 20 years. The period would 
then cross the presumed handover year – 1997. Later, after the signing of Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 1984, the property market was stabilized and the mortgage loan-to-value ratio 
was loosened to 90%. In 1987, the payment period was further extended to 25 years.279  
A financial common sense was behind this new era of investment – the belief in “little 
land, many people” and the faith in the colonial state to continue to provide future urban 
development. “Little land, many people” was a belief based on the law of demand and 
supply: housing supply could not match the rapid increase of population and its demand of 
sheltering. This belief and the actual experience of housing shortage had been proliferating 
well before Second World War. Yet the Chinese landlords were often criticized by the 
intellectuals as exploiting the fellow Chinese tenants from the perspective of nationalism. 280 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, a new way of articulation towards investment emerged. The 
belief of “little land, many people” was widespread across the population; yet this time it was 
seen as an excellent investment opportunity. The short story, “Intersection” (1972) 281  can be 
read as an indicator of the emergence of such belief as early as in the 1970s. I chose this 
novel as it is the first novel in the history of Hong Kong that depicts the frustration and 
aspiration of a property owner – Chunyu Bai – without moral criticism. The author Liu 
Yichang is also one of the most significant writers who captured the turn to individualism in 
his modernist novels. 
In the novel, Chunyu Bai overheard a dialogue between a few Shanghai women about 
investing in real estate. All of them agreed that real estate was the best type of investment in 
Hong Kong. The reason was the rapid increase in population, and the shortage of housing and 
available land in the urban areas: “Property prices will go even higher. Hong Kong is so 
small and yet there are so many people. They still haven't got round to solving the basic 
problem of housing… The higher the prices, the more people want to buy!”282 In Chunyu 
Bai's own dialogue with his friend, similar observations appeared as well, 
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Hong Kong is just a tiny island. The space is too small, and the population is rising 
rapidly. The crisis of housing cannot be eliminated. 20 years ago, I went to Hong 
Kong from Shanghai, the crisis of housing has already been very serious. Now, 
although the government keeps building resettlement areas, but the crisis of housing 
in the urban area is more serious than the past. I have heard that very little crown 
land were sold in the urban areas. And many people who own private land are not 
willing to sell their land easily, because they see that the land price is 
rising. …Exactly because of this, the housing price in the urban area must keep 
rising.283 
The shortage of housing in Hong Kong was a serious social problem. Instead of 
expressing their discontent, Chunyu Bai and his friend saw it as an opportunity of investment 
which connected with their knowledge of urban planning and the faith in colonial state. They 
still found that the housing problem could not be solved right away, but they believed in the 
colonial state's willingness to address the problem. For instance, they linked the shortage of 
housing with future urban planning, including new towns and a mass transportation system 
that could solve the problem: 
“Going high-rise may not be able to solve the crisis of housing. The best solution is to 
build more satellite cities.” 
“Transportation is another problem.” 
“So Hong Kong must build underground railway.”284 
Beyond the fictional world of the “Intersection”, this belief in investment had also 
emerged across the local population at that time as shown in the booklets published by the 
banks that promoted real estate investment. The earliest texts that I have collected were a 
series of “Pamphlet of Hong Kong Real Estate” from the Hang Seng Bank in the late 1960s. 
Hang Seng Bank285 was the pioneer of the relaxed mortgage requirement in 1967. These 
booklets were published starting in 1969. The objective of the pamphlet was to provide a 
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guideline to Hong Kong people for buying apartments and also to be the bridge between the 
real estate enterprises and the buyers. We can take the first issue (January 1969) of this series 
of handbook as an example. At the beginning, it predicted the rise of the real estate market 
for the reason of demand and supply: “As long as the industrial and commercial environment 
continue to thrive, the demand towards land and housing will not be stopped with the dense 
population.”286 
The depiction of Hong Kong's future was bright and optimistic under the urban 
planning of the colonial state. And this depiction matched with Chunyu Bai's narrative. In 
this 21-page handbook, the major component was an introduction of one particular urban plan 
– the “Underground Train” (the future Mass Transit Railway system). The editors translated 
an extraction from “Hong Kong Mass Transport Studies” from English to Chinese.287 They 
did so to remind the property investors to consider how this could improve the transportation 
system, change the urban network, and shape the scope of the urban area in the future. In 
particular, the Underground Train would connect the urban area with two satellite cities – 
Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan, and would bring prosperity to the nearby areas that were 
previously remote and underdeveloped.288 This early form of financial knowledge in real 
estate investment did not explicitly encourage the investors to take risks. They promoted real 
estate investment by reinforcing the common sense of “little land, many people” under their 
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analysis of the increase in population, the development of urban area, and the improvement in 
living standards. 
The unquestioned assumption was the faith in the colonial state to perform the role of 
the administrator faithfully, and to follow the plan in an efficient and reliable way. Thus, the 
local population believed that the state would continue to improve “governmental 
responsiveness and administrative efficiency”.289 This discourse assumes its subjects to be the 
kind of investors that can understand the economics and future of Hong Kong using a 
politically neutral imagination that contains no criticism of colonialism. This is not to say that 
there were no political discussions in that era. Rather, they existed everywhere in the popular 
discourses. The struggles between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist 
Party were severe before the 1967 riot and throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. The 
criticisms against the colonial government and its irresponsiveness were also common place 
before and throughout the 1970s. What appeared in these booklets was the depoliticized 
separation of economics from the political. They treated economics as a separate domain that 
operated with its own logic as long as the colonial government could bear the role of faithful 
administer – developing infrastructure, safeguarding the local population's investment 
opportunities, and protecting their economic well-being. These beliefs, together with the 
positive experience throughout the late 1970s to early 1990s, were articulated to be a deep-
rooted ethos that the local population would “perceive housing as an investment”.290 
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3.6 Belief in Open Opportunities, Generally-felt Optimism and Hope in the Tunnel with 
Undercurrents of Social Inequality 
This section discusses the last component of house buying – the social plane with 
open opportunity structure, the generally-felt optimism since the 1970s and its undercurrents 
at the end of the 1990s. This was an era of rapid economic development that brought about 
abundant opportunities of social mobility and the improvement of living standards. A liberal 
promise of the Hong Kong Dream – “hard work plus a little bit of luck could bring great 
success”291 – prevailed not only in one's career and business, and also in homeownership. 
Yet, social inequality also widened in the 1990s. 
The belief that “Hong Kong is a land of opportunity” took root in the 1970s. We can 
find evidence from social surveys during that period. For instance, Wong concludes from his 
social research findings that there was “an increasing identification with Hong Kong as a land 
of opportunity and for career development”.292 From 1967 to 1977, the people who opted to 
stay in Hong Kong had increased from 23% to more than 50%, based on Hong Kong as the 
place with better prospects for acquiring an affluent way of living, and a sense of security 
based on economic success.293 
The experience of living in “a land of opportunity” was an unprecedented, valuable 
experience to many refugees in Hong Kong. These refugees had suffered from diasporic 
insecurity through a long journey from the Second World War, the Civil War, and the 
political movements in the Communist China from the 1930s to the 1960s. They fled to Hong 
Kong and took the chance to move upward on the social ladder. This experience granted them 
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a sense of controlling one's fate even in the potential political turbulence of the future. An 
example of the articulated belief in one's personal effort, economic success and the security 
these offered would be Mei Foo Sun Chuen. Mei Foo Sun Chuen represented consumer 
choice and freedom. It was built upon the assumption that the general public aspired to 
“choice” in the private market. For instance, anthropologist Sherry Rosen in the classic 
research about the making of middle class in the 1970s summarized her interviewees’ 
enjoyment of the pleasure from choosing where they live: 
…the flat in Mei Foo (the middle class private housing estate) is not an assigned 
accommodation based on waiting lists in the Housing Authority headquarters; Mei 
Foo was a choice made, and part of the pleasure of the new environment is the 
pleasure of a choice well made.294 
The experience of moving upward with the material proof of a private property 
granted these refugees a sense of independence through economic success: 
“The security offered in the Mei Foo model lies in the freedom it permits those who 
attain it to take some measure of control over the rest of their lives. Many will and 
already have become immigrants, but none will ever again be refugees”.295 
The short story, “Intersection” (1972) again gives us an elaborated example of such a 
belief in open opportunity revealed as the above social surveys and ethnographic study. It is 
particularly interesting as Chunyu Bai was a middle-aged man and a backward-looking 
refugee who dwelled in the past and memories. He compared and evaluated everything he 
saw in Hong Kong with his memories in Shanghai, Chongqing, and Southeast Asia. In his 
gloomy monologue, only two events were aspiring enough to pause his backward-looking 
narrative: envy about his ex-colleague's social mobility experience, and observing the rapid 
development of the infrastructure in Hong Kong. 
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The belief in Hong Kong as a land of opportunity was prominent when he compared 
his friends’ career development in Hong Kong. Chunyu Bai met an ex-colleague, Lee who 
worked his way up in 20 years, from messenger, to clerk, to general officer. During the 
property speculation in the early 1970s, his ex-colleague quit his previously stable job and 
joined a stock brokerage firm. Chunyu Bai expressed his envy of Lee's experience, even 
though he was indeed wealthy from being a landlord and had retired early. Lee praised him 
about his early retirement, which allowed him to enjoy life. Chunyu Bai envied his go-getting 
ex-colleague instead for having a forward moving social experience, 
“Perhaps I am just unaspiring.” 
“So what is aspiring?” 
“Being aspiring is to be someone as hardworking as you… It's not for a living… As I 
see it, you do it for fulfilling your wish.”296 
He compared Lee's upward mobile experience with the life story of a boss of a 
company in the past. “Twenty years ago, Lee (the above ex-colleague) was the assistant in 
the company. Now, because of his hard work, his condition is good now. But Chin was the 
head of the company back then. Now because of abandoning himself to despair, he had fallen 
into this condition (being a drug addict).”297 Chunyu Bai's account was an articulation of Lee 
and Chin's success and failure in a society with open opportunity for one to decide his/her 
future path. The key in this story was “choice” in a land of opportunity – keep working hard 
for the future career and get rewarded from life, or abandoned one's life to despair and 
become a drug addict. This echoes with Rosen’s findings in Mei Foo where “choice” was a 
valuable experience among the middle-class homeowner. 
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Optimism also arouse from observation about the rapid improvement of the 
infrastructure of the colonial city. When travelling through the city by bus, Chunyu Bai 
compared the past city with its recent improvement in the form of high-rise buildings. He 
concluded that the Cross Harbour Tunnel is “a wonderful piece of engineering linking 
Kowloon and Hong Kong Island”.298 This infrastructure saved people a lot of time. He also 
articulated his observation about the city with the knowledge of future urban planning and 
looked forward to a better Hong Kong. The major new developments of the colonial state 
would be the new towns and the mass transportation system, 
“Just building upwards won't solve the housing shortage. The government has to 
develop the rural areas and build more satellite towns. More people will certainly 
move to satellite towns in the near future,” he thought.299 
These formative experiences and optimism were part of the early stage of the “tunnel 
effect” 300 with a hope effect – “hope in the tunnel”. Australian Anthropologist Ghassan Hage 
uses a similar analogy of queuing at a bus stop to make sense of the function of hope in 
maintaining social order. Homeownership in Hong Kong during the 1970s to 1990s functions 
like a kind of queuing. People gather in a queue is a collective that join together under a 
contingent condition. They don't share any group identity. A queue is merely “a plurality of 
isolations”,301 and some people join and others leave with order. In this analog, the queue 
symbolizes social order, and its individualization and self-governing effect works as long as 
the queue continues to distribute social resources in an orderly and smooth manner. In the 
context of economic development, improving infrastructure and the booming housing market 
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in the 1980s and 1990s, one's gain was not seen as other people's loss and the target of envy, 
but the proof that the society is improving and one can wait patiently to share its fruit.302 
In the early stage of economic development when queuing and “hope in the tunnel” 
still functions, the state would find the citizens surprisingly easy to please. However, this 
came with a cost if the traffic jam was prolonged. When the hope of upward mobility 
remained unfulfilled for a long period of time, the citizens would turn out to be an enemy of 
the established order. Hirschman had also warned us about this possibility, 
But suppose that the expectation is disappointed and only the right lane keeps 
moving: in that case I, along with my left lane co-sufferers, shall suspect foul play, 
and many of us will at some point become quite furious and ready to correct manifest 
injustice by taking direct action (such as illegally crossing the double line separating 
the two lanes.303 
We will discuss the accuracy of this prediction again in Chapter 5. Here in 
Hirschman’s discussion, the hope mechanism in house buying was vulnerable in two 
conditions. First, if one's waiting time within the tunnel was prolonged while people in other 
lanes were moving forward rapidly. Second, the collapse of the “tunnel” could happen, if the 
economy stops growing, or there is economic downturn and a crisis of the housing market 
happens. 
The undercurrents had emerged already in the late 1990s. Social inequality was 
growing and the rich-poor gap was widening. As shown in Figure 3.7, social inequality as 
indicated by the Gini Coefficient grew at a particularly rapid rate between 1986 and 1996, 
alongside the booming housing market, and the increase in the median income of household. 
In the field of homeownership, the difference between the owners and non-owners was 
significant. This difference was not only on the effect of wealth accumulation in the booming 
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house market. Actual transactions were less frequent in owner-occupancy, and hence one 
could not “cash in” as easily from the rise in housing price of an apartment where they were 
living. Thus, the exchange value of the apartment would often remain values on paper. The 
major difference was that the non-owners, like public and private rental tenants, suffered 
from the erosion of savings and earnings in the booming housing market. The owners could 
enjoy potential life chances by re-mortgaging for other expenses, “trading up” in the housing 
ladder, or securing a retirement plan by selling high and stepping down the ladder. And the 
non-owners lost these potential chances as well.304 
 
Figure 3.7 Gini Coefficient Indicator (1971 – 2001). 
Source: Social Indicators of Hong Kong. (2018). Gini Coefficient 
 
The booming housing market widened the gap of existing class and generational 
difference between owners and non-owners. “The capitalist, the service class and supervisors 
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and technicians”,305 who were also more likely to be private property owners, further 
surpassed those who were not able to afford homeownership. And the timing of entering the 
housing market was critical as well. The late comers from the younger generation in the 
1990s would not be able to enjoy the rapid growth in exchange values of the housing market 
and the advantages it brought about. Koo's conclusion about homeownership in the 1990s 
rightly pointed out the discrepancy between the owners and non-owners, while the informants 
in the public sector were realistic about their impossibility of achieving homeownership. Yet, 
they still wished to join this game if the chance arose. 
However, this “formative experience” fell only in a certain period and among a 
segment of the population. After years of rapid increase in property price, all the 
informants in public sector (most of them are from lower income groups) claimed that 
private housing was beyond their reach. Although they have similar perception that 
property owning is a kind of investment for assets accumulation, they just find no way 
to join the “game”.306 
Thus, at the end of 1990s, house buying already had discrepancies between the actual 
living experiences among the local population. The social discontent could still be controlled 
under the relatively egalitarian distribution of hope because the tunnel had not yet collapsed. 
However, as Smart and Lee also warned as, the property-led growth system would also 
generate social instability through the condition of both rising and falling housing prices, 
challenging “the profitability of non-real estate companies and the daily lives of ordinary 
people”.307 This was evidenced in the Struggle Period of house buying after 1997 and the 
Asian economic crisis. In Chapter 4, I am going to outline the structural changes that 
happened in this period, and will further discuss the young adults’ responses in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 – Collapse of Housing Ladder and Narrowing of Opportunity Structure in 
the Struggled Period 
Chapter 2 and 3 explored the significance and the historical formation of House 
Buying as a hope mechanism. This chapter is going to discuss the change in the temporal 
mapping of the future of House Buying since 1997, when the housing ladder has collapsed 
and the objective opportunity structure on the social plane is narrowing. I term this post-97 
era as the Struggled Period of House Buying. From 1997 to 2017, Hong Kong first 
experienced the political handover of sovereignty from the British to the Chinese 
government, and transformed from being a Crown Colony to Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the rule of China. Meanwhile, Hong Kong suffered 
from two economic crises – the Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath between 1997 and 
2003, and the Financial Tsunami in 2007 and 2008. Hong Kong suffered more from the 
former, and it led to the retreat of the HKSAR government from the role of investing in and 
actively regulating the housing market in 2003. 
Social discontent was evident in two large-scale protests in 2003 and 2004, each with 
about 500,000 participants. After 2003, Hong Kong's economy bounced back, yet the 
population was further polarized after 2008, following the influx of external capital as a result 
of the Quantitative Easing of the US government and the Chinese economic stimulus 
program. One consequence of the influx of money was skyrocketing housing prices, which 
further contributed to the polarization. Social polarization, along with the struggle for the 





largest sit-in protest in the history of Hong Kong. It occupied three major commercial areas 
of Hong Kong and lasted for 79 days. 
 
This chapter is going to discuss the political, economic, social and cultural shifts 
underlying the above events. Politically, the influence from business sectors on the policy of 
the HKSAR government became explicit and formalized after the handover in 1997. 
Economically, the process of deindustrialization has been completed and the economy of 
Hong Kong now relies almost completely on the property-led growth regime of 
financialization. Along these political and social shifts, socially the opportunity structure has 
been narrowing. The gap between rich and poor has been widening, and society is 
increasingly polarized through indicators such as occupational structure, income level, and 
living space. This brought about a cultural turn. A new set of post-materialist values and 
discourses has emerged. This emergence poses a challenge to the belief in materialism and 
the dominant discourse of the market. The increasingly polarized society also created the 
discursive resources to reflect upon the ideology of open opportunity and evaluate the above 
political, economic and social changes. 





The above shifts affected House Buying particularly on the collapse of the “housing 
ladder” and the narrowing of the opportunity structure on the social plane. “Housing ladder” 
is a housing path designed by the colonial state in the late 1970s. It consists of three steps 
from bottom to top – public rental housing, subsidized homeownership and private 
homeownership. The middle step now has been collapsing for two reasons: the cessation of 
the subsidized Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) in 2003, and the skyrocketing housing prices 
since 2008. People at the lower end who are or have not entered the step of public housing 
are stuck, and cannot see the opportunity of moving forward in this housing path towards 
private homeownership in this Struggled Period of house buying when the middle step is 
missing and the final step is increasingly unattainable. 
4.1 Social Policy: Failed Response from the State 
House Buying suffered the most damage from the government policy in the housing 
market for its cessation of the HOS as we shall discuss soon in this section. Yet this “free 
market” approach to the social policy is not an isolated case. Social policy to offset the social 
problems that are caused by polarization has been short-term, piecemeal and “neoliberal” in 
general. For instance, in 2008 after the Financial Tsunami, the government appointed a 
temporary task force (Task Force on Economic Challenges) to revise its policy. The 
economic measures they implemented were designed to have relatively long-term results, 
while the social policies are supposed to be aimed at relieving the immediate hardship. The 
former measures are mostly about sustaining long-term economic growth, including 
strategies to strengthen “the six economic areas where Hong Kong has enjoyed clear 





cultural and creative industries, environmental industry, and educational services”.308 
However, the measures in social policy are mostly short-term. These included providing 
temporary jobs and internship that lasted from six months to three years, a one-off grant of 
HK$1,000 for students who are from the families which are already receiving social security 
assistance, and paying the basic rent for two-months for public housing tenants.309 
The government began to implement plans to privatize public services, especially in 
the realm of housing and property management. The commercial assets in public housing 
estates, like shopping malls and car parks, were grouped together under a private company – 
The Link.310 The rationale for the creation of this company was to boost the property market 
and aid economic recovery.311 However, the social consequences of the formation of this 
company were significant. Under its management, smaller local shops were gradually driven 
away because they were unable to pay the higher rent that chain stores could afford. The 
shopping experience became homogeneous and limited to more expensive choices. As a 
result, the everyday grocery expenditures for public housing tenants was higher.312 
The most significant impact on the hope mechanism of House Buying was the result 
of the government's decision to stop intervening into the housing market in the early 2000s. 
During the economic recession from 1998 to 2003, the HKSAR government adopted the neo-
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liberal ideology that “economic growth is the best way to enhance social welfare”.313 Hence, 
the government chose economic and social policies that maintained low taxes and low public 
spending to restore economic growth during the recession.  
In this context, the government's housing policy took a drastic turn. At the beginning, 
in 1997, Tung Chee-hwa, the first Chief Executive, proposed to ease the property bubbles in 
the 1990s by introducing a large-scale housing project to build 85,000 housing units annually 
in the first year of the HKSAR era. But after the Asian financial crisis, the economic downfall 
disrupted Tung and his administration's original plan. The subsequent economic recession, 
the plummeting of housing prices and the pressure from the propertied class and property 
developers in the political system of “corporatist state”314 forced Tung to not only withdraw 
his interventionist plan, but also to totally retreat from the housing market. Through this 
drastic policy turn, the HKSAR government sent a strong “political signal” to the market that 
the HKSAR government was going to “guard the property market from further decline”.315 
In 2002 the government announced its total retreat from being an active participant in 
the housing market, and suspend the subsidized Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), in which 
the government builds and sells apartments with a 30% to 40% discount lower than the 
market prices. “A Statement on Housing Policy” made the government's repositioning of its 
role clear: “Government should withdraw from its role as property developer”,316 and 
“withdraw as far as possible from other housing assistance programmes to minimize 
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intervention in the market”.317 In the conclusion, the HKSAR government reiterated again: 
“home ownership should be a matter for the market with which Government should refrain 
from competing.”318 From 2004 to 2007, the HKSAR halted the subsidized homeownership 
scheme and stopped building any subsidized housing units.319 Meanwhile, the supply of 
public rental housing hit a record low.320 Scholars had suspected the reasons behind this to be 
“the pressure of property and financial interests”321 and “the pressure exerted by developers 
on the government”.322 
As the HOS vanished, this also caused the shrinking of the first step in public rental 
housing. While the HOS had been popular in the 1980s and 1990s, the applicants were 
selected through a lottery. The public housing tenants had to return their public housing units 
to the government in exchange for a higher chance in the lottery. Without the incentive that 
can encourage the existing tenants to return their public housing units, the queuing time for 
the new comers in public rental housing is further prolonged. 
The government's retreat from the housing market accompanied the changing 
conception of “being self-reliant” promoted by the HKSAR government since the mid-1990s. 
At the beginning of the colonial government’s promotion of private house buying in the 
1980s, being self-reliant only meant not using the social welfare provided by the government 
in the official discourse of the colonial state. The objective of the colonial government's 
subsidized homeownership program was to add an incentive for the population to return the 
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public housing units they occupied to the government by entering the private housing market. 
Thus, the HOS aimed at setting up the subsidized housing as the next step on the housing 
ladder for those capable, to finally move into the private housing market. It helped “fulfilling 
a double purpose of providing new homes for those who can afford to buy them and of 
simultaneously making rented accommodation available for those who cannot”.323 
The wealthy tenants in public housing were seen by the government to be those who 
misused the public resources. Adding to the incentive of HOS that encourages these tenants 
to return their units, the colonial state forced the rich tenants out to rely on themselves in the 
housing market through charging extra rents. The government implemented “the Housing 
Subsidy Policy and Policy on Safeguarding Rational Allocation of Public Housing 
Resources” (the more common name is the “Well-off Tenants Policies”) in 1986 and further 
modified in 1993. The policy required the tenants who lived more than 10 years in the public 
rental housing to declare their income and wealth biennially. Those who exceeds the limit 
were required to pay extra rents (1.5 to 2 times of the normal rent). The colonial government 
stated that “it is plainly wrong that public housing should continue to accommodate tenants 
who have the financial resources to meet their own housing requirements at the expense of 
those with a genuine case for rehousing”.324 After all, the government policy treated public 
housing as social welfare for the needy, instead of a social right of the whole population. 
Since the mid-1990s, “self-reliant subject” gained another layer of financial meaning 
in the official discourse. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, homeownership was often 
addressed by the colonial state in the context of soaring housing prices, and characterized as 
the cause of unhappiness of the population that affected its legitimacy.325 Subsidized 
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homeownership was the response to increase the housing supply and to satisfy the 
population's desire for homeownership. In 1996, homeownership was addressed for the first 
time not only as a legitimacy problem and social need of owner-occupancy. Homeownership 
was put on the table in the official discourse as a desirable investment object and carried the 
meaning that one can make use of his/her own apartment as the financial tool to solve one's 
individual problems. The HOS in its official statement outlined multiple reasons for 
promoting homeownership. It stated that in addition to the sense of belonging to the 
community, homeownership can also enhance “personal financial planning and security” – 
“in Hong Kong, ownership of property has also proven to be a popular and valuable 
investment”.326 It was an investment vehicle of a family's finance. Despite the 1997 
handover, this financialization turn of homeownership remained unaffected even during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998.  
Property is one of the most important components of the economy. A good home is 
also an important factor in maintaining the quality of life, and the residential property 
market in particular serves as both a major vehicle for the personal investment of 
wealth and a public barometer of social stability.327 
This way of talking about homeownership continued in 1999 and 2000. “For most 
people in Hong Kong, a home is more than a place to live. It represents the most important 
investment in their lives”,328 and “people buy property not only as a home, but also as an 
important long-term investment”.329 The homebuyers are also the self-reliant investors in the 
official discourse. The government's action was not to help them directly, but to retreat from 
intervening into the “free” housing market. Under such neoliberal ideology, maintaining a 
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“free” market was seen as a decision that benefits these homebuyer-investors. As we shall see 
in the focus group discussions in Chapter 5, such financialized imagination of 
homeownership has become commonplace among the young adults when they understand 
homeownership as the safety net, not only as a shelter, but also as a financial tool. 
4.2 Political: Corporatist State 
The collapse of the housing ladder, besides the immediate cause from the shift in 
government policy and official discourse, is set in a series of structural changes: the increased 
influence of real estate conglomerates in the formal political regime; the real-estate driven 
financialization of the economy; and the widening gap between rich and poor. These 
political, economic and social shifts will further be discussed in the following sections. 
The deliverance of sovereignty from the hands of Great Britain to China in 1997 is the 
watershed moment in the history of Hong Kong. No longer a Crown colony, Hong Kong now 
is the Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under the rule of China. But the consequence 
of the transition in the political system has not been a turn from a capitalist to a communist 
regime, or decolonization. Instead the most significant political change is the formalization 
and institutionalization of the influence of sectoral interests over the government’s policy. 
Political scientist Ma Ngok terms such a regime “the corporatist state”.330 Together with the 
property-led financialization of Hong Kong’s economy, real estate conglomerates are now 
one of the most influential actors in government's economic and social policy, including 
housing policy. 
Before 1997, the colonial state had collaborated with the local elites. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, colonial Hong Kong was ruled in the form of synarchy. Both British merchants 
                                                 





and Chinese industrialists were incorporated into the political system of the colonial 
government and were appointed as the members of Legislative and Executive Councils since 
the early 20th Century. Yet this collaboration between the colonial state and the elites was 
achieved “under-the-table”, and was “informal, not well institutionalised and relatively 
restricted”.331 As a remote British colony in the Far East near China, the colonial government 
carefully maintained its posture of non-intervention. It avoided directly subsidizing specific 
sectors or firms to avoid the conflicting interests of the British merchants and Chinese 
industrialists. The local population also seemed to accept the role of the colonial state in 
balancing the interest of the public and the business community for the sake of the economic 
growth this “non-intervention” policy brought about.332 
The situation changed before and after the handover in 1997. During the transition 
period in the early 1980s, the colonial state experienced a legitimacy crisis333 under the 
shadow of the Communist China's takeover. There were waves of migration among the 
middle-class in the 1980s and 1990s from Hong Kong to other developed countries like the 
US, UK, Australia and Canada. In response to the crisis, the colonial state modified its 
appointment system to incorporate voices from the local population, as well as the business 
and professional elites. The Legislative Council gradually was opened to general election in 
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1985, and was divided into two constituencies: the “Geographical Constituency” (GC) and 
the “Functional Constituency” (FC). The Legislative Council members from the GC were 
elected by the whole population according to their residential districts, while the members 
from the FC were elected by major business and professional groups. This system also aimed 
to meet the possible “populist” demand from the public by increasing public expenditures and 
social welfare. A “balance” was achieved by giving full weight to the “representation of 
economic and professional sectors of Hong Kong which are essential to future confidence 
and prosperity”.334 These economic and professional sectors included: designated 
organizations from the industrial and commerce sectors; professionals, like schoolteachers, 
lawyers and medical doctors; corporate sectoral representatives, in which the voters are the 
“corporations” but not individual persons. For instance, in the finance sector, the voters are 
the representatives from the licensed banks instead of the bank employees. Other sectors 
included insurance, catering, financial services, import and export, wholesale and retail, 
transport, textile and garment, and real estate and construction, etc., as well as social 
organizations, including labor unions, and sports and cultural groups. 
After the handover, the Chinese government continued to use the GC and FC system 
as it befitted China's interests and strategy. Building a “united front” with the business and 
professional elites in Hong Kong has been the most important task of Chinese officials in 
Hong Kong since the mid-1980s. Their objective was to ensure the stability and prosperity of 
Hong Kong, and the smooth transition of sovereignty335 in the handover. For Chinese 
officials, the FC system serves the function of maintaining the confidence of the local 
capitalists and professionals through promising their continued representation and political 
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dominance after 1997. In this way, the politically conservative business and professional 
class were incorporated into the ruling regime, and this class became “a convenient ally for 
Beijing to help fend off the democrats' demand for full-fledged democratisation”.336 In 
addition to the FC system, the Election Committee for the Chief Executive in Hong Kong 
was designed in the same vein to make sure “the industrialists and businessmen will continue 
to stay in the establishment”.337 One of the consequences of the corporatist political 
framework was the uneven distribution of resources, through which the represented sectors, 
like the real-estate and financial sectors, continue to grow and influence the government 
policy.338 
As a result, unlike the non-intervention postures of the colonial state, the policy of the 
newly established HKSAR government is heavily influenced by corporate interests; yet the 
interests are not unified or coherent. Since the handover, in response to the conflicting 
interests between different sectors, the government's interventions are often piecemeal and 
fragmented. This has raised a new legitimacy crisis for the HKSAR government. In the past, 
the colonial state could maintain its posture of staying neutral and above sectoral interests. 
This posture granted legitimacy to the colonial state without democracy, and the local 
population believed in the state's ability and willingness to keep the balance between public 
and private interests and prevent excessive rent-seeking. Now, the rationale and objective of 
the HKSAR government is constantly called into question because of the disappearance of its 
neutrality towards the business and professional class.339 Sectoral groups and their 
representatives in the Legislative Council often accuse the HKSAR government of favoritism 
                                                 
336 Ma, N. (2016). P. 252. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. P. 262. 





that privileges the interests of other sectors above theirs, and hence ask for more subsidies to 
expand their sectors. The pro-democratic parties in Hong Kong also attributed the plight of 
the lower class and widening income disparities, and the government's retreat from the 
housing market in 2003 “to the political dominance of the business class”, and identified the 
FC as the symbol of such collaboration.340 
4.3 Economic: Deindustrialization and Financialization 
One factor that influenced Hong Kong’s transition from a light industrial city into a 
global financial hub was the Open Door Policy of China in the late 1970s. China provided 
cheap labor, land, and low production costs that enticed Hong Kong industrialists to move 
their factories across the border. The deindustrialization and relocation of manufacturing 
industries from Hong Kong to the nearby provinces in the Mainland around the Pearl River 
Delta started in the late 1970s and was completed in the 1990s.341 Another factor that 
influenced the shift of Hong Kong's economy was the entry of China into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. This ended the monopolistic role of Hong Kong as the major 
entrepot in the trade between China and other parts of the world.342 After deindustrialization, 
Hong Kong's tertiary sector became the vital component in the economy. In 2016, the tertiary 
sector contributed 92.2% of the GDP of Hong Kong.343 Within the tertiary sector, “financing 
and insurance” (17.7%), “real estate, professional and business services” (11%), and 
“ownership of premises” (10.7%) added up to almost 40% of the total GDP. Hence, Hong 
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Kong's economy now heavily relies on finance and real estate, and is vulnerable to crises 
from internal and external causes.344 
Hong Kong's finance-led regime of accumulation is a real-estate centric model as 
discussed in Section 3.2. In such a regime, “the close links between real estate markets and 
governmental finances in Hong Kong… institutionalize the centrality of concern for real 
estate prices and help to disseminate expectations for ever-increasing rents”.345 The 
shortcoming of a real-estate centric model of finance-led growth regime is that when housing 
prices rise quickly, the unaffordability of housing becomes a serious social problem. 
Increased rent was one of the factors driving the manufacturers in Hong Kong to relocate 
their factories to the Mainland, and/or turn their attention to property investment for more 
profits with less effort. However, when housing prices plummet, it harms the wealth of the 
propertied class and the manufacturing industries, and other small-and-medium enterprises 
are also affected because most of their reserve capital is real-estate based.346 
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the subsequent economic recession, lasting 
until 2003, showcased such downside of a real-estate centric model of finance-led growth 
regime. The downfall of housing prices caused negative equity for homebuyers who had 
purchased their home at the peak in 1997. This also affected the economy and the 
employment market when manufacturers and small businesspersons had also invested in real-
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estate. As a result, the closing of local companies and industries caused high unemployment 
rates347 following the collapse of the housing market. In 2002, “more than 150,000 families 
fell into a category of those having negative assets” and “bankruptcies rose, from 780 
recorded cases in 1996 to a high of 26,922”.348 From 2000 to 2003, the GDP continued to 
drop from 1 to 3% annually and the unemployment rate reached the historical height of 8.5% 
in 2003 during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. (See Figure 4.2 
and 4.3) 
 
Figure 4.2 Year-on-year % change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1997 - 2016). 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2018). Gross Domestic Product (GDP), implicit price 
deflator of GDP and per capita GDP. 
 
                                                 
347  Smart, A. and Lee, J. (2003a). “Housing and Regulation Theory – Domestic Demand and Global 
Financialization”. Pp. 103 - 104. 






Figure 4.3 Unemployment Rate (%) (1997 – 2017). 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2018). Labour Force, Unemployment and Underemployment. 
 
The influence of the Mainland on Hong Kong's economy is also apparent. In 2003, 
the signing of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)349 marked the deepening 
economic integration between Hong Kong and China.350 For instance, the direct investment 
from the Mainland tripled from HK$928 billion to HK$3,043 billion between 2001 and 2011. 
The inflow of Chinese capital has had multiple consequences on Hong Kong society. Market 
confidence was restored following the inflow of external capital from the Mainland in the 
local retailing sector, and opened the “China opportunities” to the trade, commerce and 
finance sectors. The GDP grew from 4.8 to 9.8 annually between 2004 and 2007. After a 
                                                 
349 CEPA was signed in 2003. It is a free trade agreement between Hong Kong and the Mainland China on 
four areas: “trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation”. The HKSAR 
government introduced the objective to be “accelerating the economic integration and enhancing the long 
term economic and trade development of both places.” Trade and Industry Department, HKSAR. (2018). 
“Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)”. 





short recession in 2007 and 2008 following the Financial Tsunami, the GDP was restored in 
2010 and 2011 with 7.1% and 8.9% growth, and continued to experience around 4-6% 
growth annually between 2012 and 2017. The unemployment rate was decreasing as well. 
From 2003 to 2008, the unemployment rate decreased from 7.9% to around 3%. This went 
back up in 2009 to 5.3% after the Financial Tsunami; yet later the rate decreased again back 
to around 3%. (See also Figure 4.2 and 4.3) 
The economic growth resulting from external Chinese capital came with a heavy 
social price. The influx of external capital contributed to the rise of housing price from 2003 
to 2008, and an even more drastic increase since 2009. This was caused by the Chinese 
economic stimulus program with US$586 billion package351 and the wall of money it created 
in search of assets investment opportunity. Real estate in Hong Kong was one of its targets. 
The capital from China directly invested in real estate of Hong Kong increased from US$20 
million in 2008 to US$1.6 billion in 2012.352 The external capital was one of the main factors 
that pushed up the housing prices in Hong Kong in the Struggled Period. Between 2003 and 
2017, housing prices have risen more than 460%, while the median monthly employment 
earnings have increased only around 50%.353 In addition, young adults' (aged 20 – 29) median 
monthly employment earnings is lower than the average with only around 30% increase.354 In 
this skyrocketing market, House Buying has lost its connection to ordinary people's 
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long-term aftermath is the rapid increase in debt. Dittmer, L. (2018). China's Asia: Triangular Dynamics 
since the Cold War. P. 42. 
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353 See Figure 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2 for more details. 
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experience. To repeat, Hong Kong has been the least affordable private housing in the world 
since 2010, far surpassing other private housing markets in developed societies.355 
As we are going to discuss in the next section, this influx of capital caused social 
polarization across the society. The gap between rich and poor continued to widen despite the 
recovery from economic recession. The Gini-coefficient had already been high among 
developed societies in the late 1990s and it continued to grow even widener in Hong Kong 
from 0.533 to 0.539 between 2001 and 2016 (Figure 4.4). In 2016, Hong Kong was the 
second-most unequal city in the world in terms of income.356 The so-called “China 
opportunities” that the CEPA generated were also distributed unevenly. They benefited 
specific sectors that could generate profit across the border, such as commerce, finance, and 
trading; yet local professionals, like teachers and doctors, were left behind. The privileges of 
external investment were also more concentrated in the established companies and hence 
furthered the growth of existing conglomerates.357 
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357 Szeto, M. M. and Chen, Y. C. (2011). “Mainlandization and Neoliberalism with Postcolonial and Chinese 






Figure 4.4 Gini Coefficient Indicator (1971 – 2016). 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2012). Half-Yearly Economic Report 2012. & Census and 
Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2018). 2016 Population By-census 
 
4.4 Social: Increasing Social Polarization and Narrowing of Opportunity Structure 
Private homeownership was further disconnected to the lower-middle class 
population, especially in the context of social polarization. Since the 1980s, social structure in 
Hong Kong changed following deindustrialization, and social polarization in occupational, 
income and spatial division have increased as a result. In addition to the widening rich/poor 
gap as shown in the Gini Coefficient, the higher and lower ends of the service sector have 
expanded and the middle-income group of manufacturing jobs has been almost entirely 
eliminated.358 Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show the difference between the numbers of persons 
engaged in manufacturing sectors and other sectors. In the 1980s and 1990s, we see a 
dramatic fall in the numbers of persons in the manufacturing sectors, the equally dramatic 
expansion of the service sectors like retail, and the continuous growth trend of the finance 
                                                 





sector. In the 2000s, employment in the manufacturing sector continued to decline to less 
than 100,000 people. The finance sectors, including finance, insurance, real estate, 
professional and business services, and the service sectors, including retail and personal 
services, continue to expand. 
 
Figure 4.5 Number of Persons Engaged by Industry Section (1981 – 1996). 








Figure 4.6 Number of Persons Engaged by Industry Section (2000 – 2017). 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR. (2018). Number of Establishments, Persons Engaged and 
Vacancies (other than those in the civil service) Analysed by Industry Section. 
 
Income inequality increased as well among different types of workers. From 1991 to 
2001, the median monthly income of the whole labor force increased by 93.4%. Among 
different occupations, the median monthly income of managers and administrators increased 
by 116.7%, while elementary occupations (like cleaners, messengers and security guards)359 
increased by only 51.4%.360 Since 2001, the difference in income became more drastic as the 
general trend of income growth slowed down. In 2001, the difference of median monthly 
income of managers and administrators (HK$26,000) was around five times more than the 
elementary occupations (HK$5,300). In 2011, the gap widened to seven times greater. The 
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former occupational group's earnings increased by around 40%, and the latter group's 
decreased by around 6%.361 In other words, the rate of growth of income at the higher end 
was more rapid than those at the lower end. This widened the rich/poor gap in Hong Kong in 
the 2000s.362 
Deindustrialization of the occupational structure has meant limited occupational 
choices for new workers. Young adults who do not perform well in the formal education 
system mostly ended up working in entry level jobs in the expanding retail or the service 
sectors that do not require high academic qualifications. In these jobs, job insecurity, 
temporary contract work, and unclear career paths have been the norm in the name of 
flexibility or “survival strategies of enterprises”.363 
The risk of unemployment is also unevenly distributed in Hong Kong. Workers in 
manufacturing and other low value-added industrial sectors (including retail, accommodation, 
food services, and especially in construction) have a higher risk of unemployment than other 
sectors including the seemingly vulnerable financial sector as well as the most stable sector – 
public administration and social service. Unemployment rates for higher-end workers like 
managers and administrators are also considerably lower.364 Young and older workers have 
higher unemployment risks than the middle-aged. The age group 15 - 19 and 20 - 29 suffered 
the highest rates of unemployment. Their present livelihood can still be aided by family 
support for the moment. Yet the jobs they end up getting are usually temporary and low-
skilled jobs that do not accumulate valuable work experience for future career development. 
Thus, “they will face particular risks of long-term social and economic exclusion and induce 
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high social costs”.365 Low-income workers in general also suffered further “downward 
mobility” through wage reduction, overdue wages, or alterations in their contracts, while 
lacking labor protection including “insurance, maximum working hours or provident 
funds”.366 
Even among the middle-class, there is increasing disparity between the finance 
workers who can work across the border, and other professionals in community and social 
services who are tied to the local, such as social workers, teachers, nurses, and doctors. 
Especially after CEPA, “China opportunities” opened up for the workers in the sectors of 
trade, commerce and finance as part of China's rapid economic development in the 2000s. 
These opportunities in the Mainland left local middle-class professionals behind. The trickle-
down effect of such “China opportunities” has been limited, no matter the direct benefits 
gained from participating in the Mainland for the finance workers, or the indirect 
improvements in local economic confidence. Thus, local middle-class professionals found 
that “the promise that further economic integration of Hong Kong with the Mainland would 
bring benefits to all sounds remote. …they have not yet felt the impact of the economic 
recovery.”367 
Recent research368 indicates that social polarization between 2001 and 2011 did not 
only take place on the level of occupational structure and income level, but also at the socio-
spatial level. The deprived groups, especially the homeless and ethnic minorities, are 
concentrated in the poorer districts.369 During the same period, districts were further polarized 
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with rich districts getting “richer” or and poor “poorer”.370 Meanwhile, the rent difference 
between the highest and lowest rent districts has increased from 7 times to 13 times from 
2001 to 2011.371 
4.5 Cultural: Emergence of Post-materialist Values and Discourses 
Alongside the corporatist politics, deindustrialized and financialized economy, and 
polarized social structure, the cultural ethos of Hong Kong has hints of change with the 
emergence of post-materialist values and discourse. As discussed in Chapter 2, the population 
of Hong Kong has been characterized by the discourse of the market since the 1970s. The 
discourse of the market is the belief in “market” as a free world of consumption that is 
unbounded by anything. This discourse encourages detachment and calculation, and is often 
accompanied by a set of materialistic values – materialism. Materialism prioritizes tangible, 
material choices, like food and shelter, over non-material choices, like democracy, social 
justice and freedom. In the Struggled Period, we see new challenges towards both the 
discourse of the market and materialistic values. 
On the level of shared experience, the long journey from being refugees to climbing 
up the social ladders with the material proof of homeownership had granted the population 
the pleasure of celebrating the capitalist system, and freedom of choice in the colony. Lau 
Siu-Kai372 describes the Chinese family ethos as “utilitarianistic familism” – “among the 
familial interests, materialistic interests take priority over all other non-materialistic 
interests”.373 Baker describes the emergence of a unique type of individual in the 1970s: the 
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“Hong Kong Man” who lived in the city and was associated with the materialistic ethos of 
get-rich-quick.374  
The market discourse and materialistic values was often articulated by the 
establishment to reinforce a depoliticizing effect.375 The hidden message in the market 
discourse is that Hong Kong people care only about market choices, material needs and 
economic considerations. According to this discourse, abstract values like democracy and 
freedom are remote to the local population. In recent years, the depoliticizing articulation of 
the market discourse and materialistic values has been resurrected again in popular 
discussions, especially during social movements. For example, in Lee and Chan’s376 analysis 
of the news reports on social movements by the conservative, pro-establishment newspapers, 
“Hong Kong people are economic animals” appear regularly. The political struggle was then 
reduced to a struggle that is driven by economic hardship and rewards only. Law links this 
economic orientation to the narrative framework initiated by the British colonial government. 
377 In this framework, Hong Kong’s economic achievement has been emphasized to cover up 
the social problems of the colonial past. After the 1997 handover, the Chinese and HKSAR 
governments continued to use this narrative framework generalizing Hong Kong people as 
“economic animals”, with the only difference being how much credit is given to the 
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contributions of the Chinese government in CEPA for the economic prosperity of Hong 
Kong. 
Despite the dominant market discourse and materialistic values that were circulating 
throughout the HKSAR and Chinese governments, these discourse and values have faced 
challenges since 1997. Non-materialistic378 or post-materialistic379 values emerged in the 
protests against the newly-established HKSAR government throughout the 2000s. These 
protests began to connect themselves with ideas of civil society, democracy, and freedom. 
Yet this did not happen right away. At first, these protests were about materialistic 
considerations and were motivated by the poor performance of the government in 
safeguarding people's wealth. Thus, the participants, unlike the social movements in the 
1970s and 1980s initiated by the grassroots or the downsized workers in the process of 
deindustrialization, were middle-class investors in the stock and property market. For 
instance, in 2000, there was a protest that gathered “5,000 people in five separate petitions 
representing different interests, including those of doctors, social workers, and property 
owners”.380 This protest was restricted to complaints about the inability of the HKSAR 
government to carry out its role of efficient administrator in upholding people's economic 
interest.  
Gradually a new discourse of citizenship381 among the middle-class population 
emerged in the social movements during 2003 and 2004. These two movements were the 
largest scale of marches in the history of Hong Kong, with approximately 500,000 protestors 
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in each.382 A group of intellectuals and professionals attempted to articulate the movements 
with a set of core values of Hong Kong beyond the discourse of the market. These values 
included “liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, fairness, social justice, peace and 
compassion, integrity and transparency, plurality, respect for individuals, and upholding 
professionalism”.383 They worried about the deterioration and weakening of the city's 
“governance and business environment”, and “institutional rationality and social cohesion” 
since the handover. They called for the local population to take action and defend their social 
freedom. Ma Ngok discusses these social movements in 2003 and 2004 as “civil society in 
self-defense”.384 
While the above social movements represented possible middle-class non-
materialistic values, other social movements expressed a critique of the discourse of the 
market and the underlying assumption of Hong Kong's capitalist system and way of living. 
These movements criticized neo-liberalism and stressed the importance of local community. 
For instance, Chen and Szeto discuss the “New Preservation Movement” from 2003 to 2008. 
The movement included Lee Tung Street (Wedding Card Street) movement from 2003 to 
2007, and Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier movements in 2007 and 2008. These movements 
aimed at preserving the local landmarks and communities, like Lee Tung Street, Star Ferry 
Pier and Queen's Pier. 
They argue that these movements are an example of a progressive localism in the 
making. The movements responded to the government's project of privatizing public assets 
(e.g. The Link), and also the gentrification brought about by the massive urban renewal 
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projects in the 2000s. They argue for going beyond the traditional social movement model of 
Hong Kong. In the old model in the 1980s and 1990s, the organizers and the participants 
aimed to struggle within the system of parliamentary democracy in the elections of 
Legislative Council, pressing for universal suffrage to elect the Chief Executive, and for 
increasing social welfare and resources. 
The supporters of progressive localism recognized the importance of these aims, yet 
they differed from the old model in the way they developed a bottom-up democratic 
movement based on local communities. These supporters aimed at constructing the new, 
decolonialized subjectivity of the Hong Kong people, and hence emphasized “the rediscovery 
of Hong Kong subjectivities emerging out of the acts and agencies embedded in actually 
existing local community resistance and community building processes”. 385 They challenged 
both the state and the conglomerates. On one hand, they protested the undemocratic urban 
planning system within the government. On the other hand, they fought against the 
neoliberalism characterized by commercialization of public space and collusion between the 
state and the conglomerates. 
The above cultural changes influenced the younger generations, particularly by 
allowing them to acquire a language to criticize the government and social inequality, and to 
reflect on their own situation. Lee and Tang have an inspiring discussion of this turn which 
they termed as “post-materialism”.386 In their focus group research, they found that the values 
of the younger generation had changed. Young people were more concerned about abstract 
values like democracy and freedom, instead of merely about survival and subsistence. 
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Lee and Tang suggest that changes in the material base, for example, economic 
growth and the transition towards an affluent society, are not sufficient to bring about the 
cultural turn in post-materialism. They instead propose two contextual reasons behind this 
turn: first, prolonged social inequality and the dysfunction of the ideology of open 
opportunity; and second, the experience of being raised in a more democratic environment 
with discourses of abstract values. For the former reason, as we have discussed in the 
previous sections, the economy bounced back after the recession in 2003, yet the rich/poor 
gap was still widening and social polarization worsened. In this context, the ideology of open 
opportunity — that one can gain success through individual efforts in an open society — had 
lost its credibility. Young adults, who grew up without the experience of sharing in the 
economic growth like the older generation, questioned this ideology. To them, the widening 
rich/poor gap was seen not as a reasonable outcome of fair competition between isolated 
individuals, but the evidence of social injustice in the system. 
For the latter reason, the young adults Lee and Tang interviewed are capable of 
articulating and debating post-material issues. They can reflect on issues about environmental 
protection and criticize the problems of developmentalism. Lee and Tang attribute this ability 
to their upbringing and socialization. These young adults grew up in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and were living in a society where the values of democracy and freedom had dominated and 
been taken for granted compared to the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the colonial state 
began to promote the general election of the Legislative Council, and political discourses had 
proliferated in the media. Thus, Lee and Tang conclude that post-materialism is not only a set 
of values, but also the discourses and reasonings that circulate in the public sphere. They 
believe that post-material discourse has become popular among the younger generation, yet 
they also admit that the struggle between and coexistence of material and post-material 





how far have the discourse of the market and materialistic values been challenged in young 
adult's discussion of housing and homeownership? 
To conclude, behind the failure in the government’s social policy of responding to the 
widening gap between the rich and the poor is a series of political, economic, social and 
cultural changes. Politically, the formation of a corporatist state allowed the real estate 
conglomerates to have more influence on government policy and damaged the legitimacy of 
the HKSAR government. Economically, the deindustrialization and financialization of the 
economy, accompanied by the implementation of CEPA, brought about a private housing 
market that was easily affected by the influx of external capital. Socially, the rich/poor gap 
was widening despite the recovery from the recession from 2003, and the society was 
increasingly polarized. Culturally, the experience of increasing social inequality in the midst 
of affluence387 and the proliferation of new political discourses went beyond materialism 
helped to cultivate a post-materialist turn in the younger generations. 
The above contextual changes have weakened the material base upon which the hope 
mechanism of House Buying was built in the period between the 1970s and the 1990s. House 
Buying and the “hope in the tunnel” it produced has lost the optimistic temporal mapping of 
the housing ladder and the previously-accepted belief of open opportunity in an era of 
skyrocketing housing prices. Apparently, House Buying should have lost its ability to 
produce hope in the above contextual change. But as we’ll see in the next chapter by 
analyzing the data from focus group interviews among the relatively better educated young 
adults, House Buying continues to produce hope through a discourse of “waiting for the 
                                                 














Chapter 5 – Hope through Waiting for the Coming Crisis 
House Buying as hope mechanism produces three social processes: individualization, 
self-governing of the subject, and the hope effect. To continue the tunnel metaphor, all the 
people that are going through the tunnel do so as a collective that is joined together 
contingently without any group identity. They are a group of isolated individuals or “a 
plurality of isolations”.388 When the queue is moving, people join and leave at different times. 
People queuing up in the lane share the self-governing tendency to be disciplined and wait 
patiently, as long as the queue continues to move smoothly and orderly; waiting seems to be a 
temporary condition of exception. This process of moving along contributes to the hope 
effect. Those who were left behind in the process of economic growth are not likely to be 
moving well in the tunnel and, as a result, have the unpleasant feeling of prolonged waiting. 
Yet, this unpleasant feeling was compensated to a certain extent during a historically 
contingent moment – the early stage of economic development. 
This hope mechanism had its “hour of truth”389 in the 1970s to the 1990s when Hong 
Kong was undergoing rapid economic development. At this early stage of economic 
development, the observation that people in other lanes were able to move could have been 
read as the signal of hope that my chance of moving is coming soon, instead of as evidence of 
social inequality or as the target of envy.390 (See Figure 1.1) One could hope to seize the 
                                                 
388 Hage, G. (2009). P. 103 
389 Hirschman, A. (1982). “Rival Interpretations of Market Society”. P. 1481; Wong, T. W. P. (1995). Pp. 
389. 





coming opportunity through individual effort. This “hope in the tunnel” to a certain extent 
compensated and depoliticized the suffering produced by waiting in the queue. People could 
interpret the shortage of affordable housing and high housing prices as individual issues, 
instead of a widespread social problem that was caused by the colonial and capitalist system. 
This chapter examines the consequence of what happens to House Buying when 
queuing no longer functions the way it did in the past. The last chapter traces the recent 
structural changes in Hong Kong that lead to the collapse of the housing ladder. Now, 
without the housing ladder as a means to connect the self-reliant subject and the middle-class 
life goal, the question is, has the population been “(re-)politicized” and developed a stronger 
social awareness in their imagination of the society? Will a stronger sense of social awareness 
turn the young adults into “an enemy of the established order”?391 In this chapter, we find a 
“yes” to the first question, but a “no” to the second one. Despite the increased social 
awareness about the dysfunction of the government and housing market, young adults in this 
research project channel their social discontent through a discourse of waiting for the coming 
crisis, and seek to be self-reliant in the market. In this sense, the hope mechanism has 
changed, but is also paradoxically reinforced amid the increased social awareness and 
discontent. (See Figure 1.2) 
The findings of this chapter are derived from focus group interviews I conducted in 
the summers of 2014 and 2016. In these two summers, I participated in a large-scale, 
longitudinal research project392 about the cultural values of Hong Kong people. I took this 
                                                 
391 Hirschman, A. and Rothschild, M. (1973). “The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course 
of Economic Development”. P. 552. 
392 This research project is led by Prof. Francis Lee from the School of Journalism and Communication in 
CUHK, in collaboration with Dr. Chan Chi-kit, Dr. Leung Kai-chi, Dr. Tang Kin-yat and Miss Vivien Zhang. 
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the focus groups and enjoy valuable discussions before and 





opportunity to observe and ask questions of participants to discern how they articulate House 
Buying. Thematic, semi-structured focus group interviews were used to “take account of the 
complexity, layering and contradictoriness of all lived cultural forms”.393 This research 
concerned interviewee's narratives not as “self-evidently authentic”394 experience, because 
what is expressed is always already in discursive forms. Asking a discussion question always 
involves both discourses and experience, the articulated and the lived. This method can grant 
us a more general understanding about how an issue is discussed in a group setting, where 
“participants have to explain, justify and argue for their opinions”.395 The objective was to 
trace the dominant discourse and social imagination these young adults share, and to see what 
political effect the discourse and social imagination produce.  
These focus groups were conducted in Cantonese.396 I interviewed a total of 73 young 
adults ranging from early 20s to their early 30s and relatively better educated. They were 
separated into 12 groups of 5 to 7 young adults each. In total, there were 42 female and 31 
male participants. Groups were divided by their educational background and work 
experience, except one group which was formed by their living experience in Hong Kong as 
frequent movers (Group 12). (See Figure 5.1) Four groups were university students, four 
groups were university graduates who had worked for a few years, two groups were associate 
degree student and graduates and one group was young professionals. The students were 
usually in their early 20s, and the graduates were in their mid to late 20s.397 We asked the 
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interviewees to discuss several hot topics from news and online forums, which were aimed at 
prompting people to discuss their future planning. I also posed this rhetorical question: “Is it 
worth it to exhaust one's youth on homeownership?”398 This question prompts the 
interviewees to simultaneously reflect on the general meanings of material return, dreams, 
happiness, life goals, and the relation between two generations. In general, the young adults 
have a strong distrust of the government, and a strong sense to survive instead of achieving 
social upward mobility. 
One major shortcoming of this sampling is that it missed the young adults who have 
not had associate degree or higher educational qualification. This bias should not be 
overlooked. The discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis” should be read as prevalent to 
the better educated young adults, yet its articulation in the relative lower educated groups 
should not be assumed until further research is conducted in the future. The subsequent 
analysis also missed out sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and class difference. These differences 
should also be attended and explored in future research. 
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president of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Prof. Joseph Jao-Yiu Sung. He was a relatively 
outspoken and liberal president in the academy of Hong Kong, and had an official blog on the university 
website to communicate with his students. In a blog post titled “The Taste of Youth” (4th March 2016), 
Sung criticizes the corrosive influence of the market discourse and the pressure from older generations on 
the upbringing of young people. At the end, he poses this rhetorical question – should one spend the youthful 
period on a house as the ideal material return, or should young people spend this time working on other 







Group 1 July 2014 6 University Graduates with a few years of working experience 
(5 Female and 1 Male in their mid to late 20s) 
Group 2 July 2014 5 University Graduates with a few years of working experience 
(3 Female and 2 Male in their mid to late 20s) 
Group 3 June 2014 6 University Students (5 Female and 1 Male in their early 20s) 
Group 4 June 2014 7 University Students (4 Female and 3 Male in their early 20s) 
Group 5 July 2014 5 Associate Degree Holders with a few years of working 
experience (2 Female and 3 Male in their mid to late 20s) 
Group 6 June 2014 6 Associate Degree Students (3 Female and 3 Male in their 
early 20s) 
Group 7 June 2016 7 University Students (4 Female and 3 Male in their early 20s) 
Group 8 June 2016 7 University Graduates with a few years of working experience 
(3 Female and 4 Male in their mid to late 20s) 
Group 9 June 2016 7 University Students (5 Female and 2 Male in their early 20s) 
Group 10 July 2016 7 University Graduates with a few years of working experience 
(4 Female and 3 Male in their mid to late 20s) 
Group 11 May 2014 5 University Graduates with a few years of professional 
working experience (2 Female and 3 Male in their mid to late 
20s) 
Group 12 May 2016 5 young people who were in their 20s. This is a unique group 
which we call the Frequent Movers. It was formed by those 
who had moved their home from one district to another 3 times 
in 10 years. (2 Female and 3 Male) 
 






5.1 Gloominess of Young Adults with Social Awareness 
The most striking impression I got from the focus group interviews was a picture of 
gloominess. Among all social issues, including careers and education, housing and 
homeownership were one of the areas that easily provoked the interviewees to express 
pessimism. Yet, the gloominess was not only about the issues of sheltering and family 
making. The interviewees articulated their gloominess to the social imagination of Hong 
Kong society in general, or what I have called the social plane. This section aims at teasing 
out the meanings of their gloominess – imagining the social plane of Hong Kong as “a pool 
of stagnant water”.399 Discussing this image of stagnation is necessary to ground the 
subsequent discussion of the reimagination of House Buying. 
The word “stagnant” highlighted the key characteristic of young adults’ imagination 
about the social plane. This imagination of Hong Kong social plane as stagnant was not 
prompted by immediate suffering from life and death issues. At the time of the focus groups 
the present conditions were unpleasant and social inequality was visible, yet the social 
problems were not serious to an extent that many people had moved into the condition of 
unemployment400 or homelessness. “Stagnation” pointed to the narrowing of the future 
opportunity structure on the social plane one imagines himself/herself to be situated in. 
This suffocating image can be contrasted to the social imagination of open 
opportunity in the 1970s to the 1990s, which Wong described Hong Kong as an imperfect 
utopia.401 In his research, people in general believed that Hong Kong was a place with an 
                                                 
399 As we shall see in later section, this description was used by an interviewee to describe his feeling towards 
Hong Kong’s present condition in his mind. 
400 The unemployment rate has been low and is about 3% in today’s Hong Kong. See Figure 4.3. 
401 Stephen Chan understand the temporality of Hong Kong in the 1990s with the following formula: 
“Present”, if it cannot embrace any forms of utopian ideal or urge, perhaps it's because the people has already 





open opportunity structure where one can have the chance to move up through individual 
effort. This world was by no means perfect, because people clearly had unpleasant 
experiences when living in Hong Kong. They could clearly vocalize their dissatisfaction in 
work, class, social inequality and the political system, and describe their problems: “failure to 
derive satisfaction from one's work, seeing conflicts between the haves and the have-nots as 
inevitable, seeing the big corporations as having too much power, to the view that there is 
much inequality in mobility chance between different classes, and to a pervasive sense of 
political impotence”.402 
Yet these experiences of inequality and discontent had not been articulated into a 
social criticism of the whole social system and the status quo.403 At that time, maintaining the 
status quo and social stability was a popular slogan across the public sphere, and hence the 
politicians repeatedly promised that the Hong Kong way of living would continue after the 
handover in 1997. The general wish of the local population in the 1970s, over 80%, in fact, 
was to “have the status quo maintained”.404 And the public had also taken social stability and 
economic prosperity to be “the benchmarks of ‘legitimacy’”405 and prioritized maintaining the 
status quo over democracy and social justice. For instance, in a survey conducted in 1977, 
57.3% of the respondents regarded maintaining social stability to be “the major responsibility 
                                                 
it's because the historical imaginary of the people has already been dissolved by the existing social and 
cultural constraint. “Future”, hasn't it been already indifferently tamed, acquiesced, unimagined in advance?” 
Chan, S. C. K. (1997) “Unimagined the Future”. P. 275. 
402 Wong, T. W. P. and Lui, T. L. (1993). “Morality, Class and the Hong Kong Way of Life.” P. 18. 
403 There was such possibility in the 1960s when individual problems were articulated into social problem 
as shown in the 1966 and 1067 riots. The subsequent social reforms by the colonial government could 
provide a dominant individualistic discourse in the context of rapid economic development. Social 
movements existed, but they were articulated more to the personal issues to fight for more social resources 
instead of structural change towards colonialism and capitalism. 
404 Lau, S. K. (1982). P. 104. 





of the government”, while only 10.5% placed “the construction of a democratic and 
egalitarian society on the top priority list of governmental responsibilities”.406 
 In the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, people mediated their experience through 
the imagination of a social plane, which was perceived to be a trajectory characterized by 
open opportunity. They articulated their unpleasant experiences through a narrative of self-
reliant expectation, wherein an individual exercised “initiative and choice”407 to try different 
paths and “make a better living”408 in the open yet imperfect utopia. To the people at that 
time, “the world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil”.409 
“Most of the respondents put the blame of failures not on the government or its policies, but 
on themselves.”410 After all, they believed that “one has to attend to one's business, there 
being no use in showering the failures with sympathy”.411 People in general carried the hope 
that waiting while working hard would be rewarded eventually. Thomas Wong summarized a 
unique temporal mapping of the future behind the imperfect utopianism – a combination of a 
realistic assessment towards their unpleasant condition, the actual possibility of social 
mobility, and “optimism in the future”.412 
Hong Kong people’s imagination of the social plane has changed drastically since 
then. The young adults I interviewed in 2014 and 2016 shared a similar realistic assessment 
of their conditions and dissatisfaction with life issues as those adults in the 1990’s surveyed 
by Thomas Wong on work, class, social inequality and the political system. While the 
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dissatisfaction with work, social inequality and the political system existed well before the 
1997 handover, the key distinctive element of the younger generation in today’s Hong Kong 
is their disbelief in the chance for an individual to take “initiative and choice” to try various 
paths and achieve a better life. Young people are also not convinced, like previous 
generations, that maintaining the stability of the status quo is beneficial to the whole society. 
Contrary to the image of “the best of all possible worlds” and imperfect utopia in the past, the 
status quo in today’s Hong Kong was described by the young adults as “a pool of stagnant 
water”. The pessimistic, gloomy picture matched Cultural Studies scholar Stephen Chan's 
recent discussion about the cinematic engagement with “the absence of hope” in Hong 
Kong.413 Chan proposed that the movies he discussed capture “the collective panic, anger, 
frustration and anxiety”.414 In these movies the subject is presented “in a state of gloomy 
uncertainty, unsettling fascination and devastating despair”.415 
Chan's discussion is about the cinematic imaginary of Hong Kong, and has not 
touched on the actual articulations among young adults about his proposed “absence of 
hope”. My subsequent ethnographic findings enrich and supplement Chan’s observation, and 
do not only focus on the issues about housing. I outline the young adults’ discussion of the 
social plane in general to ground their specific concern about homeownership and hope in 
Housing Buying in the latter half of this chapter. The following two sections are going to 
discuss two characteristics of their social imagination. First, the young adults as shown in this 
research can go beyond the individual, and discuss the social elements of their life problems. 
Second, their social imagination consists of economic, social and political elements which 
articulates the status quo as stagnation, instead of stability. 
                                                 
413 Chan, S. C. K. (2017). “Un-imagining the local/future: cinematic engagement with the absence of hope”. 
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5.2 Identifying the Social Factors in Stagnation 
In their discussion of the life problems they faced, we can summarize two approaches 
when articulating the reason behind their frustration. These two approaches are the individual 
and the social. Unlike the previous generations which were inclined to articulate life 
problems as individual issues, these young adults now were more inclined to take a social 
approach and were capable of identifying the social root behind these problems. 
The individual approach to understanding the life problems articulates their frustration 
over future paths as part of a normal stage of youth — one is getting lost when facing the 
transition towards adulthood and the school/work transition. The younger participants of the 
focus groups, who were still studying in the university, tended to have a more personal, and 
even existential approach when discussing stagnation. They suggested that youth is a period 
when young adults are in search of the meaning of life. When they are leaving the family, 
they negotiate between their own aspirations, and the demands and expectations of their 
parents. Family, the educational system, and career choices are the immediate issues that they 
are frustrated about.  
The individual approach can become a philosophical and personal reflection on the 
meaning of life. For instance, Lau416 and Erin417 were both participants in the focus group of 
university students. Lau shared her experience about expectations she felt from significant 
others on future career and family making. She carries the responsibility to be a breadwinner 
and hence she must secure her future career and homeownership. Similarly, Erin saw life as 
an endless pursuit with a series of interim goals such as studying, getting a job, getting 
married and giving birth to children. People keep pursuing the next step of the life trajectory 
                                                 
416 Lau was a female university student in Group 9 (2016) in her early 20s. 





on the social plane endlessly under these external social expectations. These expectations 
from significant others serve as a force that keeps them pursuing success. Like Erin said in 
the focus group, 
At last, if one fails to reach these goals, then other people, including my parents or 
the social atmosphere, will push you to continue. This way of pursuing one life goal 
after another seems to be endless and exhausting. When will be the end to the 
expectation of others and myself? In general, this is quite grey and dim. 
In the focus group discussion, the individual approach was not the only engine that 
people discussed reflecting on life planning. The social approach often accompanied the 
above personal reflection and went a step further to examine the social roots behind the 
interviewees’ frustrations over future movement in life. The young adults examined and 
connected both perspectives together. Thus, they had gone beyond the perspective of isolated 
individuals, and now had a social awareness of the problems they are facing. One outstanding 
case would be Joyce,418 who was in the same focus group with Lau and Erin. She connected 
this personal approach towards her life trajectory with a critical reflection on the social 
system, in particular the pervasiveness of materialistic cultural priorities. Joyce described 
these social conditions as “grey” or “gloomy”, when a person’s dream is subordinated to 
material consideration. For example, she described her experience of learning music. Her 
mother had long been nurturing Joyce’s interest in music.  However, when she proposed 
pursuing music as a career, her parents did not approve. In her parents’ eyes, this interest falls 
under the need of serving a materialistic purpose, like getting into a better school by having 
better cultural capital than other students. Her parents worried, what if her interest in music 
exceeded this practical purpose and became a “genuine interest? When Joyce considered if 
                                                 





her interest in music could be developed into a career, her parents stopped this dangerous 
tendency saying, “you cannot feed yourself by doing music. Don't do it.” 
Up to this point Joyce case was still a very typical experience many middle-class 
families might have when discussing the future career of their children. But then, Joyce's 
personal approach became connected with a social criticism about the political system of 
Hong Kong. To Joyce, career, and more broadly the development of industries, is not only a 
choice of an individual but is also shaped and supported by the government policy. The 
policy in Hong Kong often seems like “having a banner with a slogan to promote some ideas, 
yet with no concrete plan to really achieve the goals”, as Joyce put it. She clearly cited the 
previous failed examples of Hong Kong to promote the arts and youth development. 
But the problem is on the social system. For example, the government have developed 
some infrastructures like the Cultural District and the Youth Square. The objective is 
to nurture the creativity of young people like us by providing space. But these 
infrastructures are not designed and planned by those people with related 
background, like arts or musician. They are merely politicians or civil servants. So 
those infrastructures failed to achieve their objective in the end. 
Joyce’s analysis of the social context was commonly shared by other young adults as 
we shall see in next section when further discussing the content of this social approach. In 
general, they have a strong and subtle sense of social awareness and can acknowledge the 
social causes of their personal frustration. They can further articulate their gloominess into a 
narrative of stagnation about how the government failed to construct a more open social plane 
in today’s Hong Kong. 
5.3 Imagination of a Stagnant Social Plane 
A second characteristic of the social imagination articulated by the interviewees 
combined the stagnant social plane with three discursive elements: first, a narrative of the 





opportunity structure and high living costs; second, a strong social awareness of the weak 
social support system and problematic housing policy after the government’s shift to a hands-
off approach to the population; and third, a strong sense of political impotence towards the 
political system that refused to reform and take the young people’s discontent into account, 
particularly after the Umbrella Movement in 2014. 
The first element is a narrative that Hong Kong society has passed the period of rapid 
social and economic development. In this narrative, while opportunity structure expanded as 
Hong Kong’s economy grew rapidly in the past, now the structure has fully developed and 
reached a relatively stable stage. “Stability” is another name for “stagnation” in the young 
adults’ eyes, and the “stability” of the existing social system makes the opportunity structure 
“unmalleable”. Parks419 was the interviewee who described the status quo of Hong Kong as a 
pool of stagnant water. He invoked this image when comparing the stable development in 
today’s Hong Kong with other social systems he perceived to be “unstable”. This image 
implies that a social system should be “unstable” enough to allow people to have hope that 
things can change — “those places that are unstable are the places with most hope”. But 
Hong Kong is too “stable”, and hence “stagnant” to the younger generations. I perceive his 
use of “unstable” to mean the “malleability” of a social system that allows the possibility of 
change. To Parks, this would also mean conditions can change for the better in the future. But 
“Hong Kong nowadays is just a pool of stagnant water, and the problems in the social system 
are difficult to change”. 
The malleability young adults longed for corresponds with what is considered open 
opportunity in economic terms and was related to the developed economic stage. We can find 
                                                 





a clear expression of such “unmalleability” from Daren.420 He expressed his discontent about 
the high rental costs that hold back his entrepreneurship and has efforts to try new paths in 
life. “If I want to start my own business, no matter what kind of business it is, the rent has 
already impeded its development.” Daren believed that the paths to success in Hong Kong 
were now narrow and fixed after years of development driven by the financial game of 
speculation in the property and stock market. 
This image was further strengthened through comparing the developed Hong Kong 
with other developing societies in terms of housing price and living expenditures. Parks had 
touched on the this when he proposed that Hong Kong is stagnant. Another interviewee, 
Eva421 provided a concrete case and compared Hong Kong with Xi'an, a second-tier Chinese 
city. She found that the private housing price is surprisingly cheap. She shared that her 
friends living in Xi'an told her that a property located at the city center cost only a university 
graduate's two-month salary. This story may not be accurate, but what matters is her 
reasoning. She used this story to support the narrative: during the early stage of economic 
development, even though people’s economic life was often poor, opportunities were open 
and the society was vibrant for its open-endedness. Yet at the stage of a fully developed 
economy like Hong Kong, “the housing price and living expenditures are so high, and the 
salary is so unreasonably low. And you just can't catch up with the rise (of the living costs)”. 
Now that economic development has slowed down in Hong Kong, young people find the 
rapid increase in rental, housing and living costs have held them back from trying new paths 
in life. Especially when considering the speed of increase in housing price and living costs, 
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they cannot sense the possibility for upward movement and the achievement of new life goals 
supported by a salary increase and hence feel stagnated.422 
The second discursive element that is related to young people’s perception of 
stagnation is a strong sense of social awareness. This awareness is shared in young adults’ 
discontent and distrust over the social system and government policy. The depoliticized and 
individualist attitude towards social inequality, which was dominant between the 1970s and 
the 1990s, has vanished in the focus group discussions. Going beyond the older generation’s 
individualist approach to solving their problems in life, now the young adults are very aware 
of the HKSAR government's hands-off approach in social policy and can articulate its social 
effect in the widening rich/poor gap, and more broadly its failure in constructing a more open 
social plane for the young adults to imagine and connect to a better future.  
Young adults’ social awareness was evidenced in their everyday observation about 
the government’s hands-off approach towards the social problems. Esther423 criticized the 
government policy of outsourcing and privatization by using the example of The Link.424 To 
Esther, such policy is indeed a political statement, “the government is not going to intervene 
into the livelihoods of the population; the private firms can go ahead to do whatever they 
want.” Most shopping malls in the public housing estates originally designed for the lower-
class population now are privatized by the government. 
                                                 
422 Harris (a male working university graduate in his mid-20s. He was in Group 8 2016.) gave us another 
perspective to understand this comparison between Hong Kong and other places. He visited Taiwan for a 
while. And his lesson was that each place has its own problem. If we take the salary in Hong Kong to live 
in Taiwan, then we may live a good life there. But for those young people there, considering the salary of 
the fresh graduate, they may earn less than the young people in Hong Kong. The Taiwan government has 
not helped them at all. 
423 Esther was a female working university graduate. She was a professional in Group 8 (2016) in her mid - 
late 20s. 
424 The Link is a private company that controlled the commercial assets in public housing estates, like 





The consequence is that the private companies aim to maximize profit and renovate 
the shopping malls with middle-class style. This drives up the rent of these shopping malls, 
and as a result the shopping experience in these malls became homogenized and more 
expensive because only the chain stores can afford the rent. What Esther described is a 
process of gentrification; she further connected this process to the overrepresentation of 
sectoral interest in the political system of Hong Kong that neglected the needs of the lower 
and middle classes. This analysis mirrors Ma Ngok’s discussion of the corporatist state.425 
The young adults recognized that the problems were about inequality in the social system, 
instead of merely the result of administrative inefficiency or political miscommunication. 
Young adults were also aware of the impact of government’s policy in housing 
problem, and could articulate its relation to the increase of housing prices, the collapse of the 
housing ladder and the dominance of the real estate conglomerates in the private housing 
market. They understand that it is not only the social plane that is stagnant, but that this 
stagnation is produced in large part by the collapse of the housing ladder that connects the 
self-reliant subject and the middle-class life goal along a clear temporal line. The university 
graduates especially cannot opt for the housing choice of public rental housing because their 
salary exceeds the maximum income ceiling.426 Yet, they are not well-off enough to catch the 
skyrocketing housing price since 2008. Kathy is a middle-class professional in her late 20s.427 
She felt trapped in-between public rental housing and private homeownership. Following the 
government’s retreat from the housing market and the halt of HOS since 2002, the discounted 
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to apply public rental housing for an individual is HK$11,540. See Section 2.5 for more details about the 
viable housing choice among the young adults. 





homeownership as the middle step provided by the government has gone. Kathy complained 
that, 
Older generations may have begun by living in the public housing unit, moving on to 
HOS housing, and after all achieving private homeownership. But in my generation, 
people lost the step in the middle after the halt of HOS. You can't live in public 
housing. Either you are very rich and achieved homeownership, or you'll have to go 
private renting. The step in the middle is missing for one to buy a house. 
The desire towards homeownership will be discussed in section 5.5. Here I only 
outline that private rental housing is often seen unfavorably among the young adults for two 
reasons. First, the cost of renting is high as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.5. Second, 
money spent on the rent is often seen as “dead money”.428 This money is “wasted” because it 
can “originally” be used as the down payment for homeownership – the ultimate destination 
for one’s savings as I shall discuss later. 
Young people’s social awareness consists of a subtle understanding of the dominance 
of the real estate conglomerates in Hong Kong, and complained about the collaboration 
between the real estate conglomerates and the HKSAR government. In the focus group, many 
participants speculated about how these conglomerates use the strategy of accumulating 
undeveloped land and delaying the selling of buildings to control the housing supply. When 
an interviewee, Keith,429 raised this point, two interviewees joined the discussion. First, Paul 
speculated that the government has collaborated with these conglomerates430 because “they 
are the major source of government revenue. And almost 60 – 70% of the population may 
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429 Keith, Paul and Angus are from a unique focus group of Frequent Movers in 2016 (Group 12). They are 
all young adults who are in their 20s to 30s. 
430 This observation is similar to Alice Poon’s discussion in her work, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong 





probably be working for these real estate conglomerates. These conglomerates have extended 
their reach beyond real estate, and monopolized many businesses in Hong Kong”. Another 
interviewee, Angus, then complained about the government not charging tax on vacant 
properties. To them, this was yet another example that showed the incapability of the 
government in protecting the livelihood of the population. Their speculation reflects the 
strong distrust in the social awareness of the government and its integrity in safeguarding the 
interest of the local population. 
The third discursive element is a strong sense of political impotence. The implication 
is that the government should have worked to provide a better social plane for the younger 
generation to move forward and connect to the future, yet the government failed to respond to 
their requests. The criticism of the political system was not only directed at immediate 
problems, like having better leaders with good will. On one hand, they recognized the leaders 
of the HKSAR government did make a difference and were the obvious ones to blame. The 
participant named Parks431 proposed that to make the society more hopeful, at very least, the 
government and its leaders should show the young adults that they are willing to act and 
change the future direction of Hong Kong society by going beyond caring only about the 
sectoral interests. However, Parks found that “the changes” from the top are only lip service: 
“but now these people with power are mere hypocrites, and hence the young find they can do 
nothing besides voicing their request through the failed social movement.” 
On the other hand, they were realistic and understood that the structural problems, 
like the collaboration between the real estate conglomerates and the state will not disappear 
overnight even if the personnel in the government changed. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 
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state requires a long process to establish and accumulate. Tai432 said that merely changing the 
head of the government will not change the circumstance at all. “No one thing can change the 
society immediately”. Tai added that the population’s confidence in the government must be 
accumulated through a long process in which people can witness the accomplishments of the 
government. “The change can never be one-off.” Yet Tai concluded with this statement, “in 
Hong Kong, the people's opinion will never be listened by the government.” 
Young adults found themselves incapable in changing the social system and 
government policy that caused “stagnation” in the social plane, and felt that their voice does 
not make a difference after the Umbrella Movement in 2014.433 Alex434 expressed that the 
citizens of Hong Kong cannot influence the government's policy at all and connected his 
complaint again with the collaboration between the real estate conglomerates and the state 
under a corporatist political system. To Alex, this collaboration is the fundamental problem 
that can hardly be shaken by their collective efforts, 
Perhaps we can influence those minor issues, but we cannot fundamentally break the 
tight collaboration between the real estate conglomerates and the state. And those 
non-property owners can only be slaughtered by conglomerates and the rising 
housing price in this context. 
The sense of impotence was shared by other young adults, and together connect to a 
sense of hopelessness in changing the political system and social problems. Christine’s435 
expression was one that articulated the feeling of impotence clearly, 
after the Umbrella Movement, we know that no matter how much we do, we cannot 
change the reality. No matter how hard we try, how eager we are, the reality just 
responds: “you don't have the power to change”. So even those dramatic events like 
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the movement happened, we still see those problems remain unchanged. I think this is 
the source of a sense of hopelessness. 
The above two sections discuss the imagination of the social plane as stagnation 
among young adults from different educational and class backgrounds, who have a shared 
sense of discontent and entrapment. The further question is, does the shared social discontent 
and the sense of entrapment mean that the young adults have a critical reflection on the 
capitalist system and the commodification of housing in Hong Kong, and hence reject the 
financialized game of homeownership? As we shall discuss in the final section of this 
chapter, such conclusions did emerge in the interviews, but they remain an undercurrent and 
are not the dominant direction of the discussion among young adults. Most young adults still 
would opt for homeownership if they have a chance and the ability even though they show a 
strong sense of social awareness. The rest of this chapter is going to explore how the 
discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis” and the hope it produces channels people’s 
discontent through the market. The next section is going to discuss Ghassan Hage’s 
conception of the discourse – “Heroism of the Stuck” to illustrate how the discontent people 
experience in the process of prolonged waiting can be channeled into an even more 
individualized life project in the Australian context. 
5.4 Self-government in Waiting – “Heroism of the Stuck” (the Case of Australia) 
Thomas Wong,436 following Hirschman's theory, warned us in the 1990s that the 
tunnel effect is a double-edged sword. At the early stage of economic development, the state 
may find the citizens surprisingly easy to be pleased because they are waiting with hope. But 
once the expectations remain unfulfilled for a period, the sense of entrapment or immobility 
                                                 





can have the potential to turn people into “an enemy of the established order”. 437 Similarly, 
Hage suggests that “a viable life presupposes a form of imaginary mobility, a sense that one 
is ‘going somewhere’”.438 Waiting is the unpleasant condition that people tend to avoid and it 
can bring about political consequences in the “queuing in the tunnel” analog I have used. 
Hage draws upon Sartre and Badiou to suggest that when the queuing turns into an 
endless waiting, it can disrupt the individualization and self-governing effect of queuing. The 
crisis of prolonged waiting can provide a shared experience, a topic and a language for a 
group of isolated individuals to communicate with one another. In fused discussion, these 
individuals find out that the surrounding people are fellows who share the same unbearable 
sufferings from endless waiting. This sense of immobility “triggers the questioning of the 
existing social arrangement and leads to the social upheaval”.439 With this experiential and 
emotional foundation, the isolated individuals can have the potential to form a collective 
group to complain and find out the reasons behind the waiting, and act to break through the 
stagnant context. 
However, this transition from a group of isolated individuals into a collective group 
must not be taken for granted. Hage gives the example that the experience of prolonged 
waiting can be channeled otherwise through a discourse of “heroism of the stuck” and 
become another self-government project. Hage analyzes the Hansonites440 – the group of 
Australian white nationalists’ resonance of a survivor story in a catastrophic landslide – the 
Thredbo landslide. It happened in 1997 at a ski resort at New South Wales. A survivor, Stuart 
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Diver, buried and stuck under a collapsed building in freezing weather; Australians 
celebrated his survival and endurance. 
Hage highlights the resonance across the white cultural milieus as “the product of a 
form of imagined affinity between the sense of being both socially and existentially stuck that 
was expressed by many Hansonites, and the stuckedness of Stuart Diver under the 
landslide”.441 In Hage’s analysis, prolonged waiting has become a usual part of life in the 
white nationalists he interviewed. Global capitalism now brings about a social context of a 
precarious labor market. Job insecurity makes the working culture increasingly 
claustrophobic, because people are worrying about losing their jobs, and act as if they were 
constantly being watched for mistakes as excuse for layoff. This crisis of “being stuck in 
one's job” has become normalcy or a “permanent state of exception”.442 
This experience and sense of waiting endlessly are now articulated through a 
discourse of “heroism of the stuck” that changes the meaning of waiting.443 This discourse 
inverts the image of actors and non-actors in the crisis of being stuck. The heroes are the non-
actors who have the capacity of endurance to wait out the crisis, instead of the supposedly 
courageous actors. Today's good citizens should have the capacity and proper manner to 
endure crisis as the normal mode of living. Waiting out the crisis becomes a heroic action, 
and good citizens can assert agency in the act of waiting in a situation where they cannot do 
anything. Those who wait patiently become the civilized heroes “who get stuck in a classy 
way”.444 In the Australian context, besides the above “heroic” aspect, this also takes on a 
racialized and class dimensions. Those who do not know how to wait and complain or even 
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take action are not only uncivilized. They are also the “lower classes” and “third-world 
looking”. To Hage, this becomes a form of self-government that continues to be reproduced 
amid the prolonged waiting: 
It is here that the heroism of the stuck seems to me to signal a deeper form of 
governmentality, a governmentality that is reproduced even in times of crisis. Even 
when the bus does not come, even when people are feeling stuck in a queue that is not 
moving, they heroically keep on queuing. And this is self-reproducing: the more one 
waits and invests in waiting, the more reluctant one is to stop waiting.445 
Likewise, in Hong Kong, we must not take the transition from having social 
discontent to questioning the capitalist system for granted. In this research, I identify a 
discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis”, in which young adults imagine an external crisis 
to be the way to break through the temporal mapping on a stagnant social plane with a 
disappearing housing ladder. This discourse consists of two parts: crisis as an imagined line 
that connects the present and the future, and a strong sense of self-reliance to survive through 
the market. 
5.5 The “Coming Crisis” 
“Crisis” in the context of this research is different from Hage’s discussion in waiting 
out the crisis.  Hage conceptualized crisis as the collective stagnation across the population 
when queuing fails. Young adults in this research referred to this situation as “a pool of 
stagnant water”. Crisis carries another meaning to these young adults. Crisis is an anticipated, 
yet unexpected event (like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - SARS epidemic, a financial 
crisis, or a terrorist attack), which I termed “the Coming Crisis” within a narrative of 
economic cycles. Young adults expect the crisis to be an external disruption of the present 
suffocating stagnation, and it will help them move from the present self-reliant subject to the 






future goal of homeownership. Meanwhile, this crisis is domesticated under a selective 
historical narrative of the housing market – the ups and downs are parts of normal and 
predictable phrase of economic cycle, and homeownership is eventually the most reliable 
investment. The young adults welcomed, instead of dreaded, about the coming crisis, and 
perceived this crisis to be the “once in a life time” investment opportunity that one must 
seize. Despite strong social awareness, the individualization and self-governing effect 
remains strong in House Buying. After all, one still has to attend to his individual business 
and be prepared for the future opportunity of acquiring homeownership. 
When discussing their conception of the social plane, almost all young adults in the 
focus groups shared a sense of gloominess. As discussed in section 5.3, the opportunity 
structure is perceived to be narrowing and “unmalleable” when economic development of 
Hong Kong has passed the period of rapid growth. The young adults have the social 
awareness to recognize the role of government’s policy (including housing policy), speculate 
on its collaboration with the real estate conglomerates, and propose that the government 
should bear the responsibility to develop a more open opportunity structure on the social 
plane. In the meantime, the young adults have a strong sense of distrust towards the 
government and a sense of political impotence. 
This gloominess is the result of having no ways to break through the stagnant 
circumstance. Here the discourse of “Waiting for the Coming Crisis” with a hope effect kicks 
in and directs young adults’ discontent and future direction through the market. Only the 
scenario of the Coming Crisis provided hope. They discuss this scenario with both genuine 
enthusiasm and guilty pleasure characterized by dark humor. One salient future direction they 





Harris,446 articulates “crisis” most vividly with “hope”. When being asked what can give them 
hope, Harris said, “what if SARS or terrorist attack happens in Hong Kong?” 
The scenario was supported with a reductionist historical narrative by tracing the case 
of SARS epidemic in Hong Kong during 2003. Hong Kong was an infected area where 1,755 
cases and 299 deaths were reported. SARS was a critical incident that was often understood 
as the rock bottom in the contemporary history of Hong Kong. Political scientists like Ma 
Ngok447 would articulate SARS in the Spring of 2003 as one of the turnaround incidents that 
triggered the subsequent July 1 march with more than 500,000 participants in the same year; 
the march represented the civil society in self-defense. Yet, in young adults’ economic 
narrative, SARS was an excellent investment opportunity that they missed because they were 
too young at that time. Harris traced the price of the private housing estate, Amoy Gardens 
where SARS broke out. The price fell from more than HK$2.4 million in 1997 to 
HK$550,000 in 2003, and in 2016, its price had increased ten times and now was almost 
HK$6 million. Harris regretted that he lost this “once in a life-time” investment opportunity 
because he was too young and was studying in secondary school. Now, he wishes a crisis will 
happen again to provide him with the chance of buying a 500-600 sq. ft. property for the 
price in 2003. 
This economic narrative was selective and reductionist. First, the historical trajectory 
of the booming housing market since 2003 consists of contingent elements that cannot be 
easily replicated in the future, like QEII, CEPA, and China’ Stimulus Package. Second, the 
consequences of negative equity after the financial crisis in 1997 has been neglected.448 And 
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third, most importantly, the unemployment rate in 2003 reached the record high at 8.5%,449 
and jobs became further precarious since the financial crisis as discussed in Chapter 4 Section 
4.4. Some of the young adults indeed also realized the crisis’s effect on the whole economy 
that could possibly cost their job, and hence they would not be able to repay the mortgage. 
Yet by neglecting these details, the hope effect now embedded within waiting for the 
coming crisis, which the participants see as “revealed” in the history of Hong Kong, like the 
skyrocketing trend in the rise of housing price as shown in Figure 2.1. The notion that “what 
goes down will eventually go up” domesticated the supposedly devastating crisis and its 
damage, and highlighted the potential economic opportunity.  Other interviewees may not 
have articulated a crisis as devastating as SARS, but what in fact the disaster will be and the 
actual damage it may cause is not part of their concern or imagination. Indeed, these 
problems are not relevant. After all, this is just an imagination. The most important effect of 
this narrative was that most of the young adults in the focus groups were waiting and 
preparing for the coming economic crisis. The potential opportunity embedded in the coming 
crisis gave them hope during this time of waiting. No matter how slim and distant this “hope 
in the coming crisis” is, it sustains them to be self-governed, and to continue to work and plan 
even as through a gloomy social imagination. 
Waiting for the coming crisis consists of an assumption that homeownership is still 
the most reliable form of investment that every person in Hong Kong will invest in, and 
hence its price would eventually go up again after the coming crisis. Other young adults in 
the same focus group with Harris supplemented his economic narrative by referring to Hong 
Kong people’s (including their own) belief in homeownership as the preferred housing choice 
in Hong Kong. They estimated that people will rush to invest in the plummeting housing 
                                                 





market if such a crisis happens. In Chapter 3 Section 3.5, we have discussed the financial 
common sense – a belief in “little land, many people” since the early 1970s. This belief was 
still dominant among the young adults, even though it has been challenged by leftist scholars 
in recent years.450 As Daren said, “Hong Kong people still believe in ‘little land, many 
people’, and buying a house is the best way to get rich quick. Even gold is not as good as 
property in terms of being an investment.” 
Two characteristics emerged in their conception of property as an investment: first, 
house buying is “risk-free” when weighed against other investment tools, and second, a house 
is the proper destination of one's savings. In the first characteristic, house buying is the most 
reliable form of investment choice that one can hold onto without a second thought amidst 
the unpredictable financial market. This belief goes against the perspective of professional 
financial management. From that perspective, an investor should diversify risk into different 
investment tools because the market is difficult to predict.451 However, the investment 
strategies these young adults shared concentrates all the risk in one investment object – real 
estate, which is locationally fixed and is prone to social and political instability. 
Homeownership is now more than an ordinarily good investment as it was in the 
Formative Period. These interviewees articulated that homeownership is too “risk-free” to 
even be considered as an investment, while any investment is imagined to be risky. In the 
focus group, we asked a hypothetical question: if you earn HK$300,000 (USD$38,560) a 
year, how will you make use of this income? In general, people's responses were cautious 
towards investments, and interviewees generally put a big portion in savings. Kelly452, the 
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finance worker in her late 20s, put more than half of the annual income (HK$180,000) in 
savings. When asked if this portion of money could be used for investment, she clarified, 
“this portion of money all goes to savings. It won't be used for investment at all”. Kelly's 
reasoning is that,  
In investment, one can gain or lose. I have tried to invest before, but the loss cannot 
be covered by the gain. And some of my friends, who are older than me for around 10 
years, also think that one cannot gain a lot from investment. Hence, putting the money 
in savings is more secure. 
But later she elaborated more about her ideas in investment, savings and risk. Other 
investments, like stock exchange, were as risky as speculation or gambling. One must spend a 
lot of time on research to make speculation become investment. She could not afford the 
time, and hence she put all the money in savings as the future down payment. 
At the right moment, I prefer buying house. Thus, if you rent, the money is spent 
merely as expense.453 If one goes on renting until retirement, after 60 years it is still a 
kind of expense only. But if you have bought it, then you'll have finished all the 
installments by that time. You simply live there and pay the rates (the property tax) 
and government rent to the state. I think this can be called “The investment”. 
In this sense, Kelly's savings aren't merely savings after all. It is the preparation for 
future house buying. And “the right moment” is the moment when the coming crisis brought 
down the housing price. All other kinds of investment were regarded as unreliable in her 
conception unless one can do the homework to reduce the risk by acquiring related financial 
knowledge. House buying is different. This doesn't involve extra homework in her 
imagination, and indeed it is a no-brainer when comparing to other options for one to invest 
money in. It stands out as an investment for its reliability with no risk at all, and one can hold 
on to this asset after retirement. Kelly works in banking and supposedly has more financial 
knowledge than ordinary people, yet to her, saving a large portion of money in the bank and 
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waiting for the right timing to achieve homeownership is the best and most risk-free 
investment strategy. 
Homeownership as the most reliable investment was often accompanied by metaphors 
of liquidity and fixity. Capital should remain in its liquid form as savings, until it has the 
chance of entering into the housing market and being fixed in the form of homeownership. 
Jim454, a university graduate with a few years of experience also in the finance sector, put a 
large portion (HK$200,000) into savings, which is two thirds of the hypothetical annual 
income. His reason was that “in Hong Kong, buying bricks is more reliable in terms of value 
preservation than stocks.” He continued to elaborate, 
The stock market is too fluctuated, and we are only small investors. Hence, I would 
rather put the money as savings. …With this plan I can save $400,000 in two years, 
which is not bad. I'll put them in a time deposit, with a bit more interest. But I won't 
put the money in investment, like a plan of life insurance with savings. Those plans 
will freeze your money for a long time and I can't use the use money. Although at this 
moment, the interest rate of savings deposit is zero, at least you can use the money 
whenever you need to. If chance comes, then you can enter the housing market and 
buy a house. 
Jim's emphasis on how important liquidity is to one's capital expands on Kelly’s 
reasoning. He is going to catch the next opportunity to buy a house when the chance is right 
(thus when the crisis finally comes) following the aforementioned ups-and-downs of the 
housing market. The money in savings must be ready at any moment for this use. This 
emphasis of liquidity meets the metaphor of fixity in Jim's discussion. Kelly's sense of “risk-
free” is put metaphorically by Jim as “bricks” in describing the reliability of house buying as 
an investment in relation to the preservation of value.455 In Jim's conception, money should 
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take the form of a house as its destination, instead of savings, to preserve its value and 
purchasing power in the context of rapid asset inflation in the booming housing market of 
Hong Kong since 2008. 
The young adults recognize that the real-estate driven capitalist system in Hong Kong 
will not easily go away even if the coming crisis does happen. The coming crisis serves only 
as a one-off investment opportunity for the left-behind younger generation to catch up and 
share in a chance to become one of the vested members of the population. Like Joey456 said, 
“even a disaster cannot change the social system fundamentally.” The wealth of the Hong 
Kong society will continue to be concentrated in the hands of the older generation who hold 
the properties. The vested interest will continue to disregard the discontent and suffering of 
the younger generations. And the propertied class takes advantage of this unequal distribution 
by renting out their properties. Joey concluded at last, 
Should the world be like this? It depends if you or the one besides you are the vested 
interest group. If you are one of them, then of course you will accept this. 
5.6 Self-reliance – Buying a House as a Shackle and/or a Safety Net 
The previous two sections discuss a temporal mapping which combined a social 
imagination of a stagnant social plane, and a coming crisis to be the imagined line that 
brought about a future investment opportunity. No matter how distant, slim and nebulous this 
hope in the coming crisis is, the young adults are preparing themselves financially to catch 
this future opportunity when it comes. Even though the future of Hong Kong society is 
gloomy, at least the personal future feels changeable through the hope of the coming crisis. 
Thus, being stuck and having stronger social awareness do not automatically turn people into 
an enemy of the established order. Through “waiting for the coming crisis”, the individualist 
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subject formation of being self-reliant is still pervasive among young adults in the focus 
groups within the context of a strong distrust towards the government and its housing policy. 
What differs between the 1970s – 1990s and today is that while young adults are self-reliant, 
today’s young adults do not explicitly articulate that they are aiming at achieving the middle-
class good life. Rather, within the stagnant social imagination, they articulate the reason 
behind the goal of acquiring homeownership to be a seemingly contradictory image of a 
safety net – being simultaneously a shelter to live and financial tool to rely on. As discussed 
in Chapter 4 Section 4.4, this shift accompanied a change in the official government 
discourse; the meaning of “self-reliance” changed from “not using the government’s social 
welfare” to “owning a house as the financial tool to solve personal problems” since the late 
1990s. 
This section probes further into self-reliance and how homeownership and people’s 
imagination towards the future are articulated together. Homeownership is often attached to 
multiple, and often self-contradictory meanings.457 At the core, a reference to house buying 
collapses two choices – owner-occupier and real estate investment, each with its own lines of 
calculation and meaning. Owner-occupier is a housing choice that is different from other 
forms like public and private rental, and real estate investment is a financial decision as 
opposed to other investment decision including stock market, loans, and cash deposits. Both 
owner-occupier as a housing choice and real estate as an investment decision create a tight 
connection to the locality and in time. Through acquiring private ownership rights and a 
mortgage, the house buyers are tied in time under a fixed term in paying the installments, and 
are presumed to stay and live in this place in the long run. The use and exchange value of 
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their house is also tied to the local community, the prospects of the surrounding environment, 
and the stability of the society. 
This fixity of homeownership towards one’s future life planning can be interpreted 
very differently. Two seemingly opposing facets emerged in the discussions among the 
young adults in this research – housing buying as a shackle to one’s life opportunity or as a 
safety net458 in securing potential life chances. This was particularly salient among the 
middle-class and would be middle-class who cannot enjoy the public housing that was 
provided by the government.459 However, both images of shackle and safety net are indeed 
two sides of the same subject formation – self-reliance. 
The image of being shackled is derived from the fear of being constrained by the 
long-term commitment in the form of a mortgage. Following the collapse of the housing 
ladder, the middle-class and would-be middle class especially find themselves trapped in-
between public housing and private homeownership. Wendy460 worked as a professional for 
ten years. She withdrew from the goal of homeownership because it would drain her savings 
and insurance. Her depiction of being self-reliant was about relying on one's individual 
ability to earn enough money, pay the medical insurance plan, and save enough for 
retirement. The skyrocketing housing prices and the increasing cost of a down payment could 
cost her all the savings she had. Wendy expressed her worries, 
If I bought a house, everything I do would be for the house. I think the young 
professionals is the helpless group. We don't have subsidies at all. We need to take 
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care of ourselves like insurance and retirement… Adding these costs together, I have 
given up homeownership because I cannot afford it after paying insurance. 
Committing to homeownership and the mortgage produced a sense of entrapment in 
not only the housing choice, but also in their career. Another professional in the same group, 
Kathy461 has the savings for a down payment, which is often around HK$1,500,000 (around 
USD$200,000) in the current housing market. But she perceived it to be too risky to invest all 
her savings into homeownership because she could not afford to be unemployed or resign 
under the need of repaying mortgage with any savings, and hence she would be trapped in the 
present job. The fear for this group of young professionals is two-fold: on one hand, if they 
commit to homeownership, they will be deprived of other opportunities in life, like changing 
to a job that is more interesting but with less income, or resigning to explore other ways of 
living; on the other hand, they cannot afford losing the job, and thus will have more pressure 
in holding on to the present job for the sake of paying the monthly installments. Thus, Kathy 
said, “when you have bought the house, you'll have the pressure to hold onto this job for the 
whole life.” Homeownership in this sense is a trap that makes life planning inflexible, or even 
claustrophobic under the pressure of repaying the mortgage loan when the housing price is 
way too high. 
The image of a safety net is connected with the social use of homeownership as a 
shelter and the economic use of homeownership as a financial tool. This image seems to be 
contradictory – a house to be used simultaneously as a shelter and sold as an asset. This 
contradiction was reconciled when a booming housing market is taken for granted. Informed 
by the historical narrative of the housing market, focus group participants foresee that 
homeowners, just like those who bought a house in the 1980s and during the SARS epidemic, 
can enjoy the inflated housing price. In this image of the housing market, having the 
                                                 





ownership of a house is an asset that can accumulate wealth through the inflated housing 
prices even though it is only on paper for the time being. In this imagination, one can scale 
down to a cheaper flat in the future, and use the wealth gained as retirement funding. For 
instance, Lillian462 clearly described a property to be a financial tool for retirement, 
A property is an asset, an investment. You'll find that having a property in this 
booming market, its value will appreciate no matter what. And even if its price doesn't 
go up, at least it is an asset. When you are old, you can rely on it. You can even sell it 
for living expenses for retirement. 
An apartment can also potentially become a flexible source of capital in critical 
conditions.463 Financial tools, such as re-mortgaging as emergency fund and a reverse 
mortgage as retirement fund, make such scenario possible in people’s future planning. This is 
also how the banks promote these two types of mortgage. For instance, Bank of China 
highlight the financial benefit from taking out a loan at any time – “you can make use of your 
asset to satisfy your needs.”464 These needs include immediate consumption, or future 
planning – “to decorate your house or travel around to improve your living standard; or you 
wish to fulfil your goals of further education or starting your own business.”465  
The basic idea is to take advantage of the inflated housing price that takes the 
appreciation of the housing price for granted: 
A property owner purchased a HK$4,000,000 property with mortgage loan amount of 
HK$2,400,000 (60% of appraised property value) three years ago. Today, the latest 
appraised property value is HK$4,500,000 and the mortgage loan outstanding is 
HK$2,200,000.  The owner can… loan up to 60% of the appraised property value (i.e. 
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HK$2,700,000), deducts existing owed HK$2,200,000, the available cash out amount 
will be HK$500,000. 
Reverse mortgage is designed as a kind of retirement fund for people who are aged 55 
or above and own a property. It is provided by The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
Limited, which its shares were held by the HKSAR government. The Introduction of its 
leaflet highlights its function of being a pension as well as a shelter simultaneously. 
Reverse mortgage is a loan arrangement. It enables you to use your residential 
property (or more than one residential property) in Hong Kong as security to borrow 
from a lender. You will remain as the owner of your property and can continue to stay 
in your property for the rest of your life.466 
Based on these financial tools and the beautiful future scenario it depicts, Eva467 
proposed that, to those who are from the lower-class like her, having a house has a practical 
function. It can be a financial resource if an emergency happened to her and her family, such 
as a family member falling ill. Hence, she prioritized having a house more than achieving 
wealth accumulation. Homeownership can be used to fulfil her responsibility towards the 
family because it can become the reserve capital that her family members can rely on. 
Doris468 bought a house just before the focus group discussion. She also imagined it to be the 
self-reliant safety net under the conditions of limited social welfare and no retirement 
program from the government. 
If one doesn’t own a property, when one gets old, who are going to feed this person? 
To me, I will find it worthwhile. Just one to two months ago, I brought a property. 
That’s a real concern. You ask me if it is worthwhile? Absolutely, because it is a need. 
This image of a safety net often neglects the hardship of homeownership in history. 
For instance, the bank lending rate has been 5% since 2009. However, when the interest rate 
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increases, the burden of repaying the mortgage would increase as well. In the past, the 
interest rate of mortgage has reached almost 20% in Oct 1981, and fluctuated from 5% to 
15% throughout the 1980s and 1990s. (See Figure 5.2) The maintenance fee of 
homeownership can be high as well. Reports have shown that the elderly who achieved 
homeownership in the past faced difficulties when their apartments and the building are now 
in urgent need of renovation.469 These shortcomings have been neglected in their imagination 
towards the future with homeownership. 
 
Figure 5.2 Best Lending Rate (1980 – 2017). 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority. (2018). Monthly Statistical Bulletin (June 2018 - Issue No. 286) 
 
Underneath these two seemingly opposing ideas about homeownership as a shackle or 
a safety net is a taken for granted sense of self-reliance – you are on your own with your 
money or your asset. And these ideas can indeed coexist under the hope of waiting for the 
coming crisis when the market is still believed to be the savior of the individuals. The image 
                                                 





of the shackle can be resolved through the coming crisis as the core concern was only about 
young adult’s ability to afford the housing price. As Wendy said, she gave up the goal of 
homeownership just because she could not afford it. They have not fundamentally challenged 
the commodification of housing or the dominance of private property rights. Once these 
young adults can afford the housing price after the coming crisis, they may join the game of 
house buying as well. The savings they had can soon become the down payment if the “right” 
moment of house buying finally comes.  
5.7 Undercurrents besides House Buying 
One possibility of House Buying as a hope mechanism as shown in this chapter was a 
self-reliant subject that treats homeownership as a future safety net, which was different from 
those in the previous era who treated it as the symbol of the middle-class good life and waited 
for their turn of social upward mobility to come. House Buying is now grounded in a more 
politicized imagination of a stagnant social plane with the hope of waiting for the coming 
crisis. This hope also carries the individualization and self-governing effect while people’s 
worries and discontent is imagined to be solved by being an individual subject of self-reliance 
– they can continue to work hard and save in their present condition even if they are 
discontented about the status quo. When the coming crisis comes, they can then catch their 
personal chance of homeownership with their savings even though the future of the Hong 
Kong society as a whole is gloomy. Being stuck in an imagined stagnant social plane with a 
collapsed housing ladder does not necessarily turn people into an enemy of the established 
order. 
Yet, this hope mechanism is delicate. Undercurrents of skepticism about the market 
and House Buying already exist. In the focus group discussions, we can observe at least three 





places as an alternative, and taking the crisis to be a rupture in the capitalist system. First, in 
the past, the housing ladder assumed an upwardly mobile path, and public rental housing was 
at the bottom of the ladder. The widespread perception was that those capable should not rely 
on the social resources from the government. Now public rental housing is perceived not as a 
shameful choice for the lower class, but is also seen as an important safety net among the 
young adults. King470 argued that the young applicants for public housing are just keeping 
open an emergency door for themselves. 
I think those young people who apply for public housing want to prepare an 
emergency door. They submit the application and queue up for the public housing unit 
first. If by the time they get the unit and they don't need it, they can just give it back. 
Thus, you won't know what will happen a few years later. Perhaps your family finance 
will fall apart in the future, and at that time you really need that housing unit. No one 
knows. I am not someone who prepares for the future, but at least public housing unit 
can shelter you. And that's important. 
Likewise, Wing’s471 father also advised her to apply for public housing. She said, “it 
is just for ‘security’. If an emergency happens, even for a medical student, it's a viable choice 
even if one must wait for 10 years.” Gigi,472 a woman in her late 20s, said she did not aim at 
achieving social upward mobility, and celebrated the quality of public housing. 
The private housing is now too expensive. I asked my little sister to apply for public 
housing together with me immediately after she reaches the age of 18. Because in this 
era, I am sure that I can't buy a house. In the past, people look upward. But now, 
having a public housing unit is good enough. 
Migration is another viable choice. Opting out of the Hong Kong society and 
migrating to another place has become a viable option besides being self-reliant through the 
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market. Katy473 said that even if she won a lottery of a few million HK dollars, she would 
rather use the money to migrate to Taiwan, a place with Chinese culture and democratic 
system while the living costs and housing price are much lower than Hong Kong. The 
stagnant social plane and the political impotence causes her despair about living in Hong 
Kong: “it’s like I cannot find a reason to put effort into this place. It’s like whatever I do is 
meaningless, whatever I do will be in vain.” Another interviewee in the same group, John,474 
said that even if the economic prospects of Hong Kong are good and going in a good 
direction, this doesn’t mean that you’ll have to stay in Hong Kong. “You have other options 
like, I can choose to do agriculture in the countryside in other cities.” Katy immediately 
added her discontent over the inequality in the social system as she cannot share the benefits, 
“even the economy is good, but we cannot get a share of economic success. The rich will 
continue to be rich, and the poor will continue to be poor. Their richness is not relevant to 
me.” 
The last approach welcomes the “coming crisis” not as an investment opportunity, but 
as a rupture to the status quo. In this view, the local population should stop participating in 
the distorted system in which one can only barely survive in the existing system, instead of 
living in the full sense. Jaden475 represented a voice among participants that welcomes the 
revolution: “So what's the point to go after this kind of survival? We just keep looping in an 
endless grey cycle.” Crisis was welcomed in this image, yet consisted of an imagination of a 
“destruction” of the existing system and status quo as it is socially unjust. Its stability will 
reproduce more injustice. “If we don’t shake it and break it down, we cannot change the 
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situation. This distorted system may let us survive in a disrespected way. But to me, let’s 
finish off everything and end the current system, so that we can start a new round of the 
game.” Yet this view that equates the coming crisis as a revolution against status quo is not 
the dominant voice in the focus group. Jaden is the only interviewee among the 73 
interviewees who actively articulated the need of revolution to disrupt the system. 
At this moment, the dominant hope mechanism is still about waiting for the coming 
crisis; yet young adults are exploring other possibilities as well. The above alternative voices 
are visible, and have not encountered serious objections in the focus group interviews even 
when the “destruction” of the status quo was raised. This was unimaginable between the 
1970s and the 1990s when maintaining the stability of the status quo was the consensus 
across the population. With a stronger sense of social awareness, people can indeed 
understand the reasons behind such a claim even if they do not agree with overthrowing the 
status quo. In the next chapter, we are going to venture into the theoretical discussion of 







Chapter 6 – Discussion 
In this conclusion I aim to extend the discussion of House Buying and, in doing so, 
venture into the theoretical debates about hope and ask, what is the nature of hope in House 
Buying? Ghassan Hage proposes that the debate of hope is generally divided into two camps 
– hope as passivity and joy-deferral, and hope as activity and life-affirming.476 The first camp 
is oriented around criticism of the dream of achieving the good life goal. This is based on the 
premise that the external goal will divert us from addressing our life problems in the present. 
This camp asks, is hope towards the good life merely an empty promise that holds us back 
from reality and reckoning with social inequality? The second camp of thinkers considers 
how the go-getting, active social subject is formed. It discusses how the creative life force 
may be channeled. 
In the sections that follow, I will first outline the claims behind these two ways of 
thinking about hope. As I have shown in this research, rather than discussing if the nature of 
hope is good or bad at the abstract level, I discuss the concrete mechanism of hope that is 
often intertwined with the context of a society. By approaching hope from this angle, we can 
see that both types of hope can indeed be part of the same hope mechanism, highlights 
different elements – the life goal and the subject formation. In other words, the proposal of a 
hope mechanism in this research reconciles the dichotomy by putting these two elements 
together. It gives us a fuller picture of how hope is produced, and traces the historical, social 
and cultural context that makes such hope mechanism emerge and work. 
                                                 





Finally, I evaluate if hope from waiting for the coming crisis is necessarily “bad” 
because of its individualizing and self-governing effects. My answer is ambivalent. This form 
of hope apparently is passive for sustaining the status quo, but it also serves as a valuable 
resource for young adults to survive the negative experiences that arise from what they 
perceive to be a stagnant social context. This hope has not erased their social discontent. 
Once the crisis comes and if it is beyond their imagined domesticated scope, the consequence 
could be very different from the present assumptions they have in mapping their future. 
6.1 Passive and Active Hope 
Nietzsche reminded us long ago that not all goals are worth pursuing. For instance, an 
ascetic ideal is a goal in which life “turns against itself” and “denies itself”, for such a life is 
merely a bridge for the religious hope of the ascetic priest.477 But people still pursue it to 
overcome their existential crisis that life has no meaning at all. To cope with this 
meaninglessness, no matter what that goal is, “he needs a goal – and he will sooner will 
nothingness than not will at all”.478 This kind of hope is not restricted to religion. We can 
observe it also in the promise of delayed gratification which is common in modern middle-
class values. In this version, one tolerates the immediate suffering and social inequality for 
the goal of future social upward mobility. Suffering is inevitable in the journey, and joy lies 
far away at the top of the ladder or the end of the tunnel. 
This joy-deferral or passive hope is often questioned for its political implications; it 
encourages passivity and limits our imagination of future possibilities. Braune479 uses 
consumerism as an example of this. She argues that consumerism packages objects one after 
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another, through which commodities function as future goals for people to desire. However, 
to her, the consumers are passive – what they are aiming for are merely someone else’s 
design. In her words, they merely want “to ‘drink in’ the world rather than transform it”,480 
and this displaces “the experience of creativity and of being in relationship with others”.481 
These objects distract our attention from the present social problems, and discourage us from 
improving our self and the social world. As a result, social inequality is tolerated and the 
status quo is legitimated. 
Likewise, Hage proposes that capitalism “hegemonises the ideological content of 
hope so it becomes almost universally equated with dreams of better-paid jobs, better life-
style, more commodities”.482 Ahmed also summarizes a list of good life goals, including “a 
stable relationship, a successful job, a beautiful house, a child”.483 Most often these goals are 
articulated with one type of dream – upward mobility. This upward-looking dream becomes 
the shared cultural imagination that people use to make sense of their ways of social mobility. 
Acquiring or accumulating certain things and reaching this or that milestone is linked to the 
sense of movement on the social ladder. By observing these benchmarks, people can make 
sense of the direction of their movement – upward, downward or horizontal. 
Nietzsche, Spinoza and Fromm proposed another form of hope – hope as active and 
life-affirming. In this tradition, hope is not merely a noun for the belief in achieving socially 
assigned goals and acquiring the subsequent benchmarks of the good life. Rather, hope 
assumes a social subject that embodies effort, devotion and investment. It should also be 
understood as a verb that represents the active action of creativity and courage to connect the 
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social with one’s life.484 Drawing from Spinoza, contrary to passive hope of acquiring 
external objects, Fromm suggests that hope should be understood as a person’s will “to 
develop his reason and his objectivity of a sense of himself that is based on the experience of 
his productive energy”.485 A sane society is one that furthers people’s capacity to love, to 
work and create, Fromm advocated. And if hope is not a static prediction of the future as 
delayed gratification or ascetic ideal implies, then it involves a temporality that views the 
present moment as “a state of pregnancy”486 from which “possibilities for the future are 
inscribed into the conditions of the present”.487 This sense of time is open-ended, like Bloch’s 
insistence, “hope must be unconditionally disappointable”.488 The radical open-endedness 
urges people to bring the present and the future together, because what we do and invest in 
today helps materialize our future. 
Hage points to the joy that one receives from achieving betterment in this active hope. 
“Joy comes from a simple change to the better in the state of the body. That is, it is an 
experience of reaching a higher stage in the capacities to act, associate and deploy oneself in 
or with one’s environment”.489 Sennett’s idea of craftsmanship490 can help us further 
elaborate this perspective. In his conception, a craftsman (like a cellist) gains self-realization 
through devoting time, effort and affect into an external, objectified work in a disinterested 
attitude – doing something good for its own sake. For instance, a cellist imagines his/her 
future work in the process of practicing and making. He/she also carefully examines and 
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evaluates the finished product, and reflects on the quality of one’s skills. Thus, craftwork 
becomes the object that accumulates time, effort and affect. It is the crystallized labor and the 
objectified self that closely connects the past, present and future in a hermeneutic circle.491 
Through devoting to and investing in the craftwork, one enjoys betterment by embodying the 
improved skills. He/she gains dignity and establishes character from the objective evaluation 
of the quality of work that represents him/herself. People can then expect future improvement 
in their ability and capacity within such a society. 
6.2 Hope as the Resource of Survival 
Hage, while distinguishing the above two approaches, proposes three ways of 
conducting research on hope. The first way is to criticize how “capitalism reduces the ethic of 
joy to an ethic of hope and deferral”,492 and take up the political project to reinstate the active 
hope that affirms life. The second way is to criticize the ideologies of capitalism that “reduce 
hope to dreams of upward mobility”.493 My research follows the third way that begins “by 
accepting whatever hope capitalism has to offer”494 and looks at how even this “truncated” 
hope is produced and distributed unevenly amongst the population. 
My research has not argued if hope is genuinely passive or active in nature. I 
understand that life force has always been channeled through the socially defined life goals 
and subject formation, and both passivity and activity of hope co-exist in any given time and 
space, yet with different weighting. The objective in this research is to reveal the historically 
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contingent context and mechanism that makes the current life goals and subject seem to be a 
natural, unshakable truth. 
In the context of Hong Kong, House Buying in the Formative Period happens to 
consist of both external life goals and internal self-reliant subject, and was connected to the 
imagination of the social plane and the imagined line or path that directs the subject towards 
the life goal. Being self-reliant as an active project has been connected more to individualism 
than to collectivism in this context, and was indeed achievable to a certain extent for a limited 
time. Those homebuyers in this period perceived themselves to be the active author of their 
life in the acquisition of an apartment – an external object as material proof – following years 
of effort. They enjoyed the pleasure of choice and independence in making good decisions of 
working hard and investing wisely. 
In recent years, House Buying has become increasingly unattainable, like the carrot in 
front of the donkey, and young adults have lost the sense of being the active author of their 
life. Berlant495 uses the concept “cruel optimism” to describe the attachment towards 
unattainable life goals. This attachment simultaneously sustains people’s existing ways of 
living, yet obstructs their “flourishing”.496 My research offers an empirical answer to the way 
of upholding the attachment to the unattainable dream of homeownership – through the 
discourse of “waiting for the coming crisis”, House Buying as a hope mechanism still 
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manages to sustain and produce the political effects of individualization and self-governing 
amid increasing social inequality, even though it has become delicate. 
Is the hope in waiting for the coming crisis necessarily a “bad” thing because of these 
effects?497 I am ambivalent when reflecting on my own experience. I have been a part-time 
lecturer for four different academic institutions since 2012. The contracts are temporary and I 
will not be notified in advance if the course that I am teaching is not going to be offered in 
the coming semester. Every several months, I will have to rely on my personal network to 
find the next work opportunity. Sometimes I imagine myself to be a pub singer in different 
bars and pubs when I get on the stage in the lecture theatre. The sense of insecurity is 
deepened when the private rental housing estate that I am living is rumored to be part of the 
next reconstruction project by one of the real estate conglomerates. My parents and I may 
become homeless as we are only tenants and may not be compensated. And our income 
exceeds the income ceiling to apply for the public rental housing. The present life and living 
standard is indeed satisfactory, yet we never know how to connect to the future. This is the 
feeling I share with my interviewees about the depiction of a pool of stagnant water. This 
depressing feeling is somehow compensated by the hope that one day I can finish the doctoral 
dissertation, become middle class, and can save more money. Most importantly, as my 
mother tells me constantly, “when the next financial crisis comes, then you can catch the 
chance and buy a house”. 
I understand the problems underneath such hope and belief in House Buying (which I 
have already discussed in Chapter 5). And the unequal social structure which “a certain 
available hope for someone is built on the sucking of the very possibility of hope from 
                                                 





someone else’s”498 has not been challenged. However, we should not underestimate the use of 
hope. Even though House Buying has lost its active role in affirming people’s life 
achievement, it still helps people survive through the shared sense of social stagnation and 
political impotence. I gain this insight from Zigon’s ethnographic research499 in the Muscovite 
context under a moral breakdown – “those moments when social and moral life is reflectively 
and consciously called into question and posed as a problem.”500 The interviewees in Zigon’s 
research were aware of the contingency in realizing the hopes, which depended on “God and 
the Church/Seminary”.501 But as a day-to-day project they act continuously, to “pray, confess, 
attend classes, study hard, actively avoid alcohol”.502 Through these actions, they continue to 
prepare “the best possible situation” for the realization of hope.503 Thus, in his treatment, 
hope is a kind of resource for a day-to-day project of living that “is not necessarily aimed at 
the future good, but primarily at the perseverance of a sane life”.504 This way of treating hope 
was grounded in the broader historical context since the Soviet period. At that time, “the call 
to work on oneself”505 had been prevalent in everyday and institutional contexts. This extends 
into today’s conceptions of personhood in post-Soviet era. In the case of Hong Kong, in the 
place of “praying” and “confessing”, the relatively better educated young adults like me are 
working and saving, and preparing for “the best possible situation” for the coming crisis. 
Zigon focuses on the daily use of hope in enabling one to continue to work and move 
forward. Here I share his proposal, that we must not understand hope only as a potential 
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revolutionary force, but also as a resource for people to maintain sanity and fight against 
despair. 
I hesitate, however, to limit hope to an attitude that is always or for the most part 
hope for something better or ideal. For my research suggests that hope as articulated 
by my Muscovite interlocutors is not primarily aimed at a better life or attaining the 
good. Nor did anyone articulate utopian, activist, or progressive aspirations. Rather, 
much of the hope articulated to me was similar to how some have recently described 
agency as an aim toward continuity, stability, or living sanely.506 
I am aware of the effects of individualization and self-governing in that they can be 
utilized to maintain the status quo, uphold the capitalist system and fuel the housing market. 
However, we should not forget that having hope through “waiting for the coming crisis” has 
not erased young adults’ discontent over the social system. After all, at this present moment it 
only channels our unhappiness towards being self-reliant in the housing market. The 
discontent has not gone away, and should be seen as the water in a reservoir that continues to 
amass if the coming crisis does not come. Social discontent can be channeled otherwise when 
a critical event happens. The present condition of stagnation reminds me of Hobsbawm’s 
conclusion in The Age of Empire, when the wars in the 1910s appeared “as a kind of 
deliverance, a hope that something different will come” that could end “the superficialities 
and frivolities of bourgeois society”.507 As I discussed in the last section of Chapter 5, the 
traces of other discourses have already been there once the critical event happens. But we are 
never sure what different future this event may bring. 
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